NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1. Composition textbooks such as Bazerman’s *Involved*, Hatch’s *Arguing in Communities*, Klooster and Bloem’s *The Writer’s Community*, and Trimbur’s *Call to Write*, to name a few, increasingly acknowledge and present writing and invention as thoroughly situational and cooperative activities. Trimbur’s book, in particular, applies current theories of genre to teach students how to write different texts, and has enjoyed some success. And an increasing number of textbooks use ethnographic techniques to teach students how to identify and examine scenes of writing.

2. For a more detailed account of the conditions that helped construct this view of the autonomous author, including the role of the printing press and the emergence of copyright law, which designated the text as the property of its author, see M. Rose 1993 and Woodmansee and Jaszi 1994.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

1. In describing genres as sites of action, we must acknowledge that genres do not only help us make certain activities happen; they also help prevent other activities from happening. As such, genres function as sites of articulation and silence. What cannot be articulated is as significant as what can be, and any theorization of genre needs to account for the power and politics of genre. For more on the relation between genre and the politics of articulation, see Paré (2002) and Schryer (2002).

2. In literary studies, scholarship in cultural studies is a notable and more recent exception. Scholars in cultural studies recognize and treat all texts, literary or otherwise, as cultural artifacts, which reflect and reproduce cultural contexts and
everyday social practices. For cultural studies work that examines theories of the everyday, see Michel de Certeau’s *The Practice of Everyday Life* (1984).

3. As I am describing it, the genre function is akin to what Pierre Bourdieu calls *habitus*, which he defines in *The Logic of Practice* as “the system of structured, structuring dispositions” (1990, 52) and in *Practical Reason* as a kind of “practical sense for what is to be done in a given situation—what is called in sport a ‘feel’ for the game, that is, the art of anticipating the future of the game, which is inscribed in the present state of play” (1998, 25). As Bourdieu is careful to note, the habitus is not only a symbolic structure, but is rather “constituted in practice and is always oriented towards practical functions” (1990, 52).

4. For those who, like Benedetto Croce (1968) and Maurice Blanchot (1959), perceive literary texts as being indeterminate, an expression of unbounded imagination, genre is an institutional threat to literary texts and authors. Echoing in part the formalist and new critical dream of a free-standing text made up of its own internal relations and subject to its own structural integrity, Blanchot perceives genre as a threat to the text’s autonomy. He writes: “The book alone is important, as it is, far from genre, outside rubrics . . . under which it refuses to be arranged and to which it denies the power to fix its place and to determine its form” (qtd. in Perloff 1989). Even poststructuralist critiques of formalism subordinate genres. Questioning the stability of structures and exposing the contradictions and fissures within what appears to be a self-contained and coherent text, poststructuralist theorists have highlighted the instability and arbitrariness of meaning. In relation to such textual indeterminacy, genre exists tenuously. For example, Jacques Derrida, who in his “Law of Genre” acknowledges that “every text participates in one or several genres; there is no genre-less text” (1980, 65), insists that the “law” of genre, as with any other kind of law, is an arbitrary and conservative attempt to impose order on what is ultimately indeterminate.

Even scholars such as Cohen (1989), Hirsch (1967), Perloff (1989), and Rosmarin (1985) who recognize the
heuristic function of genre nonetheless subordinate it to an *ad hoc* status, one that not only classifies but also explains texts. These critics are careful to note, however, that even though genre may exercise some explanatory power over literary texts, it does not interfere with their autonomy. Literary texts are produced and exist independently of genres; genres function only as critical apparatuses. Genre is, therefore, the critic’s tool or heuristic, a lens the critic uses to interpret literary texts. The same text can be subject to different genre-lenses without compromising its imagined integrity.

5. Carolyn Miller takes up this idea of genre as chronotope when she explains, “genres impose structure on a given action in space-time” (1994a, 75). For more on genre and the way it shapes and regulates space-time, see Bakhtin (1981), Bazerman (1994b), Schryer (2002), and Yates and Orlikowski (2002). Of course, the idea that genres constitute certain space-time configurations is not as recent or novel as it may seem. The classical triad of lyric, epic, and dramatic, which can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle and which Genette calls “archigenres,” has received considerable attention in literary studies (see, for example, Frye 1957; Genette 1992; Scholes 1975; Welleck and Warren 1942). The triad has served as the basis for a great deal of literary generic categorizations, and has often been associated with space-time configurations, especially with spatial presence and temporal perspective. Lyric, for instance, is often defined as subjective, dramatic as objective, and epic as subjective-objective (Genette 1992, 38), so that in each formation we have a different notion of presence—each, that is, articulates a different spatial dimension in which action takes place. Within lyric, the writer exists in spatial proximity to his or her text, being in the text, so to speak, whereas in the dramatic, the action takes place in its own spatial context that determines the interaction between two independent actors. Spatially, we equate objectivity with distance and subjectivity with proximity and intimacy. Temporally, lyric is often associated with the present, dramatic with the future, and epic with the past (Genette 1992, 47-49), so that each archigenre represents a particular
way of conceiving of literary temporality that, needless to say, will affect literary actions within that temporality. So the lyric, dramatic, and epic archigenres orient the way that time, space, and the activities that occur within them are configured and enacted in different literary texts.

6. This is particularly the case for scholars working in cultural studies. Stephen Greenblatt, for example, introduces the special issue of the journal *Genre* dealing with the power of form in the construction of Renaissance culture by claiming that “the study of genre is an exploration of the poetics of culture” (1982, 6). Similarly, Terry Threadgold argues that genre “cannot be treated in isolation from the social realities and processes which it contributes to maintaining (and could be used to subvert)” (1989, 103).

7. For a more comprehensive discussion of the difficulties associated with the concept of discourse community and how scholars in genre theory respond to these difficulties, see Bawarshi, Devitt, and Reiff’s “Materiality and Genre in the Study of Discourse Community.”

8. Thomas O. Beebee, defining genre as the “use-value” of texts, in part applies what Bakhtin claims for speech genres to written genres. For Beebee, “primarily, genre is the precondition for the creation and the reading of texts” (1994, 250), because genre provides the ideological context in which a text and its participants function and attain cultural value: “Genre gives us not understanding in the abstract and passive sense but use in the pragmatic and active sense” (14). The kind of use-value a genre represents depends on who its users are, on what practices it makes possible, and on its relation to other genres within a sphere of speech communication. It is within this social and rhetorical economy that a genre attains its use-value, making genre one of the bearers, articulators, and reproducers of culture—in short, ideological. In turn, genres are what make texts ideological, endowing them with a social use-value. As ideological-discursive formations, then, genres delimit all language—not just poetic language—into what Beebee calls the “possibilities of its usage.”
9. In raising genre to the level of register, I follow J.R. Martin (1992, 1997) who defines genres as textured relations of field, mode, and tenor. In so doing, I do not mean to suggest that genre constitutes or accounts for the entire social sphere that we call culture, or, for that matter, that genre accounts for the social sphere of the university or even a classroom within the university. Each of these social spheres, in addition to other social and material forces at work within them, contains multiple, sometimes competing genres that, grouped together, allow us to map these spheres rhetorically. Indeed, the genre function itself is a function of these larger social spheres, at once reflecting, reproducing, and potentially transforming them. By claiming that genres function as registers, then, I am only referring to the ways in which genres maintain and articulate specific relations of field, tenor, and mode within these social spheres.

10. Others working in genre studies have also considered the impact of Giddens’s theory of structuration on theories of genre. Carol Berkenkotter and Thomas Huckin were among the first to do so in their “Rethinking Genre From a Sociocognitive Perspective” (1993), positing that genre is both constitutive of social structure and generative of social practice (495). See also Yates and Orlikowski (1992) and Giltrow and Valiquette (1994).

11. Not all scholars working in rhetorical genre studies are willing to make such a claim for genre. For instance, John Swales, whose *Genre Analysis* has contributed so much to rhetorical genre studies, locates genre as one of six characteristics shared by members of a discourse community in order to achieve their goals. As Swales puts it, “genres are communicative vehicles for the achievement of goals” (1990, 46). Yet Swales overlooks what his own analysis seems to reveal: the functional as well as epistemological nature of genres. For example, he concludes that the research article (RA) is a “quite different genre to the laboratory report and has its own quite separate conventions, its own processes of literary reasoning and its own standards of arguments” (1990, 118-19).
He then delineates these conventions in order to teach students how to write RAs. Yet he does not consider or explain what these differences reveal about the way each genre sets up its own social and rhetorical representation of science or, for that matter, how the different processes of reasoning that each genre allows affect how its writers recognize and experience their subject matter or themselves as subjects. All we are left with is Swales’ suggestive claim that the RA is a “remarkable phenomenon, so cunningly engineered by rhetorical machining that it somehow still gives an impression of being but a simple description of relatively untransmitted raw material” (1990, 125). We are left to wonder about how the RA actually represents a particular space-time configuration of laboratory practice as well as about how the “impression” that the genre creates actually shapes its users’ versions of laboratory practice in certain RA-mediated ways.

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

1. As Rebecca Moore Howard points out, autonomy and agency are not synonymous: “The issue of autonomy is an issue of whether the writer acts alone, whereas the issue of agency is one of whether the writer acts or is in action” (1999, 46). Following Howard, I do not think we deny the agency of the writer by denying its autonomy.

2. It is tempting to think about “freewriting” as a genre that denies its status and function as a genre, a free and unmediated space for the exploration of ideas. Perceived as such, freewriting might be understood as a genre that invites its users to fantasize about its non-existence, which only makes it a more extreme case of the fantasy that all genres desire their users to maintain. As Edward Said suggests, “In a human life . . . it might appear possible to believe in the freedom of one’s initiative or of one’s action; at the same time, when such freedom is viewed from a more accurate perspective, the same activity is seen to be unfree” (1975, 133).

3. Even more recent incarnations of process theory, which problematize the notion of the writer as stable and coherent,
still define writing in terms of its writer. For example, in her “Places to Stand: The Reflective Writer-Teacher-Writer in Composition” (1999), Wendy Bishop describes the role of what she calls the writer who teaches and the teacher who writes. Implicit in her definitions of “writer” and “writing” throughout the essay is a focus on the figure of the writer present in the writing. According to Bishop, teachers who write are distinguished by their interest “in the act of writing from a writer’s perspective” (1999, 14).

4. This modern epistemology, based in empiricism, was heavily influenced by John Locke. In his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, published in 1690, Locke argued that individuals, born with no innate ideas, gain knowledge through accumulated experiences. Through sensory impressions, the mind stores simple ideas and then, with the help of the understanding or reason, associates and categorizes them into more complex, abstract ideas. If the logical faculties of the mind are functioning accurately—that is, if there is no interference from such “illogical” faculties as the emotions or imagination—then an individual’s accumulated knowledge and understanding of the world should reflect and be confirmed by other individuals’ knowledge and understanding. Because words are how individuals label and communicate ideas, Locke fears rhetoric’s influence. Rhetoric, what Locke calls “that powerful instrument of error and deceit” (1992, 268), is a threat to such an empirical epistemology, for “if we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that all the art of rhetoric, *besides order and clearness*, all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment, and so indeed are perfect cheats” (Locke 268; my emphasis). In Locke’s formulation of rhetoric, a formulation that was to influence later eighteenth and nineteenth century views of rhetorical invention, rhetoric was no longer a generative art but a regulative skill involving order and clearness.

5. In his now classic definition, Richard Young describes some key characteristics of current-traditional rhetoric: “The emphasis
on the composed product rather than the composing process; the analysis of discourse in words, sentences, and paragraphs; the classification of discourse into description, narration, exposition, and argument; the strong concern with usage (syntax, spelling, punctuation) and with style (economy, clarity, emphasis); the preoccupation with the informal essay and the research paper; and so on” (1978, 31). Sharon Crowley adds: “Current-traditional rhetoric occults the mentalism that underlies its introspective theory of invention,” assuming that ideas and subjects exist prior to their representation in discourse, which becomes a graphic embodiment of the invention process (1990, 13). For an overview of current-traditional rhetoric and its impact on the teaching of writing, see James Berlin (1987), Sharon Crowley (1990), and Robert Connors (1997).

6. Of course, it was well before the 1950s that scholars began exploring the cognitive and creative workings of the mind. By 1790, for instance, Immanuel Kant was arguing that we are born with apriori cognitive categories which help us conceptualize what we experience through our sense impressions, so that our understanding is not necessarily a reflection of the natural world as Descartes had assumed. In addition, only twenty years after Locke published his Essay, Joseph Addison was already wondering if the imagination was indeed as dangerous and distorting as Locke had suggested. While he acknowledges, following Locke, that our ideas are derived from external impressions imposed on our senses, he also suggests that we gain a great deal of pleasure when our minds extend and transform these impressions through the imagination. In so doing, Addison endowed the imagination with a creative power. So did Edward Young, who, in Conjectures on Original Composition (1759), presages the romantic movement by arguing that some individuals are endowed with innate genius that allows them not only to imitate but also to originate (1992, 332-33). To counter the passivity of imitation, Young concludes by advising individuals (in terms strikingly similar to those Rohman uses a little more than two hundred years later) to “therefore dive deep into thy bosom; learn the
depth, extent, bias, and full forte of thy mind; contract full intimacy with the stranger within thee” (336).

7. Recent work in creativity theory also acknowledges such formations. For instance, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi and his colleagues have described what they call the Domain Individual Field Interaction (DIFI) model to offset the tendency in creativity research to locate creativity in a person (Feldman et al 1994, 24). In order to function creatively within a field, an individual must be familiar with its organized body of knowledge or domain, including its “representational techniques,” “symbol systems,” “special terms,” and “technologies” (Feldman et al., 22). The “locus of creativity,” Csikszentmihalyi claims, is the dynamic interaction between the domain, the individual, and the field (Feldman et al., 21). For other examples, see Kuhn (1970), Beaugrande (1979), and Weisberg (1993).

8. In describing genres as situated topoi, I am expanding the classical definition of topoi not only to include general sets of questions through which a rhetor can explore any given subject (topoi as analytical tools) but also, as the name suggests, to include locales within which such exploration takes place. By comparing genres to topoi, I am suggesting that genres represent situated sites of inquiry and action, habits as well as habitats for recognizing, exploring, and enacting arguments, situations, and identities. I do not intend the comparison to be literal, only to suggest that, like the topoi, genres are situated social and rhetorical sites in which invention takes place.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

1. My main concern in this and the following chapter is to describe and analyze how genres shape and enable writers as social actors who rhetorically enact certain subjectivities, relations, and practices as they write. The question of degree, of how much genres influence writers, may be impossible to quantify. As we will shortly see, genres, both conceptually and textually, maintain social conventions for how we recognize and act in various situations. How much we as social actors are influenced by these conventions depends on factors such
as our past experiences (especially with other genres); our social positioning, including our gender, class, race, and ethnicity; our immediate circumstances; and other psychological and biological X-factors. All these factors shape how we interpret generic conventions, but the fact of these conventions remains as a necessary condition within and against which we enact our intentions and subjectivities.

2. What becomes apparent in such places as Florida is that even those contexts that seem outside of our rhetorical range are nonetheless rhetorically bounded. The difference between so-called “wild” and “not-wild” environments is as much rhetorical as it is geographical. We recognize a place as wild mainly because we designate it as such, and we act in such a place according to accepted social norms. These norms are rhetorically rehearsed for us in such places as National Parks’ visitors centers which not only narrate the nature of the wilderness we are about to enter—and how, subsequently, we should behave in this environment—but also place us conceptually within this narrative/environment. In short, even in places that seem outside of rhetoric, places we call “wilderness” or “nature,” we cannot escape the power of rhetoric in shaping how we socially define, recognize, and experience our environments and ourselves in relation to them.

3. I am indebted to Teresa Tran, a pre-med student enrolled in a genre-based writing course I taught in the Spring of 1997 at the University of Kansas, for prompting my interest in the patient medical history form and for her insights into how such forms reflect and support medical assumptions. For related work in doctor patient interaction and subject formation, see Berkenkotter (2001).

4. The sketchbooks serve a similar function to what Janet Giltrow calls a “meta-genre,” which she defines as an “atmosphere of wordings and activities, demonstrated precedents or sequestered expectations—atmospheres surrounding genres” (2002, 195). But in addition to being atmospheres, the sketchbooks are themselves genres, so it might be more accurate to call them alpha genres instead.
5. As I take Giddens to mean, and as I conceive of it, reproduction is not the same as duplication. When we reproduce something, we are not producing an exact copy of it because any reproduction necessarily involves some variation. This is the case biologically, linguistically, and rhetorically. For instance, biological ecosystems are not static because they change as the organisms living within them reproduce and evolve. The same is true for genres. In helping reproduce rhetorical environments, genres also help communicants change rhetorical environments because on some level writing genres always involves some interpretation, which involves some variation.

6. As an example of how unique circumstances can over-ride situational motives, we can imagine that the patient who writes the allegory may be friends with the physician, and so the physician will recognize the allegory as more of a friendly, playful gesture, a way of signaling intimacy, rather than an act of resistance. But the effect of this genre transgression nonetheless remains a function of the genre.

7. For a related example, see Thomas Pfau’s study of lyric poetry and authorship, “The Pragmatics of Genre: Moral Theory and Lyric Authority in Hegel and Wordsworth,” in which he argues that lyric poetry is not, as popularly assumed, merely a vehicle for expressing private consciousness. For example, Wordsworth’s “Ode to Duty,” Pfau argues, “does not ‘express’ a newly discovered spiritual conviction but, instead, realigns (and thereby empowers as a cultural ‘authority’) the self with a historically proven social value, here present as an ‘iterable’ genre” (1994,154-5).

8. Anthony Paré (2002) provides a good example of how genres can create tensions that might lead to resistance and transformation. He describes the struggles northern Canadian Inuit social workers encounter as they use social work genres developed in southern, urban Canada. This use forced the Inuit workers “into a position between cultures and into the role of professional representatives of the colonial power” (63). Genres naturalize desires and ideologies, making the actions they elicit seem common sensible, but when these desires...
and ideologies encounter conflicting desires and ideologies, their illusion of common sense is fractured. This tension, however, does not necessarily lead to genre change in part because southern, urban social work genres represent dominant ideologies and desires. For examples of how genres change over time because of changes in technology, ideology, and context, see Bazerman (1988), Freedman and Smart (1997), and Popken (1999).

9. Of course, there are some positions that Michael cannot occupy without obtaining a certain social status, even if he had access to the appropriate genres. For example, he would not “become” a doctor simply because he knew how to write a prescription note, and he would not become a lawyer simply because he knew how to write a legal brief. There are roles we earn through education, election, and practice (all of which certainly involve a range of genres) that work in conjunction with the subject positions we occupy. Genres and roles are mixed in with one another, so that, for instance, a judge is someone who is shaped and enabled by both her status and her genres. Both necessarily interact.

10. I should note here that sub-genres are not the same as textual variations within a genre. Such variations are a mark of all genres. More accurately, sub-genres are typified variations within a genre that nonetheless still share significant social and rhetorical motives with that genre. Sub-genres typify their own more specific situations within the larger socio-rhetorical situations of the genre. John Swales refers to the various sub-genres that constitute a genre such as the GC as “multi-genres” (1990, 38-61).

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

1. It is worth noting here that the word “ethos” in Greek means “a habitual gathering place” (Campbell 1989, 122). Just like rhetorical strategy, then, the persona a rhetor assumes takes place within a place, a habitation or topoi, so that when rhetors invent, they are not only formulating the available means of persuasion, but also the rhetorical persona they
need to carry out that rhetorical strategy. As LeFevre explains, “ethos . . . appears in that socially created space, in the ‘between,’ the point of intersection between speaker or writer and listener or reader” (1987, 46). Considered as situated topoi, genres not only shape and enable how communicants recognize and enact social situations; genres also shape and enable how communicants recognize and enact their ethos or subjectivities within these situations.

2. With the increased use of computer technology in education, especially networked classes and distance learning, this claim becomes less generalizable. If anything, though, the emergence of the “virtual classroom” only strengthens my claims about genre and the classroom that follow.

3. It is worth noting that the FYW classroom is no more artificial than Epcot is “artificial” when compared to the “real” Florida. As I discussed in chapter 4, Epcot is as complex a rhetorical ecosystem as any wilderness-designated area. Both are rhetorical constructions, ways we define, conceptualize, and behave in our environments.

4. For this analysis, I randomly collected fifteen syllabi from colleagues at a research university and from published teaching guides. All the syllabi are from FYW courses, and reflect a balance between experienced and new teachers.

5. The examples I analyze in this section are culled from my examination of fifteen randomly collected writing prompts from experienced and new teachers of FYW at a research university.

6. I reprint this and the following student excerpts as they appear in the students’ essays, errors and all.

NOTES ON CHAPTER SIX

1. Certainly, a great deal has happened to mark the return of rhetoric since the FYW course was first developed at Harvard in 1874. Fred Newton Scott at the University of Michigan fought and was successful for years during the early part of the twentieth century in maintaining a program in rhetoric, producing some of the country’s only Ph.Ds in rhetoric. And the 1960s witnessed what James Berlin (1987) and others have
referred to as a renaissance of rhetoric—what Ken Macrorie, then editor of *College Composition and Communication*, dubbed the “new rhetoric” in 1964. In fact, at the 1963 Conference on College Composition and Communication, the “Rhetoric in Freshman English” workshop, led in part by Wayne Booth, Virginia Burke, Francis Christensen, Edward P.J. Corbett, and Richard Young, passed the following two resolutions: “Resolved, that rhetoric, generally conceived as effective adaptation of writing skills to particular ends and/or audiences, be accepted as an integral part of the freshman course” and “Rhetorical principles should be the organizational principle of the freshman English course and the evaluating criteria for grading student papers” (qtd. in Connors 1997, 206). Yet, while the rhetorical turn has had a significant effect on the increased interest in rhetorical theory in literary and nonliterary studies as well as the sciences over the last forty or so years, and while it has played a major role in helping establish composition studies as an academic, not just a teaching, subject, it did not have as great an impact on writing instruction. As David Fleming has recently argued, the revival of rhetoric remains a scholarly phenomenon, one marked by “relative failure at the level of undergraduate education” (1998, 169).

2. I am aware of what post-structuralist theories have taught us, that we cannot escape structure even when we try to observe or even critique structure. There is no structure-free stance, and I do not presume such a stance for FYW. I do argue, however, that its position within English departments (which share, if anything, a focus on critical language study) affords the course the kind of rhetorical vantage that can position it within a structure while allowing it to observe what Derrida has called the structurality of that structure (1992).

3. Amy J. Devitt, Mary Jo Reiff, and I describe and develop these steps in much greater detail in a composition textbook we are currently completing tentatively called *Scenes of Writing: Genre Acts* (forthcoming, Longman), a book that teaches students to read and write their way into different scenes of writing—academic, public, and workplace—through their genres.
4. Before students write their argument essays, I lead the class in a collective genre analysis of the argument essay, in which we use the guidelines for analyzing genres to identify and interrogate the goals, values, and assumptions embedded in this FYW genre and the position it invites them to assume in relation to the subject matter. This allows the students and me to examine what it means to make academic arguments.

5. For more arguments on behalf of the explicit teaching of genre in writing courses, which involves exposing the formal and rhetorical features of genres and articulating their underlying social motives and assumptions, see, for example, Christie (1988); Fahnestock (1993); Lovitt and Young (1997); Maimon (1983); and Williams and Colomb (1993).

6. I want to emphasize here that my pedagogy does not aim for assimilation into genred sites of action; it aims, rather, for a critical understanding and participation. I have discovered that as students begin to uncover the desires, subjectivities, and activities embedded in a genre’s rhetorical conventions, they not only develop the ability to reproduce the genre more effectively; they also develop the desire to change it. Teresa Tran, for example, who studied the PMHF in my course, recognized something empowering in genre analysis when she used it to uncover how doctors rhetorically and materially treat patients as embodied objects. She insisted that when she became a doctor, she would lobby the American Medical Association to change the PMHF under the assumption that a change in the genre’s rhetorical features would result in a change in the social practices these feature make possible. Indeed, genre literacy and critical literacy go hand-in-hand.