Postprocess tenets have been considerably more influential within the scholarly discourse(s) of composition and writing studies than has been acknowledged to date. In some cases, they have even functioned as “unformulated conventions,” widely shared though generally un-acknowledged conceptual premises. To justify these claims, I have dis-entangled the tenets from the category that has been used to join them together, postprocess, then identified their prevalence in scholarly discourses that are not commonly considered to be postprocess. I will apply that procedure in Chapter 5, as I trace the origins of contemporary “postcomposition” approaches to writing instruction, particularly writing studies and/or writing about writing pedagogies, through postprocess. I’ll also employ a similar operation in Chapter 6, as I demonstrate that the dominant contemporary theories of invention are postprocess approaches. In both of those cases, I hope to show that postprocess represents the un-named or un-acknowledged “umbrella” category that might join together those otherwise disparate intellectual formations. While scholars certainly benefit from distinguishing ecological approaches to composition from posthumanist ones, I believe that there’s also something to be gained by acknowledging the underlying externalist (and thus postprocess) inventional scheme that each pre-supposes, then by separating them off from internalist (and thus Process) inventional schemes. But, this is not the only way to demonstrate the heretofore unacknowledged impacts of postprocess principles.

Unlike Process, which can trace its lineage through two quasi-manifestos, Barriss Mills’ 1953 “Writing as Process” and Donald Murray’s 1972 “Teach Writing as a Process Not Product,” those who coined the terms post-process and postprocess didn’t do so to characterize their own theories of writing and/or approaches to writing instruction. Nor, with the exception of Judith Langer’s relatively inconsequential 1984 usage, did they attempt to inaugurate a new era of research or approach to instruction. Instead, the terms post-process and postprocess were applied retroactively to pre-existing works. Thus, postprocess principles must have been circulating through (at least some branches of) the discipline before anything had been deemed post-/postprocess. In the last chapter, I demonstrated that interpretive conceptions of writing circulated widely before writing
is interpretive found its place in postprocess’ “three-part mantra.” To do so, I focused on the works of Martin Nystrand and Louise Wetherbee Phelps, both of whom rightly positioned their own works as representative examples of larger scholarly endeavors, but neither of whom has been commonly acknowledged as a postprocess pioneer.

In this chapter, I will trace an alternate genealogy of postprocess writing theory and pedagogy. When Anthony Paré identified a post-process pedagogical approach in his 1994 “Toward a Post-Process Pedagogy; or, What’s Theory Got to Do with It?,” he offered a name to a series of pedagogical methods, grounded in a rigorous conceptual framework, already being applied by a coterie of scholars—Russell Hunt, James Reither, and Douglas Vipond—at Saint Thomas University in Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada. In many respects, what Paré calls a post-process pedagogy could just as easily have been called a Saint Thomas pedagogy or a Hunt-Reither-Vipond pedagogy; those scholars are that central to Paré’s formulation.

Before proceeding onward, I would voice an important caution. Throughout this book, I am distinguishing between post-process, as introduced by John Trimbur and defined as the “leftwing trajectory of the social turn,” and postprocess, as introduced by Irene Ward and defined as an externalist and paralogic conception of writing (Trimbur, “Taking” 109). I want to affirm, then, that Paré’s notion of post-process much more closely resembles what I am calling postprocess than what I am calling post-process. Indeed, although I am examining Hunt, Reither, and Vipond in their own, separate chapter, they would fit just as well in any of my three other genealogies of postprocess. Like the scholars I examined in the previous chapter, they aimed to (re-)integrate transactive theories of reading into theories of writing. As should become clear, they belong equally well within genealogies of writing studies and writing about writing that I will present in the next one. And, notably, scholars associated with those fields, including Michael Carter, Elizabeth Wardle, and Douglas Downs, have acknowledged their conceptual debts to Reither, in particular. My sense is that if Hunt’s and Vipond’s contributions were more commonly cited and discussed, those scholars would receive similar credit as intellectual forebears. Finally, I will analyze Reither’s “Writing and Knowing” myself as a precursor to externalist inventional schemes in Chapter 6.

Admittedly, according to one set of metrics—that is, textual citations—this Canadian version of post-/postprocess has been relatively inconsequential. Although Trimbur and Paré independently coined post-process within months of each other, Trimbur’s article has been cited more than 225 times, whereas (at the time of my writing) Paré’s has been cited fewer than ten. Only two texts that I consider in this book, Richard Fulkerson’s “Of Pre- and Post-Process”
(2001) and Paul Kei Matsuda’s “Process and Post-Process: A Discursive History” (2003), even cite Paré. And, when they address his work, they do so in cursory fashion. Fulkerson writes, “I believe John Trimbur and Anthony Paré get the credit/blame for introducing the term ‘post-process’ into our scholarly discourse in separate articles in 1994,” and then two sentences later remarks, “I’ll return to Trimbur” (97). He never returns to Paré. When Matsuda mentions Paré, he places him in a footnote to a discussion of Trimbur’s article, not in his article’s main text. But, of course, textual citations are neither the only nor the best way to account for disciplinary knowledge construction. To understand fully the impact that Hunt, Reither, and Vipond had on their academic discourse and inquiry community, I believe one must also examine their non-textual contributions.

In presenting Hunt, Reither, and Vipond as postprocess theorists, I want to affirm their substantial contributions to the field in terms of their pedagogy, their conference organizing, their presentations and interactions at conferences and institutes, and their editorial work. For instance, the core principles described in Reither’s “Writing and Knowing” were instantiated in the form of a particular pedagogy (collaborative investigation, often including inkshedding) and implemented at a uniquely structured academic conference, Inkshed. The pedagogical method of inkshedding also provides a conceptual basis for at least one textbook, *Conversations about Writing: Eavesdropping, Inkshedding, and Joining In* by M. Elizabeth Sargent and Cornelia C. Paraskevas. In addition, as late as 1989 (and perhaps later), Reither was offering a free-and-open-to-the-public writing seminar entitled “Writing and Knowing” at McGill University (*Inkshed 8.2*). And, as recently as 2017, the Inkshed/CASLL Press was the only Canadian scholarly press devoted specifically to the discipline of composition studies (MacDonald, “Farewell” 1-2). Writing in 1989, Richard Coe would therefore affirm Reither’s monumental importance to constructing a community of writing instructors in Canada:

Those of us in Canadian universities and colleges whose speciality is composition/rhetoric realized, just under a decade ago, that our connections ran mostly through the United States, that we came together most frequently as an informal Canadian caucus at composition conferences in the United States, that we communicated with each other about our research through U.S. publications, and so forth. In response to this realization, we—read “Jim Reither, with help from his friends, for he supplied the impetus”—created a Canadian newsletter, started an “occasional” working conference (which has, in fact, now met annually since 1984), and helped reor-
ent and transform English Quarterly into a respected academic journal. This tripod—newsletter, journal and conference—now supports the primary cross-Canada community for those who study and teach writing in the universities, colleges and corporations. ("Write a Letter" 20)

Without Reither and his colleagues Hunt and Vipond, the subsequent history of writing instruction in Canada would have looked very different.

In examining Hunt, Reither, and Vipond, then, I will focus on three areas in which they offered impressive intellectual contributions: first their scholarly writing, which was often produced collaboratively; second, the innovative pedagogical schemes they developed and implemented, especially two inter-connected elements they called collaborative investigation and inkshedding; and, third, the newsletter-that-became-a-conference-and-also-an-academic-press that Reither and Hunt founded and edited, Inkshed. Though, as we’ll soon see, these elements are not so easily separated, I’d still like to pursue them in this order. After passing through these examinations, I’ll turn to Anthony Paré’s 1994 “Toward a Post-Process Pedagogy.” Contextualizing Paré’s argument in light of the Inkshed community—especially the works of Hunt, Reither, and Vipond—shows a version of post-process (surprisingly similar to what I am calling postprocess) to have a separate, Canadian genealogy.

THREE MEN ON AN ISLAND—AND THE OLDER-THAN-WE’VE-ACKNOWLEDGED ABOLITIONISM

From a postprocess perspective, all writing is invariably and inexorably collaborative, given that (externalized) minds cannot produce thought “on their own.” Reither and Vipond present an early formulation of this idea in their 1989 article “Writing as Collaboration.” By their reasoning, writing is “impossible—inconceivable—without collaboration” and it is collaborative “from beginning to end” (856). From that perspective, there wouldn’t be much sense in trying to distinguish the amount of collaboration required to produce one text versus another. But, applying a more traditional definition of collaboration, which might uphold the possibility of solo-authored texts, one would distinguish levels of collaborative-ness. Under such a conventional viewpoint, the writing processes employed by Hunt, Reither, and Vipond (and their other co-authors and peer reviewers) would appear very, even unusually, collaborative.

Reither and Hunt would publish and present together several times, as would Hunt and Vipond (and/or Vipond and Hunt). They often worked in close quarters, and the physical particularities of their text-production were very
easy to idealize. As Hunt told me, “We often, while drafting, sat at one computer and swapped the keyboard back and forth” (personal correspondence). “Writing as Collaboration,” a text attributed to Reither and Vipond, includes a case study of the publication of Hunt and Vipond’s 1986 “Evaluations in Literary Reading,” a text that Reither and two other colleagues at Saint Thomas, Alan Mason of the anthropology department and Thom Parkhill of the religious studies department, had variously read and responded to (857). And, as an interesting historical footnote: at the close of “Writing as Collaboration,” Reither and Vipond extend their gratitude to “the trusted assessors—the enablers—who helped workshop this paper”: Hunt, Paré, and Karen Burke LeFevre, the author of *Invention as a Social Act* (866). And this is not to mention the other notable members of their scholarly collective: Richard Coe and Andrea Lunsford and Lester Faigley—all prominent figures in the discourse of social and/or collaborative writing. Coe, now commonly cited as an intellectual forebear of ecological composition, served on the editorial board of *Inkshed* from 1983 (issue 2.1) through at least the late 1990s. Lunsford, who taught at the University of British Columbia from 1977–1986, published brief notes in the newsletter as early as 1983. Along with Lisa Ede and C. Jan Swearingen, she published an article entitled “Collaborative Writing: Perspectives by Incongruity” in a 1990 special issue on collaborative writing (*Inkshed* 9.2). She also served on the Inkshed Conference organizing committee at various points. Faigley, with whom Reither had studied during his year as a visiting scholar at the University of Texas-Austin from 1981–1982, also served on the newsletter editorial board from 1991 until 1998 (Phelps, “Four Scholars” 88).

As Reed Way Dasenbrock has argued, Thomas Kent’s postprocess theories pointed toward two primary ends—first, reintegrating theories of reading with theories of writing, and second, teaching writing in the disciplines (“Review” 103). Hunt, Reither, and Vipond likewise pursued these goals, though approaching them from separate angles and arriving at slightly different conclusions. While affirming the necessity of hermeneutic guessing and the invariably interpretive nature of writing, Kent tended to focus on highly granular or localized concerns: how interpretation occurs at the level of individual utterances. The three scholars from Saint Thomas University also applied reader-response literary theories to their models of writing and/or writing instruction, and they likely would have assented to Kent’s insights. But, their own examinations also emphasized another way that reading and writing inter-connect: one’s reading (and research) practices provide one with the facts, figures, anecdotes, and insights—in short, the contents—of subsequent writing acts. In “Writing and Knowing,” for instance, Reither states, “Academic writing, reading, and inquiry are inseparably linked; and all three are learned not by doing any one alone,
but by doing them all at the same time. To ‘teach writing’ is thus necessarily to
ground writing in reading and inquiry” (625).

In affirming the inter-connection of reading and writing, of course, Reither’s
theories would also heavily overlap with Judith Langer’s and Louise Wetherbee Phelps’. Like them, he sought a means for dispensing with the (false) Product/Process dichotomy on which much Process theorizing had attempted to ground itself, and aimed to conceptualize writing processes so as to account for the role of prior products. In “Writing and Knowing,” which is notably sub-titled “Toward Redefining the Writing Process,” Reither writes, “Academic writing, reading, and inquiry are collaborative, social acts, social processes, which not only result in, but also—and this is crucial—result from, social products: writing processes and written products are both elements of the same social process” (625). And, in that article’s final sentence, he affirms, “It is time to redefine the writing process so that substantive social knowing is given due prominence in both our thinking and our teaching” (626). Thus, for Reither, as for Langer and Phelps, a suitably robust conception of the (social) writing process would need to account for the role of other people’s texts and authors’ interactions with those texts in the act of writing.

Hunt, Reither, and Vipond were jointly suited to integrate reading and writing into a model of language development, particularly in terms of writing ability. Hunt’s primary training was in eighteenth century literature and literary theory, Reither was trained as a Shakespearean, and Vipond was an expert in cognitive psychology and psycholinguistics. As Vipond explained to me, “My interest early in my career was ‘text comprehension.’ Russ’s interest was ‘reading,’ so we were really coming at the same thing from different angles” (personal correspondence). Those three also sought to incorporate others into their efforts at reading-writing integration: the newsletter that became Inkshed was first called Writing and Reading/Theory and Practice, and, as Inkshed, it would later carry the subtitle “A Canadian newsletter devoted to writing and reading theory and practice.”

To begin this exploration, I want to dwell on Hunt’s work. At least on the southern side of the U.S.-Canada border, Hunt may not be considered a “major” disciplinary figure in composition and writing studies. Though he was prolific, his articles were generally published in Canadian journals (e.g., English Quarterly and Inkshed) or other non-U.S. outlets (e.g., TEXT), in journals focused more on literary studies (e.g., Poetics and Reader), or in edited collections. As a result, his work did not achieve the level of influence that, in my estimation, it merited and continues to merit. Even so, I would affirm, it is remarkable: excellent and well ahead of its time.

Hunt begins his 1983 article “Literature is Reading is Writing” with a simple observation: “Recent research into language and language learning processes has helped us realize that we don’t actually understand enough about how reading and
writing relate to one another” (5). Throughout the 1980s, then, he and Vipond would examine the social dimensions of reading in several articles: “Point-Driven Understanding: Pragmatic and Cognitive Dimensions of Literary Reading” (1984), “Crash-Testing a Transactional Model of Literary Reading” (1985); “Evaluations in Literary Reading” (1986); and, with Lynwood C. Wheeler, “Social Reading and Literary Engagement” (1987). Their insights on reading eventually become relevant to writing instruction, but they were not solely or immediately so.

That first text, “Literature is Reading is Writing,” is interesting in its own regard, though. There Hunt notes the connection between reading and writing posited by current-traditionalism (as explained by Richard Young): “a one-directional, causal” one, in which “reading good texts causes—or is at least a major factor contributing to—good writing.” Hunt notes various problems with this model, including the most basic: “there is simply no evidence that it works” (5). Then he proposes an alternative relationship, drawn from a moreconceptually robust notion of reading, now considered to be “as active a process as writing,” a task “not governed by the text” but instead “what Kenneth Goodman calls a ‘psycholinguistic guessing game’ that is actively played by readers” (6).

Hunt argues for a conception of meaning—whether textual or gestural or otherwise—as “a joint, mutual product, the result of cooperation and sharing—a transaction—between two people” (6). This view of reading undercuts the current-traditional assumption that reading good texts invariably leads to good writing. “There isn’t much we can say about the consequences of reading,” Hunt argues, “because reading varies so much from one case to the next” (6-7). Therefore, he concludes, “We cannot simply use texts to teach writing. We have to teach reading as well”—but a particular form, what Roland Barthes would call “writerly” reading. In this approach to reading, the reader actively generates questions and hypotheses and engages with the text in something very much like a dialogue; the reader’s “attention is predominantly constructive . . . not looking at things, but at relations between things” and attempting to discern the text’s “Point”: the pragmatic, interpersonal, social purposes and intents of the text’s author” (7).

In the sort of reading that focuses on the author’s “point,” Hunt and Vipond elsewhere argue, “Meaning is not seen as something to be located in the text, but instead as something to be negotiated between readers and texts within situational constraints” (“Contextualizing the Text” 10). They draw this focus on the situationally contingent nature of meaning from Louise Rosenblatt who conceives of reading as transactional, rather than interactional (“Shunting Information” 131). In a transaction, Rosenblatt notes, “the elements or parts [of a phenomenon] are seen as aspects or phases of a total situation,” whereas, in contrast, interaction implies “the impact of separate already-defined entities acting on one another” (“Viewpoints” 98, 97). Thus, in her theory of reading,
Rosenblatt distinguishes between the text, that is, “a set or series of signs interpretable as verbal symbols,” and what she calls the poem, a catchall term for any literary work that comes into being in a transaction mutually dependent on a reader and a pre-existent text (“Poem as Event” 127). A transactional theory of reading is interested in poems, not texts. And, within this framework, the poem is considered to be “an event in time. It is not an object or an ideal entity. It is an occurrence, a coming-together, a compenetration, of a reader and a text” (126).

Hunt and Vipond would follow Rosenblatt in pursuing a transactional conception of reading but offer their own revisions to her model. Rosenblatt had distinguished between two primary sorts of reading—efferent reading, in which the reader focuses on what will be taken away from the text, and aesthetic reading, which is oriented more toward an experience of the text (The Reader, The Text 24). Hunt and Vipond would rename these two types (calling them information-driven and story-driven) and add a third: point-driven. To read in a point-driven way, they argue, is to collaborate, to attempt to “make contact,” with a narrator or writer.” In light of Rosenblatt’s terminological distinctions, then, one can better understand Hunt and Vipond’s claim that the point in point-driven reading “is not something that is ‘in’ the story at all; rather, the terms refer to an activity—a pragmatic, inherently social activity” (“Shunting Information” 134).

Much like other postprocess thinkers, understanding reading and writing as interpretive (or transactive) events led Hunt to question the utility of conventional academic writing tasks—and even the utility of conventional writing classes. Hunt begins his 1993 “Texts, Textoids, and Utterances,” by remarking on his own efforts to “put meaning at the center of all the written language used in connection with my classes.” Meaning is understood here in a specific way: not “as something that’s in text or language” but instead “meaning as a social event” (113). Here Hunt forwards a dynamic, situationally contingent and socially determined notion of textual meaning, exploring how it impacts reading and writing instruction. During the 1988–1989 academic year, he had taken a sabbatical leave in Australia and Germany and “re-discovered” the works of Bakhtin and other genre theorists. As a result, he came to understand the utterance, “any instance of language in use, bounded by a change of speakers,” as the “basic unit of analysis for understanding language” (“Traffic in Genres” 214). After considering Bakhtin’s insights, Hunt was also forced to “abandon the idea that genres were external, fixed forms,” learned by mastering abstract rules. Instead, he came to see that genres are learned through “authentic dialogue,” that is, instances of language use in which all parties attempt to infer each other’s intentions and respond to them (216). But, after arriving at these abstract conclusions, Hunt could not help but recognize a flaw in commonplace writing pedagogies: the authentic dialogues necessary for language development were
unlikely to arise in classroom settings. The typical academic essay, Hunt argues, is “neither created by the student nor understood by the teacher as an utterance; rather, it [is] bracketed, set aside, considered, evaluated. If it is a dialogue, it is one conducted around the actual text, one which brackets the text out as a sort of hypothetical instance” (216-17).

Writing in the March 1989 issue of *Inkshed*, Hunt theorizes about genre in response to the work of Anne Freadman, an Australian scholar of comparative literature. In so doing, he sets up a contrast between a Process approach to writing instruction and what he would call a “genre approach,” one that closely resembles the pedagogies of postprocess scholars. In her article “Anyone for Tennis?,” Freadman compares genre to a game “consisting, minimally, of two texts in a dialogical relation” (97). She demonstrates that the game has rules, but that the “rules” merely delimit the possible moves that one can make; they neither define the game nor provide meaningful instructions about strategy (95-96). Tennis, of course, requires two players, and no one can make a tennis “shot” without that shot being directed at another player within the context of a game. Without those two elements (another player, a game), one can only ever hit a tennis ball, one cannot make a shot. Likewise, to complete the analogy, a genre is a genre because of dialogic response and turn-taking.

Drawing from this analysis, Hunt concludes, “For me, the most powerful use of the tennis analogy is [Freadman’s] assertion that you can only pretend to play in the classroom, and that won’t work” (“Process vs. Genre” 16). And, this conclusion entails practical consequences: instructors must “offer our students a situation in which their writing counts for something that matters to them, in which it’s read for what it says rather than to be evaluated, in which writing and reading have authentic social consequences.” They must, in other words, construct an educational setting “in which their shots are part of an authentic game” (17). Now, to be sure, these ideas sound quite similar to those espoused by Joseph Petraglia, David A. Russell, and the other contributors to *Reconceiving Writing, Rethinking Writing Instruction* (1995). But, it’s important to remember that Hunt was making this case five years earlier. In closing my discussion of Hunt as a “solo” author, though, I’d like to turn to another text, one that not only shared the post-composition tendencies of Petraglia’s edited collection—but one that anticipated them by more than a decade.

At CCCC 1984 (New York City, March 29–31), Hunt delivered a presentation entitled “Language Development in Young Children and in the Composition Classroom: The Role of Pragmatics.” That presentation outlines many principles that would circulate throughout Hunt’s subsequent work and distills them for oral delivery. It also anticipates and/or prefigures many of the basic principles of genre- and/or activity-theory-oriented versions of postprocess to an astonishing
extent. Hunt begins that presentation by directly stating his opposition to cognitivism, and more particularly its “particularly damaging” and “sterile conception of [language] learning” as “something that occurs in the individual learner, in isolation, as a sort of accumulation of individual capital” (1). In contrast, for Hunt, language learning is “in its very nature so profoundly social, intersubjective and transactive” (2-3). Drawing variously from the works of Lev Vygotsky, A. R. Luria, Charles Sanders Peirce, and M. A. K. Halliday, Hunt offers a pragmatic approach to writing instruction that “examines the relationship between language and the social world” (3). In this conception, language acts as “a vehicle for relationships,” and Hunt affirms that it is best acquired “in use, when we are attending not to language itself but to something else” (9, 11). As he does elsewhere, Hunt then argues that “language learning is strongly dependent on a rich and genuine pragmatic context” but also frames quote/unquote “school writing” as being profoundly “denuded of pragmatic motives” (12-13). At best, when instructors gesture toward pragmatic ends for writing, they invite students to pretend or simulate authentic situations (13). These insights have major ramifications; Hunt writes,

What I find particularly difficult about the rethinking I propose is that it casts doubt on virtually every strategy that I have used as a teacher of writing. It casts them all into crisis—traditional essay writing, freewriting and related exercises, journals and diaries, sentence combining and fluency drills and exercises. None is supported by the kind of pragmatic network in which successful language learning occurs. . . . [Some students]—among my students, they are the vast majority—sometimes learn specific skills in areas like rhetorical strategies, organization, sentence structure, and so forth, but regularly—this is, I think, the writing teacher’s universal lament—the skills don’t transfer into other areas and they don’t last. They don’t transfer and they don’t last because they haven’t been learned the way we learn language for use and for keeps—in the service of our relations with others. (13-14)

In other words, this social (that is, dialogic and/or pragmatic) conception of language learning not only demonstrates the inherent flaws in many of the most foundational elements of Process-era writing instruction; it also explains why the lessons of writing instruction do not transfer to other contexts.

As an antidote to current-traditional pedagogy and as a means of extending Process in profitable directions, Hunt advocates creating situations “in which writing is the medium of a dialogue, in service of a collaborative attempt to learn and as a way of exploring ideas and establishing relationships,” placing emphasis
“clearly and unequivocally on the exchange of ideas, information, and values rather than on the texts as object and as evidence of skill levels.” However, he doubts whether such an effort could succeed, given the accreted, institutionalized norms and values of composition pedagogy. And, once more, the entailed conclusion is severe. In plain terms, Hunt offers a radical conclusion, “This means inevitably, I think, that we must be prepared to consider the abolition of writing courses as such” (14).

In both versions of his chapter on the “new abolitionism,” Robert Connors repeats the same claim: “In the research for this essay, I could not find anything written between 1975 and 1990 in the field of composition that called for general abolition of the [first-year composition] course” (“Abolitionist Debate” 57; “New Abolitionism” 19). Thus, unearthing Hunt’s presentation at CCCC—which should fall squarely within the field of composition—complicates this history. He represents an early—perhaps even the earliest—exemplar of what Maureen Daly Goggin and Susan Kay Miller would more accurately call “reconceptualists,” rather than abolitionists. As those two scholars note, reconceptualists did not so much call “for the abandonment of writing instruction” but rather “for the dismantling of the current system in order to build new, more effective ones” (“What Is New?” 94).

In my personal correspondence with Hunt, I asked him how he felt about the “New Abolitionism.” Agreeing with my characterization of him as a conceptual precursor, he stated,

We—I think particularly I—were certainly conscious abolitionists, before Sharon [Crowley] announced it. I’ve just been going back through Inkshed newsletters and noticing that I called for abolition (knowing it was never going to happen, in large part because of the social and economic and academic institution that had grown up around the comp class). We thought of abolition, I think, because we found it possible to imagine a writing environment that didn’t include comp classes: we lived and taught in one. . . . So, yes we were abolitionist—but I never had the sense that we’d been erased [from the histories told by Connors and others]. We really weren’t noticed—as you’ve said in your chapter. And I certainly never had any sense that abolition was in the cards, or that anybody was likely to take my recommendation seriously. (personal correspondence)

In light of his call for abolition, I would note an important terminological choice: in his CCCC presentation, Hunt addresses writing courses, not compo-
sition courses. In his estimation, not even WAC courses, as they are generally implemented, can solve the issues he has identified:

Their aim, like that of traditional “comp course” assignments, is regularly to produce text for evaluative purposes. Sometimes their aim is exclusively to evaluate the student’s grasp of the subject matter; occasionally, the more “responsible” teachers in other subjects will evaluate papers for “writing” as well. But in neither case is there a genuine purpose or audience for the writing, nor is there likely to have been reading out of which, and in response to which, the student’s utterance genuinely arises—or writing to which it will in turn give rise. (“Language Development” 15)

This is not to say that writing ability cannot be learned, though. Indeed, the central thesis of Hunt’s work is that it can be learned—but that it must be learned in social contexts in which it is acquired in use. One solution, he argues, would be to create a course “whose avowed and genuine aim is the learning of something other than language—some course with its own, autonomous ‘subject matter’”—and [then to] introduce written language in a genuinely functional way into that communal learning situation.” This “pragmatic web” might then “form a scaffolding for language development, and for the establishment and flourishing of that pragmatic imagination which allows fluent and accomplished writers to produce text which seems pragmatically whole even in the absence of such a web” (16). In other words, Hunt advocates something more like (what has come to be called) Writing in the Disciplines, but which he has elsewhere called Writing under the Curriculum: “constructing situations for student writers which offer them immersion in the social situations which occasion and use writing . . . and subordinate explicit instruction to the situations where the apprentice writer can best profit from it” (“Afterword” 380).

Hunt describes a course that might achieve these ends, using his own introductory literature and eighteenth-century lit classes as examples and focusing on five educational components:

1. Assignments in which students report to the other students;
2. Assignments in which students summarize articles and other works for members of the class who have not read those works themselves;
3. Situations in which spontaneous exploratory writing is circulated, anonymously or not, and responded to, anonymously or not;
4. Situations in which students engage in genuine, written dialogue and/or multilogue concerning the ideas included in their work—whether with their instructor or with other students;

5. Situations in which the instructor does not merely attempt to explain rhetorical approaches but “actually models them by participating in the writing community—by performing the same tasks, for the same purposes—both anonymously and not.” (“Language Development” 17)

At the close of his presentation, Hunt affirms that the particular assignments are less important than the underlying disposition toward language learning they represent. At last, he states, “A pragmatic perspective has the power to change our thinking and our teaching at least as dramatically as did the cognitive perspective . . . and I think it’s time to start exploring it in earnest” (18).

**COLLABORATIVE INVESTIGATION: A PEDAGOGY THAT CAME TO BE CALLED POST-PROCESS**

Originally located in coastal Chatham, New Brunswick, Canada, Saint Thomas University moved inland to Fredericton, 175 kilometers (110 miles) to the southwest, in 1964 (Spray and Rhinelander 515). At the time, its English department had only three members, one of whom would leave soon thereafter, and no departmental chairperson (522). Reither was added to the faculty for the 1967–1968 academic year, and Hunt followed one year later (590). When Vipond joined the Psychology department in 1977, the university’s largest academic units had six members each, and so, as he explains, “It was inevitable that we rubbed shoulders with people from other departments.” For what it’s worth, the likelihood of Reither and Hunt meeting Vipond was even higher: English and Psychology shared the same floor of Edmund Casey Hall (Vipond, personal correspondence).

Those attending Saint Thomas were primarily first-generation college students from rural New Brunswick, and the literacy panic sweeping the United States at the time was felt at Saint Thomas, as well (Hunt, personal correspondence). Thus, in 1978, Saint Thomas initiated a first-year writing requirement, with courses taught by faculty from across the disciplines (Spray and Rhinelander 649). With Reither directing the Writing Programme, classes implemented a Process approach, “built around sentence combining and other ‘state of the art’ ideas,” and employing Flower’s textbook *Problem-Solving Strategies for Writing* (Hunt, personal correspondence; Vipond, *Writing and Psychology* ix). Vipond
volunteered to teach his first (and what would become his only) course in that Programme during its third year (Vipond, *Writing and Psychology* ix). But he left it changed all the same, carrying the Process approach to teaching back into his Psychology courses. In 1985 the Programme disbanded altogether (Spray and Rhinelander 649-50). As Hunt explains, “It only lasted a few years, in large part because departments didn’t share our view that literacy was not the English department’s sole responsibility; still, while it lasted we introduced almost a quarter of the faculty . . . to the idea that faculty should all take responsibility for literacy” (personal correspondence). Around that time, Reither, Hunt, Thom Parkhill of Religious Studies, and Vipond began implementing collaborative investigation and inkshedding as central elements of their courses (Vipond, *Writing and Psychology* x).

In many of their works, Hunt, Reither, and Vipond end by explaining the practical implications of their theories. In doing so, of course, they follow the genre conventions of scholarly articles in composition studies. However, it seems clear to me that they are not so much applying their theories to practice, as though the two were or could be separate. Instead, their work demonstrates a dialectical connection between theory and practice. To the extent that they make theoretical claims, these seem to derive from practice, and they are consistently revised in response to iterative, practical applications. In a retrospective, definitional presentation from the 1999 Inkshed Conference, Hunt explains the origins of the eponymous practice:

> “Inkshedding” began as a practice in the early eighties, when Jim Reither and I began trying to make “freewriting” (which we had learned about from writers like Peter Elbow) into something dialogically transactional . . . to give writing a social role in the classroom, and thus to create a situation in which the writing was read by real readers, to understand and respond to what was said rather than to evaluate and “help” with the writing. We did this in our classes by asking students to free write in response to a shared experience . . . and then passing the freewritten texts around and asking readers to mark passages in which the writing said something “striking,” something that seemed to them interesting or new or outrageous. (“What Is Inkshedding?” 3)

Just a few paragraphs later, however, Hunt also adds, “The ways in which inkshedding functions—and the ways it has been instantiated—have grown and changed, of course, since then.” And, after noting that inkshedding could serve as “a reasonable synecdoche for [his] basic stance as a teacher,” Hunt admits
that it “turned out to have a number of implications, many of which we hadn’t anticipated at all.” In texts produced while inkshedding, for instance, students demonstrate a more profound “anticipation of audience” (“What Is Inkshedding?” 3). Furthermore, inkshedding would not only “broaden the bandwidth” of classroom conversations and reduce the degree to which the first utterances would dictate all others, it could also increase the likelihood that each utterance could be “heard” in a meaningful way (4). That is, given that inkshedders’ texts receive “*immediate* reading and response,” the practice immerses writers in an “authentic social transaction” (6, 5).

Hunt, Reither, and Vipond had two primary language instruction methods: inkshedding and collaborative investigation. In my estimation, the former has quite clearly had better branding (a cooler name, an eponymous newsletter and conference) than the latter. Even so, I would still position it as somewhat derivative of collaborative investigation and less educationally central. Indeed, Reither does not address inkshedding directly in “Writing and Knowing” or (with Vipond) in “Writing as Collaboration.” In one instance, Hunt frames it as being one of two “fundamental and related strategies” employed within collaborative investigation—the other of which “doesn’t have a name” (“Speech Genres” 249). In another case, he calls it “the central strategy” in collaborative investigation (“Traffic in Genres” 217). But, he always frames it as being a component of the larger educational method, collaborative investigation.

The (now defunct) professional organization that sprung from *Inkshed* came to be called The Canadian Society for the Study of Language and Learning (CASLL), a name that indicates a key supposition of its founders. As Coe notes, “Learning to write and learning other things [are] part of the same process and should be thought about together” (qtd. in Williams “Voicing” 58). Or, as Vipond would argue, indirectly referencing Reither’s 1985 text, “To understand writing as social process we have to understand more about how knowledge is created and used; ‘writing and knowing’ are inextricably linked. By this account, we need to be as concerned with knowing as with writing” (“Review: Frames” 4). This idea is likely correct in the abstract, but ecological (e.g., institutional and/or bureaucratic) factors may have helped to call forth its realization. In Andrea Williams’ words, “Such an epistemic approach to writing fits the Canadian institutional contexts where writing instruction is likely to be situated in the disciplines rather than in first-year writing courses” (“Voicing” 58). I would like to consider, therefore, how Hunt, Reither, and Vipond attempted to cultivate dialogic classroom spaces where subject-matter-learning and learning-to-write could occur simultaneously.

Hunt defines collaborative investigation directly and concisely: “In general, it entails creating a situation in which the class organize themselves into a team
to investigate cooperatively some specific topic, using writing as the fundamen-
tal tool for that organizing, that investigating, and that cooperation” (“Texts,
Textoids” 123-24). However, a more extensive explanation appears in Reither
and Vipond’s “Writing as Collaboration,” in which they argue that “both writ-
ing and knowing” are “impossible—inconceivable—without collaboration.” In
presenting a version of collaborative inquiry, they attempt to expand then-con-
ventional understandings of collaboration beyond “short-range activities such
as coauthoring and peer editing” to include “a long-range collaborative activity
we call ‘knowledge making’” (856). At its most basic theoretical level, this col-
laborative knowledge making implies that “all of us who write must ground our
language in the knowing of those who have preceded us. We make our meanings
not alone, but in relation to others’ meanings, which we come to know through
reading, talk, and writing” (862). In practical terms, collaborative knowledge
making entails placing each student into a research team, a “community-with-
in-a-community,” that must “investigate a more or less original scholarly ques-
tion or field” (862-63). Each team must then work “collectively to develop,
through reading and writing, its own knowledge claims, and cooperatively to
find ways to fit its knowledge claims into the knowledge of the larger commu-
nity” (862). In the midst of all this, the teacher does not simply orchestrate
student actions—as those become increasingly complex but also increasingly
student-driven. The instructor also acts “as an expert co-researcher, modeling the
process” by contributing to it (863).

In a separate text, “Time for the Revolution,” Reither argues that the promise
of student-centered, Process pedagogy was never truly realized; what was a “rev-
olution” in theory never amounted to one in practice. While instructors shifted
their focus from “finished product to invention (and perhaps even to revision),”
they still continued to assign context-free, a-rhetorical tasks” (11). Instructors
simply substituted one set of rules (about products) for another about processes.
But, even these new rules were “false and misleading about actual writing pro-
cesses,” and so the potentially revolutionary Process approach was “trivialized,
bastardized, into a non-process—and, to boot, into theoretical and practical
nonsense” (11-12). Even though, he argues, “the notion of writing as social pro-
cess is an even richer idea than writing as (cognitive) process,” it could still suffer
the same fate (12). It could be ruined in practice “by taking a new set of rules
(this time about disciplinary forms, formats, and conventions) and trying to lay
on a few ‘social’ activities” (12-13).

Thus, if instructors were ever to maximize the potential of social theories,
they would need to dispense with “the same old current-traditional designs for
writing (and other) courses” (13). They would need to re-design their courses
to be social from the ground up. Rather than attempting to instruct students
about abstract or detached principles of/for writing—even social principles—
instructors need to establish conditions in which students learn language skills
(including writing and reading) in the process of learning how to learn (i.e.,
skills in “inquiry”), all while learning about the subject matter of the course in
question (Reither and Vipond 863). Summarizing how all of this operates at
the end of “Writing as Collaboration,” Reither and Vipond present a wholly
integrated model:

In short, [students] learn to write by reading. Or, more
accurately and importantly, since there is no such thing as
knowing how to write (there is only knowing how to write in
certain genres for certain audiences of certain subjects in cer-
tain situations), they learn how to learn how to write. Perhaps
most important of all, students learn that writing and know-
ing are collaborative acts—vital activities people do with other
people to give their lives meaning. (866)

This final sentiment sounds very much like a postprocess position—espe-
cially in its assertion that “there is no such thing as knowing how to write,”
of course. Even so, I think it’s important to acknowledge a central premise of
“Time for a Revolution”—that what now sounds like postprocess to some of us
(or to me, at least) may once have appeared as a logical extension of Process itself.
Reither writes, “The idea that writing is process remains revolutionary, requiring
revolutionary ways of thinking about and teaching writing. Those revolutionary
ways must become the subject of our thinking, our teaching, and our ongoing
conversation. No issue in the study and teaching of writing is more important
than this” (“Time” 13).

INKSHED: A DIFFERENT KIND OF NEWSLETTER,
A DIFFERENT KIND OF CONFERENCE

In the first issue of what would come to be called Inkshed (then entitled Writing
& Reading/Theory & Practice, or W&R/T&P for short) Reither explains his im-
petus for writing. He and Hunt—along with other Canadian scholars—had at-
tended several recent conferences in the United States, getting “caught up in
the energy of the ‘revolution’ going on there in the fields of writing and reading/the-
ory and pedagogy.” At the same time, they had become increasingly frustrated by
the logistics and financial costs of engaging in those conversations. Therefore, at
the 1982 Wyoming Conference, seven Canadian scholars—Chris Bullock, Anne
Greenwood, Russ Hunt, David Reiter, Jim Reither, Susan Stevenson, and Kay
Stewart (who would become the second editor of Inkshed)—decided to launch a
newsletter. The first issue (October 1982) was sent to more than eighty Canadian instructors, though the subscribers list would quickly climb into the hundreds (W&R 1.1, page 2; Inkshed 2.5, page 1). In that first issue, quoting from Chris Bullock, Reither states, “This newsletter will be ‘interested in approaching writing and reading and literacy as serious subjects of interest in their own right, not just as ‘problems’ or fodder for testing or as objects of administrative technique’” (W&R 1.1, page 2). That is, as Louise Wetherbee Phelps notes, Reither “makes crystal clear . . . [that] the study of written language . . . is to be undertaken for its own sake, not as instrumental to pedagogy” (“Four Scholars” 99). Inkshed would, in other words, reject what Lynn Worsham and Sidney Dobrin later called the “pedagogical imperative”; it would allow theoretical explorations of writing without demanding that each result in direct classroom application(s).

Even in its earliest incarnation, two other, enduring elements of the Inkshed ethos appear: a light-hearted, comical tone and a commitment to dialogic and/or social authoring. Reither, apparently, had not been happy with his initial newsletter title, and so he closes the first issue with an advertisement: “LET’S-HAVE-AN-END-TO-UNWIELDY-TITLES-CONTEST,” noting that he would send a set of “six—no, make it eight—coasters (advertising an assortment of genuine German beers and stolen from genuine Gasthausen all over West Germany) and a brand new disposable BIC razor” to whomever might propose the best title for the subsequent issues. In that first-issue, Hunt (who was then on a sabbatical at Indiana University) appears in the publication information as the newsletter’s “far-flung correspondent.” In subsequent issues, he would be listed as the editor in charge of fashion (issue 2.6), obituaries (3.3), consumer affairs (3.4), and entertainment (3.5), as well as the punctuation consultant (4.4), research director (5.3), and silent partner (4.5). But, though Hunt would seldom comment on the topics for which he was institutionally credited, he would frequently contribute, as would many other scholars, including the newsletters various “provincial correspondents” (who came to be called “consulting editors”).

On the third ever page of W&R / T&P, Reither notes, “In the long run, this newsletter may well self-destruct: what we need is a journal” (issue 1.1, page 3). More than thirty years later, the newsletter’s publication-run would end; however, it never self-destructed in the fashion Reither imagined. It never became a journal. And, quite crucially, its status as a newsletter—and avowedly not a journal—indicated something fundamental about Reither’s ethos as an editor and its social or dialogic function within the field of Canadian writing instruction. Writing in Inkshed 5.6 (1986), Reither states,

My idea of Inkshed has been, from the first issue (though I didn’t have the language back then), that this newsletter
ought to be a “parlor” in which people carry on their conversations about writing and reading theory and practice. It is not a journal, privileging text over discourse, monologue over dialogue. It never should be. It’s a place where people talk with other people, collaborating with one another in the search for meaning in their fields and their worlds. It’s a place for exploration, not domination. (“Editorial Inkshedding” Dec. 1986 1)

Reither’s commitment to collaboration is evident across nearly every issue he edited. In issue 3.2 (1984), he frames his role as being a “compiler” and not an “editor.” In this light, he states, “Inkshed’s primary functions are those of the bulletin board and the podium. . . . Inkshed is not something I do. It’s something you do” (5). In the editor’s introduction to issue 4.1 (1985), this time entitled “Epistemic Newslettering; or, Inkshed as a Mode of Learning,” Reither reminds readers of the newsletter’s goal. It was not designed “only to serve the community of academics in Canada” interested in its topics but “also to help develop and promote such a community” (1). In this light, then, he presents an “exhortation,” encouraging readers to fulfill their “obligations to participate as full members of this community we’re trying to build.” Inkshed’s status as a newsletter and not a journal encouraged participation in several ways: allowing authors to “publish more exploratory, less ‘finished’ pieces of writing than a journal ordinarily can,” as well as “those observations, findings, or ideas that seem genuinely important but not really substantial enough to work up into full-length articles.” It also lowered the barriers that might keep readers from becoming contributors or even just engaging in scholarly conversation, thereby allowing them to “determine not only the kind of forum it will be, but also the kind of community we will be” (2). Reither therefore reasons, “The pages of Inkshed ought to be a stage on which the activities of participating in, constructing, and developing a scholarly (or ‘interpretive’) community are acted out” (3). Similarly, in one of the newsletter’s final issues, Horne summarizes the newsletter’s purpose and function: “Its reason for being was to create a community in which to discuss, or facilitate dialogic interaction—the same purpose, it seems, as the inkshedding writing activity” (“Inkshed: History” 8).

Just as Inkshed was to be a very different sort of academic publication, the yearly gathering that it spawned was to be “a different sort of conference” (Inkshed 3.2, page 2). In their first advertisement for Inkshed 1, a “working conference” to be hosted by their own institution, Saint Thomas University, Hunt and Reither “welcome proposals that promise to involve participants in active and constructive ways.” That is, they intone, “Sessions should do more than
present the products of inquiry, they should also engage the participants in the processes of inquiry” (Inksled 2.6, page 9). In Inksled 3.2, while offering up a tentative schedule, the organizers explain the logistics of the event. The conference would not include concurrent sessions so that “as far as possible, all participants will share the same experience.” Furthermore, after six of the seven sessions, attendees would engage in inkshedding together, after which “a series of ad hoc editorial committees (of registrants) will select from and edit, conference staff will print and publish, and one session will be based upon, the texts produced.” In this way, then, the texts produced during inkshedding would “form part of the continuing verbal exchange at the conference, supplementing and deepening the oral discussions.” By structuring the conference to include “exploratory writing,” its organizers were “putting our money where our mouths have been”—that is, implementing the concepts that the Inksled newsletter had endorsed (Inksled 3.2, page 2). In subsequent years, Miriam Horne notes, “conferences were held in isolated settings away from distracting factors such as shopping or sightseeing”; as a result, “inkshedders had nothing to do but participate in the conference.” And, given the conferences’ remote locales, “the dialogic engagement was also facilitated by the fact that meals were taken together, everyone was lodged in the same building, and a bar was usually present” (Horne, Writing 44).

**PARÉ’S POST-PROCESS PROCLAMATION**

Though the document in which Trimbur first uses post-process is a review of books by C. H. Knoblauch and Lil Brannon, Kurt Spellmeyer, and Patricia Bizzell, he uses the term to refer to a more general tendency in the field. In the most relevant passage, he refers to those books as “statements that both reflect and (especially in Bizzell’s case) enact what has come to be called the ‘social turn’ of the 1980s, a post-process, post-cognitivist theory and pedagogy . . . .” (109). Thus, when it appears in Trimbur’s text, the adjective post-process appears in an appositive position, syntactically equivalent to post-cognitivist but presumably not meaning the same thing, and modifying and/or explaining the social turn of the 1980s. That is, for Trimbur, the social turn was post-process. And, clearly, Trimbur uses the term social turn as a means of echoing others; the social turn is the name that the phenomenon in question has “come to be called.” But, even if Trimbur originally used the term post-process to refer to the whole social turn, he clearly signaled internal divisions within that movement, noting, for instance, its “leftwing trajectory.” In the years following Trimbur’s initial pronouncement, subsequent scholars primarily employed post-process to reference scholars, theories, and pedagogies associated with that left-wing trajectory.
Similarly, Hunt, Reither, and Vipond could not help but recognize a wide array of “social” theories of writing and writing instruction. In a 1993 article, Hunt repeats a criticism that had once rightly been leveled at *Process*, bemoaning the over-use of *social* to mean any and everything: “And so at conferences we begin to make jokes about how often the word ‘social’ can be allowed to appear in the program. We struggle to keep the term from becoming so general, so widely used, that it no longer means anything” (“Texts, Textoids” 113-14). Whatever the individual political commitments of the scholars from Saint Thomas may have been, though, their critiques of other social approaches were far less ideological than those associated with Trimbur’s post-process. Instead, they oriented their efforts toward increasing the classroom-level effectiveness and impact of social theories and pedagogies. In a 1988 *Inkshed* article, Vipond writes, “We’ve heard a lot lately about writing as ‘social process,’ but it’s easy to shrug off the term as simply the latest buzzword. Thanks to the efforts of scholars such as Jim Reither, however (*College English*, October 1985), it’s becoming clear that to understand writing as social process we have to understand more about how knowledge is created and used; ‘writing and knowing’ are inextricably linked” (“Review of ‘Frames’” 4). And, indeed, Reither and Vipond begin “Writing as Collaboration” by declaring non-social visions of writing passé: “The case for writing’s social dimensions no longer requires arguing.” Even so, they suggest, social theories had not produced “a corresponding transformation in the ways writing is conceived and dealt with in our classrooms,” and so they endeavored to bring that change about (855).

Hunt and Vipond worked together over the course of a decade to formulate a social conception of reading, and, in Hunt’s writings especially, the question of how meaning emerges is the central question of a social approach to writing instruction. For Hunt, meaning is not “something that’s in texts or language.” Instead, he argues, “It seems to me far more powerful and useful to think of meaning as a social event” (113). Meaning is socially derived, but one must therefore also re-think the social in light of this novel conception of meaning. In Hunt’s estimation, “These implications are easy to lose sight of; but I think once we’ve lost them we’re really not talking about treating language as social any more” (114). Though Hunt isn’t as concise as one might like in defining meaning, he does provide a useful illustration of his viewpoint:

If you listen to any naturally occurring oral conversation for more than two or three minutes, in fact, you discover that the meanings of the overwhelming majority of oral utterances are in fact determined not by their semantic properties and syntactic structures, but much more powerfully by a sort of
unspoken, continuously renegotiated social contract between the participants in the conversation. (“Texts Textoids” 115)

Though we need not return to a full exploration of these ideas here, suffice it to say that Hunt sees collaborative investigation and inkshedding as the means of exercising and enacting this social perspective in academic contexts.

Reither also distinguishes between what he had set out to do and what was generally practiced in the social turn. In “Time for the Revolution,” he writes, “Now there’s another good idea making the rounds. The notion of writing as social process is an even richer idea than writing as (cognitive) process. Thinking of writing as a social process tells us a whole lot more about what writing is, where it comes from, what its uses are, how and why we learn it.” However, in a way we might now expect, Reither adds, “But even as this idea enlivens and enriches our conversation, we strip it of its essentials and its power as we bring it into our classrooms,” primarily by treating it as something that can simply be layered on top of “the same old current-traditional designs for writing (and other) courses” (12). Though he doesn’t directly say it, Reither indicates that this sort of layering had been, to date, the primary method of the social turn. Just as the potentially radical Process approach had been “trivialized, bastardized, into a non-process—and, to boot, into theoretical and practical nonsense,” so too was the social turn being trivialized and bastardized into something non-social. But, as we now know, Reither did believe in an alternative. A suitably (that is, rigorously) social approach to writing instruction would need to embed student writing within meaningful, authentic learning contexts—it would need to involve something like collaborative inquiry in its robust sense.

In “Toward a Post-Process Pedagogy,” Paré cites some authors generally associated with the social turn, most notably David Bartholomae, Berlin, and Faigley. Although he never uses the term social turn himself, he admits that “fragments of a social theory of writing” are broadly shared. And, he presents the central claim of Trimbur’s post-process—that all language use represents a struggle over depictions of reality—as one of the “four key fragments of a social view of writing” (4). (For what it’s worth, the other three refer to the epistemic, formative, and intertextual dimensions of language use.) But, whereas Trimbur and other post-process scholars would credit social power structures (of race, class, and gender) for the dominance and/or prevalence of hegemonic ideologies, Paré takes the comparatively apolitical view that the best arguments win (5).

When the adjective post-process appears in Paré’s article (including in the title), it’s always applied to a pedagogy (4, 6). And, importantly, Paré’s thinking seems to be very much in-line with Reither’s and Hunt’s and Vipond’s. A pedagogy that would “mak[e] school writing a social act,” he argues, could not
simply draw from “one or another of the beliefs” he had previously described. It would instead need to “draw on all of them” (6). Paré also theorizes six primary implications of a social theory of writing for a “post-process writing pedagogy.” To justify the first of these, that students should “write as part of ongoing activities,” he cites Hunt; then Reither; then Vipond; then an article co-authored by Reither and Vipond—all within the space of a page. Drawing from Hunt, he notes that academic writing tends to be “disengage[d] . . . from the context of use and human purpose,” which leads students to write “textoids,” rather than actual, meaningful texts. Drawing from Reither, he argues that non-academic writing often succeeds where academic writing fails because, in non-academic contexts, “writing is a secondary activity . . . always in the service of the discource community’s work.” The “work” of schooling is “inquiry, research, speculation, reflection, debate, analysis” and so forth, and, to be clear, “writing can be used to get that work done.” To explain how to use writing to “get something done,” Paré cites his own efforts working with engineering students. But, his very next example refers to “Douglas Vipond’s psychology class at St. Thomas University in Fredericton,” which had “prepared a booklet on psychology for Susan Mac-Donald’s grade nine class at Dalhousie High school,” after an extensive process of research and correspondence. Then, Paré immediately notes that Reither has described “a number of projects that engage students in collective inquiries,” referencing his work with Vipond, as well (6). Between this first reference to Hunt and this last reference to Reither and Vipond, no other scholar (besides Paré himself) is cited.

When Paré presents his second implication, that students should “write with new technologies,” he refers once more to Hunt, who “has made ambitious use of locally networked computers to turn his literature courses into collective inquiries,” in which “virtually all classroom ‘activity’ occurs on the computer” (7). Paré does not defend his third principle (“Explore conflict and difference in writing”) by way of Hunt, Reither, or Vipond. But, he does return to them to justify his fourth: “Write as one of many voices.” To help students write as “contributors” to their “disciplinary conversations,” rather than merely as “commentators,” Paré advocates inkshedding. To assist students in “writing in many different roles”—his fifth post-process pedagogical implication—Paré endorses collaborative investigation (though he does not call it by this name). He writes,

To help develop expertise in the classroom, a teacher might begin by breaking complex topics into sub-topics and dividing reading or research responsibilities among the students. Or, better yet, have the students explore the topic and devise
their own investigations of sub-topics. Each student becomes an expert . . . and reports back to the whole group. (8)

But, even here, the influence of Hunt, Reither, and Vipond is not done. In justifying his sixth and final implication—“write collaboratively”—Paré turns to Reither once more (8). I do not believe I am over-stating my case, then, when I say that Hunt, Reither, and Vipond are the genealogy of post-process north of the U.S.-Canada border.

At the start of this chapter, I argued that Paré’s post-process more closely resembles paralogic, externalist postprocess than the left-wing trajectory of the social turn. To conclude, I would like to consider, then, how Paré’s notion of post-process moves beyond Process and how it aligns with what I am calling postprocess. In one of the few histories of post-/postprocess to even reference Paré’s work, Paul Kei Matsuda writes,

Like Trimbur, [Paré] used the term [post-process] in referring to the view of “writing as a social act” in contrast to the cognitive view of writing that emerged “when psychology was the dominant influence on composition studies.” Despite the title of his article, however, Paré used the term “social process” (p. 4) several times in his article, suggesting the ambivalent position that the social view of writing occupied in relation to process theories and pedagogy. (73)

Matsuda is, of course, largely correct. For Paré, a post-process approach is decidedly not an expressivist or cognitivist one, and he uses the phrase “writing as a social act” to indicate as much. It’s also true that “social” views of writing hold an ambivalent position within the histories of Process and post-/postprocess. Though I don’t necessarily disagree with Matsuda, I would still add a few points here.

First, when Paré refers to writing as a “social process,” he is making a declarative statement about how writing emerges. It is a process, to the extent that it emerges or unfolds in time, and to the extent readers co-construct meaning with writers. But, it is social to the extent that it is dispersed or distributed. Though Paré discusses post-process pedagogical methods and employs the phrase “writing is a social process,” he carefully avoids equating post-process pedagogical methods with “social” Process approaches to writing instruction. Indeed, in his second paragraph, he quite clearly affirms that “we have moved beyond process”—that is, a Process approach to writing instruction.

Second, even while admitting that writing is a “social process,” Paré seems to distance himself from that formulation. I think, like Reither, he is less inter-
ested in launching a full-scale critique of Process or even of the social turn and more interested in intensifying or rigorously extending them—even to the point that they become something else. In the first column of his text’s first page, Paré affirms that cognitivists formerly “thought of writing as something that happened largely in the writer’s head,” but, now, “we have come to view writing as a social process.” By the bottom of that column, though, he switches to an importantly different phrase: “I would like to explore the deceptively simple idea that writing is a social act,” a phrase that he repeats twice more in the next column (4; emphasis added). On the next page he refers to “our understanding of writing as a social activity” (5). And he refers to his post-process pedagogy as a way of “making school writing a social act” (6). When the phrase “social process” appears again, it is not something that writing is but something that writing is subsumed within: “The thinking that writers do is part of a larger, social process and the texts they create are strands in a web of activity” (6); “by locating writing within the social processes that could and should constitute school work, we can re-unite the idea and the action of composition” (9); and “naturally, we must help students with invention, style, and arrangement . . . but those concerns will only have an impact on and make sense to our students in the broader context of a social process of writing” (9).

It’s worth affirming, then, that (social) “action” rather than (social) “process” seems to be the key term for Paré or that, at minimum, any conception of writing as social process is bound up with it also being a social act. In this way, Paré’s terminological preference places his theorization alongside (if not within) the genealogy of postprocess I have been developing throughout this book. Notably, Paré does not quote from Cooper and Holzman or from Kent. But, Writing as Social Action is, of course, the title of Cooper and Holzman’s 1989 book. Cooper and Holzman admit drawing their terminology from Vygotsky (“and his American students”), and they directly oppose the “Cartesian idea of the self” and the “Romantic paradigm of the isolated writer thinking individualized thoughts.” Noting that the “social aspects of writing have increasingly received attention within our profession, particularly in the last several years,” the authors state their desire to be “very clear about what we mean when we say that writing is a social activity,” importantly “emphasiz[ing] both parts of this term” (ix). And, at the same historical moment in which Paré was writing (1994), Kent was also arguing against process as a central term and for activity, in its place: “As strong externalists, we would stop talking about writing and reading as processes and start talking about these activities as determinate social acts. This shift from an internalist conception of communicative interaction . . . to an externalist conception that I have outlined here would challenge us to drop our current process-oriented vocabulary” (Paralogic Rhetoric 169).
In short, for Paré, as for Hunt, and Reither, and Vipond, a post-process mode of writing instruction looks very much like what I have called a postprocess approach. It entails constructing situations in which texts do things, in which students write and read and respond to one another, and in which their texts are written and read and responded to, as though they were meaningful utterances. That language is a social phenomenon is taken for granted. It is, to borrow a phrase from Joseph Petraglia, “the right answer to a really boring question.” There are better what-is-writing? questions to ask, and better answers to give.