Introduction

Multiple Literacies

In this book, I argue that we take better advantage of multiple literacies, that we investigate and use whatever intellectual pathways we can to help writers generate, organize, reconceptualize, and revise thoughts and texts. The metacognitive distance all writers need—on a draft, on an idea, on their thinking—can come through visual, aural, spatial, emotional, kinesthetic, or social ways of knowing, or unique combinations of them. I also argue that we should have greater expectations for all our students, resisting the urge to use one way of making knowledge—writing—as a gauge of their intellectual capabilities. Those who for whatever reason are not “good writers” should be expected to call upon other strengths to enhance the linguistic-based tasks English Studies requires. Those already “good writers” should be expected to develop what may be for them lesser-used representational systems (talking, sketching, moving, etc.) as ways to gain deeper insights on their print-based work. All writers would benefit from multiple intellectual pathways to generate knowledge, and the world in general would benefit from the intellectual contributions of people traditionally excluded by print-loving pedagogies.

In the early chapters, I point out how univocal Composition theory has become in promoting the importance of language, especially writing, in knowing, so much so that these beliefs may be affecting our openness to other theories of knowing. I argue further that Composition has taken some of its most influential theorists and lopped off for its use only part of the theory espoused by them. There were and are a number of people who embrace ways of knowing beyond writing and language, but their language-as-knowing statements are the ones repeatedly selected in Composition citings of their work. What else they endorse regarding the role speech, visualization, and movement play in learning has been consciously or unconsciously de-selected.

Within our field, ideas related to multiple ways of knowing have surfaced in the theories and practices of some of our most influential teacher/scholars. James Moffett depended heavily on drama as a way for writers to obtain intellectual distance on ideas. Nancy Martin, who
with James Britton did much to launch the language-based reform
movement in London that was the forerunner to the Writing Across the
Curriculum movement in the United States, did much work with play.
Lev Vygotsky called play, which included the physical action involved
in it, “a leading factor in development” (1978, 101), but Vygotsky is
mostly cited in our field to support theories on the importance of the
social in learning. Even Janet Emig, whose essay “Writing as a Mode of
Learning” David Russell credits with heavily influencing the field’s shift
to a focus on writing as a unique mode of learning, supported writing
over speech partly because speech could not then be easily transcribed.
And Paulo Freire, who was deeply interested in how people come to
know, used what today would be called multiple intelligences in his
teaching. As we shall see in Chapter 2, few who cite Freire foreground
that important aspect of his praxis.

That people make knowledge in ways other than writing is an
idea that has been posited and demonstrated in disciplines beyond
Composition and Rhetoric. Thomas West has written about mathe­
maticians and scientists visualizing theories before writing them down.
Allan Gross, Susan Eriksson, and others have pointed out that Charles
Darwin’s theory of evolution was a sketch called “A Tree of Life” be­
fore it was described in words.1 Darwin’s sketch was an intricate draw­
ing, a huge tree with different-sized branches connecting to a central
trunk. According to Gross (1999) and Eriksson (1999), Darwin used
this sketch and metaphor to conceptualize and work out his theory.
Only then did he write it down.

Howard Gardner (1995) has focused attention on seven and then
eight “multiple intelligences”: linguistic, logical-mathematical, spatial,
bodily kinesthetic, musical, interpersonal, and intrapersonal. The eighth
is “naturalist intelligence,” a way of discerning patterns in the natural
world.2 Daniel Goleman (1995) has foregrounded the importance of
“emotional intelligence,” and Antonio Damasio (1999) has shown the
role emotions play in thinking. These insights from other fields, how­
ever, have not impacted writing theory and practice in substantial ways.

Whether the idea of alternate ways of knowing comes from out­
side or inside Composition, however, it is an idea that, with too few
exceptions, has been ignored or dismissed. I will end by arguing for a
critical synthesizing of divergent theories of learning. These theories
may appear at times contradictory in an either/or loving culture. How­
ever, we should take advantage of any perceived contradictions—or
“contraries,” as Peter Elbow would call them—for the productive di­
agnostic they provide for keeping us always questioning what we’re do­
ing and why.

In “Modernism and the Scene(s) of Writing,” Linda Brodkey wants
to disrupt a cliché about writing: the scene of a writer working alone in
a garret, isolated from social forces. Instead, she wants to shift our con-
ception of writing to encompass “the very social, historical and politi-
cal circumstances from which garrets have been defending us” (1987,
413). She says, “To see writing anew, to look at it from yet other van-
tage points, we must re-read an image that we have come to think of
as the reality of writing. It is not enough to say that it is only a picture,
for such pictures provide us with a vocabulary for thinking about and
explaining writing to ourselves and to one another” (399). Similarly, I
would like to disrupt clichés, commonplaces, and romanticized scenes
of writing held by pundits in the media as well as by theorists in Com-
position. I want to disrupt remaining myths about literacy: that “smart”
people write well; that “dumb” people don’t; that writing is itself the
best heuristic for carrying out the intellectual work involved in writing:
and that oral, visual, or kinesthetic approaches to generating, organi-
ing, or revising texts are acceptable for “basic” writers but not “serious”
intellectual pathways for “real” writers.3

I am not the first person inside or outside Composition to make
a case for using “multiple channels of communication” (Paulo Freire’s
phrase) to supplement the teaching of writing and textual study. As I
will explain more thoroughly in Chapters 1 and 2, a number of people
in Composition or related fields have made similar arguments: Linda
Hecker, Karen Klein, Peter Smagorinsky, Joan Mullin, Pam Childers,
Eric Hobson, Dan Kirby, Tom Liner, and Ruth Vinz. Rita Dunn and
Kenneth Dunn have done extensive work in the secondary schools
with their model of 21 “elements” or learning styles, which are in-
fluenced by environmental, emotional, sociological, and physical fac-
tors (1993, 3–4).4 With too few exceptions, however, we in Compo-
sition have not taken up either the theories informing this work or
practices that would result from it because of our limited assumptions
about how people come to know, as well as a vested interest in pro-
moting language-based epistemologies. We should expect more of our-
selves and our students.

Throughout the chapters, I use a number of different phrasings
to describe the various ways people come to know and the approaches
we might use to take advantage of those ways. Sometimes I borrow
Howard Gardner’s phrase “multiple intelligences,” and sometimes Mary
Belenky and colleagues’ “ways of knowing.” I like Brenda Brugge-
mann’s use of “alternative formats” for teaching diverse populations,
and Donna LeCourt’s recommendation for using “multiple literacies” in
Writing Across the Curriculum reform. I also use the phrases “multi-
sensory approaches,” “alternate strategies,” “diverse intellectual path-
ways,” and others. I especially admire Paulo Freire’s phrase “multiple
channels of communication” because he was aware of their importance
over forty years ago, seeing their link with student confidence, thinking,
and knowing. I use these phrases interchangeably and realize that other users may take issue with that decision. I deliberately intermix these terms to avoid being locked into one epistemological frame and also to draw from as broad a knowledge base as possible.

**Epistemological Assumptions and Methodology**

This book is not a case study, a report, or a history, but an argument. Drawing on Sharon Crowley's and Debra Hawhee's (1999) explanation of ancient rhetoric in the first chapter of their textbook, I would characterize what I do in these pages as an attempt to use both extrinsic rhetorical proofs (facts and testimony) and intrinsic ones (ethos, pathos, and logos, or reason) to advance a course of action in Composition and English Studies. I select facts from both well-known and lesser-known studies, testimony from students, and quotations from those with recognized expertise in language or literacy. I use students' texts and drawings, personal narratives, anecdotes, pathos, reinterpretations of theoretical essays, summaries of selected empirical studies, metaphors, and other figures of speech. This book is a rhetorical stew intended to convince readers to accept its argument: that we should experiment critically with broader, braver conceptions of “knowing,” “text,” “reading,” and “writing.”

If I were to describe my mode of inquiry using Stephen M. North's categories from *The Making of Knowledge in Composition* (1987), I would describe some of what I do in these chapters as belonging to the work done by “The Critics.” That is, I use a hermeneutical mode of inquiry to investigate “knowledge about the meaning of texts, derived from the act of reading, articulated as critical analysis, and refined by dialectic” (1987, 119). I examine selections of what might be called canonical texts in Composition (well-known articles or books by Janet Emig, Paulo Freire, Lev Vygotsky, and others), and I reinterpret them for what I think the field has missed regarding alternate representational systems. I also dabble in North's “Philosophers” category, accepting his definition as having “the impulse to account for, to frame, critique and analyze the field's fundamental assumptions and beliefs” (1987, 91). Throughout the book, but especially in Chapter 1, I examine and critique Composition's reliance on word-based theories of knowing. I also look at Paulo Freire's reception in this country, but I do not claim to be a disinterested historian.

However, when I look back over my professional life as a whole, not just the ten years since I received my doctorate, I come closest to fitting into North's category of “Practitioners,” in that much of my knowledge base comes from my teaching experience. I have been a tu-
tor in one writing center and a director in another. The institutions in which I’ve worked include a middle school, public and private high schools, a two-year college, a four-year liberal-arts college, and two state universities (one in New York and one in Illinois), and the Rensselaer, New York Girls Club. I’ve taught every level of student from seventh grade through Ph.D. candidates. I’ve directed plays—with little kids, as well as high school students, as actors. When I was faculty advisor for a yearbook, I learned and taught layout design. I’ve tutored algebra and geometry and showed my nephew how to swing a golf club. I’ve taught composition, creative writing, literary theory, and driver education—not at the same time, though they’re not as far apart as one might think.

My students and I have worked with lots of words, but we’ve also seen knowing and not-knowing manifest themselves in many ways. I’ve seen how people’s bodies reflect both fear and confidence as they’ve faced opening-night stage fright, road test terrors, and writer’s block. I have not fully articulated what my practice reveals about my epistemology, but the struggle to do so, knowing I’m partly unconscious of ideologies shaping my perceptions, challenges me to be as methodologically self-aware as possible. Mostly what I’ve learned is that I have to keep learning.

Therefore, much of what I “know” is experiential, shot through with composition, literary, critical, and more recently disability studies theory, but also influenced by selected empirical research in neuroscience, biology, and psychology. It should go without saying that assumptions about knowledge in these areas are different, and I am grateful to C. H. Knoblauch and Lil Brannon (1984) for helping me analyze epistemological differences and “true intellectual oppositions” these theories might involve.

In trying to characterize where I fit into published maps of the field, I admit I gather rhetorical proofs from fields with different modes of inquiry and assumptions about what constitutes knowledge. I am inspired, however, by James Berlin’s description in Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures (1996) of social-epistemic rhetoric:

Social-epistemic rhetoric is self-reflexive, acknowledging its own rhetoricity, its own discursive constitution and limitations. This means that it does not deny its inescapable ideological predispositions, its politically situated condition. It does not claim to be above ideology, a transcendent discourse that objectively adjudicates competing ideological claims. It knows that it is itself ideologically situated, itself an intervention in the political process, as are all rhetorics. Significantly, it contains within it a utopian moment, a conception of the good democratic society and the good life for all of its members. At the same
time, it is aware of its historical contingency, of its limitations and incompleteness, remaining open to change and revision. (81)

I hope my approach to teaching, inquiry, research, and learning intersects positively with that description.

Theoretical Problems

This book also describes how I or others use sketching, drawing, movement, oral group work, presentations, or performance to stimulate thinking. It suggests how and why we can use non-writing (in addition to writing, of course) to help students write better, even as it questions what “writing better” means and whose interests that writing serves.

As I consider these questions and redesign my courses around multisensory strategies, I need to address some theoretical problems involved. Much of the intellectual work described in these pages involves collaboration: students sketching patterns and explaining them to classmates, working in groups, responding to multiple drafts via e-mail, using 3-D models, presenting or performing in front of a group, etc. A good place to begin is with the juxtaposed essays about collaborative work that appear in Victor Villanueva’s Cross-Talk in Comp Theory (1997). Drawing on Richard Rorty, Kenneth Bruffee argues that collaboration can result in insightful “abnormal discourse,” Rorty’s phrase for unconventional commentary coming from an individual in a collaborative group (Rorty 1991, 407). If one group member is from another culture, for example, she or he might offer an “off the wall” take on conventional views. This “abnormal discourse” can force other group members to rethink their positions.

John Trimbur and Greg Myers, however, take issue with Rorty’s and Bruffee’s faith in abnormal discourse. Myers argues that ideologies are so powerful they prevent a group from offering anything other than a hegemonic agreement on what is appropriate or valuable. To view collaborative work in any way other than as a confirmation of mainstream ideologies, Myers argues, is naive. He says, “In this article, I am asking, not for a new kind of assignment, but for more skepticism about what assignments do to reproduce the structures of our society” (1986, 434).

Similarly, Trimbur criticizes Rorty’s idea of “abnormal discourse,” arguing that it relies on a “romantic” idea of an individual, a fool or a rebel who somehow resists convention. Instead, Trimbur argues, consensus can be used to “generate differences, and to transform the relations of power that determine who may speak and what counts as a meaningful statement.” How consensus and discensus are used, Trimbur says, “depends on the teacher’s practice” (1989, 440). Myers and
Trimbur are both wary of Bruffee’s use of consensus for its possible role in “accepting the current production and distribution of knowledge and discourse as unproblematical and given” (1989, 448). Trimbur would like to see those discussions of textual analysis framed as questions of power: whose readings, writings, or interpretations are valued and whose are not, as well as why we are doing certain kinds of interpretations in the first place.

Whenever I use the collaborative and/or multisensory work described in this book, which is most of the time, I think about the Rorty, Bruffee, Myers, and Trimbur published debate about consensus, discensus, and whether through my philosophy of teaching I am accepting or challenging oppressive societal practices. What does it mean that I use sketching, movement, peer responding, performance, or collaborative group work to “help students write better”? (And what does “write better” mean?) Am I opposing hegemonic injustices or am I complicit in supporting them? Although I reject the binary, I welcome the dialectic. These questions keep me bothered, keep me thinking about what I’m doing and why. What follows is one attempt to explain where the theories and practices I discuss in this book fit into my life’s work. I will return to this question later.

Although there’s nothing Myers says that I disagree with, I must finally reject the binary evident in his critique, and it is troublesome that he does not describe what he would have his students do that would be consistent with his theoretical stance. But Myers forces me to ask myself, Does my teaching reproduce or critique “the structures of society”? I think, finally, that it must be doing a bit of both. I’m complicit in supporting present societal values, for good or for ill, in that I think it’s my job to help students secure a reasonably satisfying career in this society. Most of the students I encounter come to college partly, maybe mostly, to enter a profession, where they will make the money that with luck will pay their bills, including the loans they took to go to college. Therefore, I feel that it is part of my responsibility as a writing teacher to help them approach present and future writing tasks, in or out of college, with confidence, skill, rhetorical savvy, and yes, some healthy skepticism and critique about what our culture seems to value.

This latter issue I address when I pick readings that call attention to discrimination, unequal distribution of wealth, and other injustices in our society. However, my main contribution against hegemony is using a multi-modal pedagogy that challenges the unaddressed privileging of those who use written words well, and the conventional discrimination against those whose talents involve other representational systems.

Therefore, I try to teach students, or help them to learn, effective rhetorical strategies. If they can recognize them in other people’s writing, they will be less at the mercy of others’ rhetorical power. As
Crowley and Hawhee put it, "the critical capacity conferred by rhetoric can free its students from the manipulative rhetoric of others" (1999, 4). In another sense, I hope I am opposing injustices by helping students recognize and use powerful language. If they can use rhetorical strategies effectively in their own writing, perhaps they can convince their world-mates to be more just, ethical people. I tell students that having rhetorical power does not mean that they will use it for "good" purposes, but that I hope any newfound power they get from this class they will use to improve the world, not make it worse. How to address questions of ethics—ethically—in the classroom is a problem I continuously revisit.

There are at least three strong reasons to use multiple, alternate strategies to teach writing. First, because words are so powerful, we must use all available means to help students discover the power of words and their own power to use them. As Robert Scholes wrote, "Textual power is ultimately power to change the world" (1985, 165). Second, we must reach as many students as possible and we must help them reach their full potential. Third, and at the very least, we must "do no harm." Using multiple ways of knowing also addresses a pedagogical injustice that is both systemic and local. Throughout most of the educational system, and especially in writing classes, students are forced to use linguistically centric tools to perform virtually all intellectual tasks.

Composition is partly failing on all three counts. We are not using all available means of helping students realize and use the power of written text. We are relying too much on linguistic pathways, probably because that's our preferred inroad, and we're not taking full advantage of what students can teach us about oral, spatial, visual, social, or other ways of knowing. Therefore, we are excluding people. In addition, the linguistically talented students who tell us they "love English" are not developing as much as they could be as thinkers because they (and we) are missing the insights from pathways others could show us. Finally, we might be doing harm, albeit inadvertently, to students who know things in ways we do not. They fail our courses, but it is we who are failing them. We are disrespecting their other intellectual contributions, even as we are losing what they could teach us.

So what, finally, are the epistemological assumptions behind "multiple channel" strategies? Let me address that question through an epistemological map of the field. In "Rhetorical Constructions" (1988), C. H. Knoblauch divides assumptions about knowledge and language into "four distinct views" of the "ground" or basis for verbal meaning. In the "ontological" quadrant, language is not related to knowledge except as a representation of thought. In this view, "truth" or "reality" exist prior to language, and language has no power to change either. The
"objectivist" view of knowledge and language began in the seventeenth century with an emphasis on observable, experiential, "scientific" facts. The third view is "expressionist," locating knowledge in human consciousness and individual imagination. The fourth view Knoblauch calls "the dialogical or sociological statement," which "rejects at once the metaphysics of an ontological argument, the positivist, reifying tendencies of objectivist rhetoric, and the privileging of 'consciousness' (universally or individually conceived), associated with expressionist rhetoric." In this sociological quadrant, "Language is regarded as a social practice rooted, as are all social practices, in material and historical process" (Knoblauch 1988, 134).

How do my assumptions about knowledge and language fit into those quadrants, and what do the multiple approaches I use indicate about my assumptions? Critics may view some of these strategies as expressionistic in that the tasks seem to assume if writers think about their texts carefully enough, or from enough distance, that they will find "true" meaning and revise accordingly. However, what students are "seeing" in that metacognitive distance is shaped by socially constructed factors: the expectations of a discourse community, the different ways a variety of readers will receive their texts, the intertextual and connotative meaning of a particular word, the cultural work they want their text to do. Sometimes, promoting any way of knowing may seem to assume an ontologically "right" way of teaching. While I do not believe in one right way to teach everyone, and I have stopped looking for it, I do think there are wrongheaded, potentially harmful things we do that we ought to change. While I am aware that scientific-objectivist research has methodological flaws and is typically not sufficiently aware of the rhetorical nature of its own reporting, I do not reject all of it out of hand. To adapt Elbow's phrase, I try to believe it and doubt it at once, trying to fit it into my own, ever-shifting epistemological frame. Am I inconsistent? Yes. Do I confuse my students? I hope so, but productively, I think.

I'm still working through my philosophy of teaching because I'm still working through my philosophy of life. I think it may not be necessary or even possible to ground knowledge making in only one quadrant. My view of knowledge and language is not yet fixed. It is partly experiential, from years as a practitioner, and partly ontological, from indelible years of Catholic school religion classes that were both sublime and ridiculous. I know things also from what I read: fiction, newspapers, student work, and composition articles—also alternately sublime and ridiculous.

Personally, I don't "know" that there is not an ontological basis for meaning. I think I believe that knowledge is grounded partly in all four quadrants. That's contradictory perhaps, but only according to a
kind of logic that is arguably irrelevant in a postmodern world in which the only certain thing is its contradictory nature. I know, mostly from background in feminist theory (thanks to graduate classes from Judith Fetterley and Joan Schulz at SUNY Albany), that what a society accepts as “known” is socially constructed. I see how women and others in this culture have been constructed, and I know that this construction is unjust and unnatural—the latter term also a social construction. A good part of what I “know” comes from my life experiences and observations, even though what I “see” and “experience” is always already filtered through a socially constructed lens. Nevertheless, my experiences seem real to me, and I live my present life under the influence of my past, aware that my notion of “self” as a subject in a post-modern world is something Lester Faigley (1995) has effectively problematized. I realize my epistemological assumptions contradict one another. Some days I dwell more in one mode of inquiry, one quadrant of assumptions, than in another. I can live with the confusion. I welcome it, in fact, often discussing these theoretical conflicts with my students, the majority of whom are planning to be teachers who also need to examine their view of knowledge.

The students in my classes live in a world in which epistemologies compete and overlap, in a world of people whose beliefs are shaped by different and various assumptions about knowledge and power. Assumptions in the field of Composition about writing are also socially constructed, complicated by Composition’s vested interest in promoting the idea that knowledge is word-based. If students can generate knowledge from drawing as much as they can discover it from writing, our expertise in writing may be less valued.

It matters whether we think knowledge comes from an ontological source, inner selves, “science,” or sociological dialectic because these assumptions impact whether people think there’s a “natural way” things are or whether they can change the “reality” their society has constructed. But why can’t those different epistemological systems oppose each other cooperatively? So what if they contradict each other? If they didn’t, then we would “know” once and for all that we’re right, which would be itself a kind of essentializing position. So we should not only live with the contradictions but encourage them. Everything we “know,” all that is “real,” we interpret through a socially constructed lens. We can also “know” things through our lives, or because we’ve read a well-done piece of research, or even because we “believe” it on some level through what remains of ontological beliefs.

We need to start with practice and we need to start with theory. We need to start with assumptions, with the various definitions of “writing” that emerge when we use that word and think we’re all talking about the same thing when we’re not. The words, sentences, essays,
novels, poems that appear on a page or screen are the result of complex sociological, emotional, physical, and neurological processes that none of us completely understands. The “writing process” of early drafting, getting responses, revising, and editing is a logical, workable pedagogical approach, especially for English teachers who probably themselves compose written drafts as part of their own preferred process. But it is not the only approach.

This book will privilege speaking and listening, drawing and moving, along with writing and reading, as ways of making knowledge. The theoretical assumptions of the practice described may not always be consistent. Because I draw multi-modal strategies from so many different epistemological backgrounds, I may be accused of using what Knoblauch and Braun call “a smorgasbord theory of instruction” (1984, 15). Part of me agrees with them that using contradictory theories can be risky and confusing for students. However, conflicting views of knowledge should confuse us, as well as our students, providing we point to the conflicts and discuss the consequences of their differences. If we are aware of contradictions, they can keep us on our intellectual toes, keep us rethinking and questioning what we do and why. Having a consistent theoretical base, a sure epistemology may be consistent, but it carries with it the danger that we will become too sure, too comfortable with what we do in our classes, too sure that the way we think knowledge gets made and writing gets done, is the only or best way. Learning comes from surprise, doubt, and confusion. We, as well as our students, can handle unanswered questions about what we’re doing and why. In fact, we should foreground those questions more often than we do.

Chapter Summaries

Chapter 1 challenges current ways of knowing foregrounded in most writing and English classes, calling into question the continued privileging of written texts as having the primary role in the production of knowledge. I reinterpret a selection of influential Composition theorists, and I critique baseline assumptions about knowledge making in our discipline. I briefly survey what people both inside and outside Composition have said about knowledge making beyond word-based approaches, and I explain why most of them have not been taken seriously in our field.

Chapter 2 focuses on Paulo Freire's reception in Composition: what has been privileged, what has been marginalized. While I do not argue "against" what has been taken from Freire and used in North American Composition classes, I do argue that an important part of Freire's praxis
that has not been foregrounded is his use of what he called “multiple channels of communication.”

Chapter 3 will foreground other, more intellectually diverse and challenging ways of knowing than are currently emphasized in most Composition and English Studies classrooms. It will show how aural, visual, kinesthetic, spatial, and social approaches can challenge students and teachers alike to think beyond text-based theory and practice and help writers generate and reconceptualize ideas. It can help them gain a metacognitive distance on their work so far, or see it from a different perspective. If those with talents other than linguistic ones can take advantage of what they do well, if they can find a way to use their spatial or physical or musical or artistic interests in their writing habits, they may like writing more and be better at it. If already-good writers are expected to work outside their linguistic comfort zone, to reconceive their project in alternate representations, the challenge of doing so may give them insights, approaches, or metaphors that will inform their work on more sophisticated levels. This chapter includes much student work demonstrating or describing alternate strategies and how students used them to help generate and organize writing projects. I use their work not as detailed case studies, but as brief examples of what some students did in one place and time, using non-writing strategies as they generated and honed their ideas and revised their drafts. It is meant to spark reflection, not imitation.7

Chapter 4 addresses revising and editing issues. It first critiques how “grammar” and “correctness” are usually framed in this culture, and then it provides some examples of how multisensory approaches can help writers deal with issues that are “simple” only to those with certain kinds of linguistic talents or cultural capital. Revising and editing, it should go without saying, cannot be neatly separated from generating and organizing issues discussed in the last chapter. Nor can revising and editing, or generating and organizing, be separated from the theoretical, ideological, and material forces that shape where, when, how, and with whom they take place. I could have separated issues related to writing by theorist, by historical circumstances, by location along a political continuum, or by alphabet. But I have separated them this way, with revising and editing in this chapter, because when I bring students through a writing project, I usually don’t talk about editing strategies until late in the project—though it might be fun some time to do so first.

Chapter 5 has some brief suggestions about how alternate approaches might be used to enhance the reading of texts, in addition to the writing of them. I summarize other people’s good ideas in this regard, as well as some of my own, and how and why I use them in my classes.
Chapter 6 serves as a point of departure for ways to frame discussions of what we are doing when we use these strategies, and why. To put it bluntly, if and when we are asked to justify our use of what others will characterize as “non-rigorous” approaches, because they involve non-writing, we may need some powerful rhetorical spin to explain our theory and practice.

_Talking, Sketching, Moving_ challenges teacher/scholars and students in Composition and English Studies to expect more of themselves and each other. It proposes a shift in theoretical assumptions about “reading” and “writing,” and it describes unconventional classroom practices that emerge from serious reflection on that theoretical shift.

**Notes**

1. In separate presentations, both Gross and Eriksson talked about Darwin’s Tree of Life sketch at the 1999 Fourth National Writing Across the Curriculum Conference at Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, June 1999.

2. See Gardner’s _Frames of Mind_ (1983) for explanations of the first seven. See Kathy Checkley’s interview with Gardner in the September 1997 _Educational Leadership_ for a good explanation of all eight.

3. Ironically, Howard Gardner’s multiple intelligence theory is used in many secondary “gifted and talented” programs. See Reid and Romanoff (1997) and Fulkerson and Horvich (1998).

4. I am not related to that family of Dunns.

5. See page 5 in their _Rhetorical Traditions_ and also Knoblauch’s (1988) “Rhetorical Constructions: Dialogue and Commitment.”

6. Many of the essays cited in this book I revisited because of Victor Villanueva’s excellent collection, _Cross-Talk in Comp Theory_, as well as Mark Wiley, Barbara Gleason, and Louise Wetherbee Phelps’ excellent collection, _Composition in Four Keys_. I am grateful to all of them for making such important essays easily accessible. In my discussion of the “abnormal discourse” debate, the page numbers in parentheses refer to the Villanueva collection.

7. I have institutional permission to conduct research, and all students whose work is included here have been informed that I might use their work in this book. They have signed permission slips from my university’s Institutional Research Board as well as from this publisher. I have changed their names, as I told them I would, unless they indicated in writing on their permission slips that they wanted their real or full names used, in which case I have complied with their wishes.