Historical Review I: From Ancient Greece through Rome

This chapter traces the evolution of thought on style from Ancient Greece through the end of antiquity, emphasizing primary texts and interpretations by contemporary historians. Teachers may want to consult the classical treatises described here to develop a sense of what style has meant to different rhetoricians over time. Most of the authors of these treatises were themselves educators and, even if they do not provide particular instructions about how to teach style, their discussions of this canon directly impact promoting the value of style in contemporary college classrooms. These treatises take a range of positions regarding the importance of style to the overall theorizing and teaching of rhetoric and writing. Some treatises address style as a small part of a larger rhetorical system, some discuss style as a substantial means of developing arguments, and others are devoted entirely to style, and see it as the most central aspect of effective discourse.

Aristotle treated style as one small component of rhetoric, and emphasized clarity and plainness. By contrast, later rhetoricians such as Demetrius, Longinus, and (much later) Erasmus elevated style as a significant rhetorical tool, encouraging students to develop a wide repertoire of rhetorical devices to enhance their persuasiveness with different audiences. The Roman rhetorician Quintilian’s *Education of the Orator* remains the most thorough and comprehensive catalog of stylistic devices and their appropriate use in different rhetorical situations.

A discussion of St. Augustine’s adaptation of the classical tradition for preaching concludes this chapter. Augustine redefined rhetoric as preaching, and appropriated most of Cicero and Quintilian’s thoughts on style for spreading the gospels. In many ways, Augustine was the last classical rhetorician. After the classical era, rhetoric shifted from a
subject devoted primarily to oratory, falling from its place as the culminating part of a student’s education. In the Middle Ages, Boethius split rhetoric and philosophy, relegating the whole of rhetoric to the adornment of thought, and thus aligned with a mimetic (representational) view of language. As such, rhetoric became mainly a matter of style, and altogether less important than invention—now the domain of dialectic. Chapter 3 shows how the late Middle Ages in particular saw style as used mainly to polish sermons and poetry, and to compose letters. Rhetoric occupied a lower place as stylistic embellishment until the Renaissance.

**Style Before the Sophists**

Before the classical era (fourth century BCE), style extended beyond *logos* (speech) to a range of behaviors, including body language, dress, tone of voice, and facial gestures, as well as to “certain types of arguments, structural devices, and techniques of characterization such as slander, or, conversely, self-praise” (Worman 11). In Homeric Greece, no measurable separation existed between thought and language, and even the “word to ‘say’ and the word to ‘mean’ were the same (*legein*), different verbs only appearing later” (Cole 42). Therefore, differences in stylistic expression were not merely adaptations of the same idea; they were different ideas. We can infer from this equation of thought and language that stylistic decisions were a matter of meaning and of invention. For example, we might recognize a difference in a phrase like “Please come with me to Troy” versus “You must come with me to Troy.” The second is not simply a more emphatic instance of the first sentence; it has a different meaning altogether.

The Greeks did not distinguish style from invention or form from content until Aristotle. What we call style today surfaces as early as *The Iliad*, where different styles are observable throughout the speeches and actions of characters. In the reference book, *Classical Rhetorics and Rhetoricians*, Patrick O’Sullivan states that rhetoricians “linked figures such as Nestor, Menelaus, and Odysseus with the major stylistic categories of their day,” comparing and contrasting the plain style of Menelaus with the grand styles of Odysseus and Priam (217). The idea of plain, middle, and grand styles did not fully take shape until Quintilian’s work, but the seeds of the tripartite division seem to lie in epic verse. Thomas Cole observes that strategies used in epic poems
by Odysseus to deceive others eventually became codified as rhetorical devices such as *evidentia*, in which vivid detail of a past event proves it happened (Cole 39).

Aspects of style—including meter, rhyme, and alliteration—originally developed as pneumonic devices used by Homeric *aoidos* (bards), and later *rhapsodes*, who were precursors to the sophists. The role of the *aoidos* was initially to chant epic tales. In the seventh and sixth centuries BCE, they came to embody more of what modern readers would call a *rhapsode*—those who “claimed expertise as Homeric scholars but also as Homeric philologists and phoneticians,” serving as “linguistic ‘guardians’ of Homeric pronunciation” (Cole 17). Thus, an *aodios* was a performer, whereas *rhapsodes* were also interpreters and critics. Both would have recited their tales to music, keeping time with a lyre or staff.

Stylistic conventions for prose evolved from these early poetic, rhapsodic devices. According to Richard Enos, prose style developed during the fifth and sixth centuries BCE, first in Ionia, and then spreading throughout the rest of Attica. Early Ioninan prose writers (logographers) still prized poetic devices and figurative language when writing philosophical, scientific, political, or historical works—so much that they sometimes elevated sound above accuracy (Enos 25). The most well-known logographer is Heroditus, whom Enos analyzes for his narrative style. While it may not be beneficial to encourage students to lie for the sake of style, the fact that early prose historians cared as much or more about their style as the content of their work may surprise students trained to see style as less important, as a matter of rules rather than a major aspect of composition.

Recognizing the origins of contemporary prose style in this period of Western history can liberate teachers from reductive or narrow definitions of style that concentrate only on the surface-level conventions of academic discourse. If style was once an inseparable component of discourse and persuasion, then it is possible to recuperate this definition of style for contemporary writing instruction. This recuperation entails helping students develop an appreciation of how words and sentences sound and how their choice of diction, phrasing, and rhetorical structure can go far beyond the simple adherence to guides and manuals. In essence, claiming this period for style means granting agency to students in their linguistic choices.
Sophists (Fifth and Fourth Centuries BCE)

The sophists conceived of style as generative rather than ornamental. In other words, style assists in the invention of ideas, not merely their expression to an audience after the fact. For the sophists, Gorgias in particular, language always carried the particular worldview of a rhetor with it, and thus could never be objective or transparent, as Plato and Aristotle later asserted. In “On Being,” Gorgias maintains that nothing is knowable or true in itself, and language always mediates the development of ideas. If language determines our perceptions of reality, it follows that stylistic choices are inventive in that they give us a means of altering those perceptions, not merely decorating them for different audiences. Sophists such as Gorgias were the first rhetorical theorists in the Western tradition to recognize and harness the inventive potentials of style.

In the Encomium of Helen, Gorgias speaks of stylistic eloquence as a hypnotic drug, stating that “Sacred incantations sung with words are bearers of pleasure and banishers of pain, for, merging with opinion in the soul, the power of the incantation is wont to beguile it and persuade it and alter it by witchcraft” (45). Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg describe the prose of the sophists, Gorgias in particular, as “musical,” deploying “the devices of the poets” (23). The sophists inherited the poetic tradition of the Homeric rhapsodes, and applied poetic techniques to rhetorical discourse.

Michelle Ballif interprets Gorgias’s work as making important, early articulations regarding the inherent instability of language, a view that complicates the promotion of the plain style (i.e., simple, literal language) as best suited to the expression of ideas. In Seduction, Sophistry, and the Woman with the Rhetorical Figure, Ballif reads Gorgias as rejecting the Athenian emphasis on “the so-called plain style on the grounds that (1) truth is not . . . pure and clear; (2) truth cannot be known . . . and (3) truth cannot be communicated—that it certainly is not transparent” (76). Ballif concludes that the “speakable is not plain—it is (always already) deception” (76). As the next sections show, Plato and Aristotle denied the inherent instability and deception of language, and posited the plain style as the ideal form for conveying truth.

The fundamental difference between sophistic and Platonic or Aristotelian views of language affected opinions about the role of style
in rhetoric. Because language was inherently unstable and always lied, the use of style was seen not as a wild thing to be tamed, but a set of tools. Aristotelian rhetoric saw language as stable, but corrupted when used improperly or unethically to advance personal interests; therefore, style had to be sterilized and reduced to the simplest possible medium so as to not interfere in philosophical pursuits of truth, ethics, and justice. The Aristotelian view led to vilifying the sophists as deceptive, superficial, and immoral until the last century. A more positive view of the sophists evolved during a reassessment of sophistic rhetorics during the 1990s, where such attention helps explain and contextualize the reanimation of stylistic studies. This recuperation of the sophists includes work by scholars such as Susan Jarratt, John Poulakos, Victor Vitanza, and Edward Schiappa.

Other well-known sophistic works include fragments by Protagoras and Antiphon, as well as the anonymous Dissoi Logoi, a text that uses the sophistic view of language as inherently subjective to advance the value of arguing on multiple sides of any issue. Unfortunately, few extant treatises exist by the sophists. Many of their writings appear in textual fragments, gathered in a collection by Rosamond Kent Sprague. Sean Patrick O’Rourke lists Anaximenes’s Rhetorica ad Alexandrium as one of the only surviving handbooks of the sophists “imparting skills to the practitioner” (20) rather than in-depth theories or prescriptions.

Scott Consigny was among the first rhetoric historians in the 1990s to challenge the once-dominant view that sophistic rhetorics elevated style above content. Distinguishing his view from other historical accounts, Consigny identifies Gorgias’s style as neither mimetic (representational) nor epistemological (knowledge-producing) but as hermeneutic, meaning that Gorgias “would presumably reject the notion that any one discourse and hence any one ‘style,’ whether it be that of the funeral orator, literary critic, attorney or philosopher, has a privileged access to the truth” (50). Edward Schiappa’s The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece reconsiders Gorgias’s use of stylistic devices to redeem him from the traditional view that his style was inappropriate for rhetoric (85–113). While scholars disagree over the extent to which the sophists subscribed to mimetic, epistemic, or hermeneutic theories of language, they tend to agree in their view of sophistic style as more than ornamental.
A wealth of other works rehabilitates the sophists. John Poulakos describes the sophistic stance similarly to Consigney and Schiappa by acknowledging the inherent contingency of knowledge expressed through language. Susan Jarratt re-interprets sophistic theories of language through the lenses of social-epistemic, feminist, Freirean, and poststructural theories of language and literacy. Like Ballif, Jarratt recognizes Plato and Aristotle’s association of sophistic style with deception:

The devaluation of both the sophists and women operates as their reduction to a “style” devoid of substance. Both rhetoric and women are trivialized by identification with sensuality, costume, and color—all of which supposed to be manipulated in attempts to persuade through deception. The Greek goddess of persuasion, Peitho, is linked with marriage goddesses—not for her domestic skill but because of her seductive powers and trickery. (65)

For Jarratt, the prose styles of French feminist writers such as Helena Cixous share stylistic traits with the sophists, including antithesis and a “propensity for poetry’s loosely connected narrative syntax in prose” that challenges “the philosophers Plato and Aristotle with a threatening disorder” and help to construct an alternative epistemic that values “physical pleasure in language” rather than seeing it merely as a transparent vehicle for truths (72).7

**Plato (Fourth Century BCE)**

Plato’s dialogues rarely discuss style explicitly, but we can infer an implicit theory from his criticisms of sophistic eloquence. When taken together with chapters of the *Republic*, Plato’s dialogues suggest that rhetors should use a plain, unadorned style rather than an ornate one. While many sophists such as Gorgias and Protagoras saw the stylistic play of language as a source of pleasure and an end of itself, Plato defined language as a medium best used for discovering and expressing

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7. Victor Vitanza’s *Negation, Subjectivity, and the History of Rhetoric* declares postmodern and poststructural turns in rhetorical and literary scholarship as a dawn of a third sophistic because of their view of style as generative and language as formative.
truth, making language necessarily plain and literal. In many cases, Plato regarded the sophistic orientation to language as dangerous, since it could persuade people toward ideas that were harmful to them and to the state.

Plato articulated his ideas through a series of conversations between fictionalized versions of historical characters. (The Republic is composed entirely of such dialogues.) Plato’s protagonist in these dialogues is his teacher, Socrates, and most of what historians know about him is based on these works. Throughout several of his dialogues, as well as sections of The Republic, Plato distinguishes knowledge from expression while privileging one over the other. Socrates often voices an unfair, subjective suspicion of style, including metaphor, and criticizes poets and sophists for misrepresenting reality. In the dialogue “Ion,” when Ion attempts to explain the importance of verse, he is cut off from explaining how a rhapsode may not know more than a general, but can certainly teach a general how to explain military strategy more persuasively.

In a 2009 JAC essay, T. R. Johnson pinpoints pleasure as a breaking point between Plato and the sophists, namely Gorgias. Johnson characterizes the sophistic goal of rhetoric as “terpsis or aesthetic pleasure, because pleasure makes persuasion possible,” something that provides “the ground on which author and audience merge, a sign that persuasion is succeeding and the crowd is changing” (444). Plato and Aristotle disparaged this notion of style, and define it in opposition to a more Attic, restrained version meant to assist in dialectic. Johnson describes fourth century Greece as an era when rhetoric, eloquence, and magic itself “came to be used unfavorably and to be applied to anything that was deceptive” (444).

In the dialogue “Gorgias,” Plato presents eloquence as harmful in that it only helps rhetors achieve selfish goals by persuading others. When debating Polus, one of Gorgias’s pupils, Socrates vilifies eloquence as flattery, as it “pretends to be that into which she has crept, and cares nothing for what is the best, but dangles what is most pleasant for the moment as a bait for folly, and deceives it into thinking that she is of the highest value” (98). Therefore, eloquence is not an art or medicine in Plato’s view, but mere “cookery” that seeks to make anything pleasant for the moment, but lacks any “account . . . of the real nature of things” (98). Socrates promotes a view of rhetoric as self-regulation for the sake of justice, one of the chief virtues. Rhetoric for
any purpose other than the unadorned expression of truth is immoral. According to Johnson, “Whereas Gorgias had equated rhetoric with both pleasure and medicine, Plato insisted that since what is pleasurable is not necessarily beneficial, not the same as Truth and Goodness, Rhetoric is therefore a spurious art, quite unlike medicine” (445). For Plato, rhetoric served only as a means of pursuing universal truths about how to live a just and ethical life. As such, rhetoric had no place for style, except in the most limited sense of conveying ideas clearly.

In the “Phaedrus,” Plato discusses aspects of style more directly. Here, Plato dismisses the idea of eloquence altogether, having Socrates declare attempts to study rhetorical devices as useless. In the place of eloquence, Plato posits rhetoric as an ethical discourse in which one attains knowledge through analysis and synthesis that persuades other souls. Again, Plato sees rhetoric as ethical only when it expresses a truth arrived at independently of public deliberation, and deliberation about uncertain political matters is labeled “sophistry” because it never attains a definite universal knowledge. Once again, Plato makes the case for a plain, direct style of discourse in which reason is used to persuade someone toward truths, rather than style as the manipulation of emotions through skillful use of language.

It may help to compare Plato’s view of language in these dialogues to that of Gorgias’s in “Encomium of Helen,” in which Gorgias promotes the hypnotic powers of eloquent language, but does not dismiss them as inherently immoral. Gorgias defends Helen, who is seduced by Paris in *The Iliad* to flee with him to Troy, abandoning her marriage and igniting a long, bloody war with Greece. His argument is that Helen was carried away by Paris’s eloquence, a fact that acquits her of any wrongdoing. Whereas Gorgias’s point is respect and awe for such power, it was exactly this power that alarmed Plato—such instances are what provoke his adamant stance on rhetoric as a tool toward advancing truth and justice, not the manipulation of language to persuade others toward any opinion or action.

In Book X of *The Republic*, Plato expels poets from the ideal city because “this whole genre of poetry deforms its audience’s minds, unless they have the antidote, which is recognition of what this kind of poetry is actually like” (344). For Plato, poetry only imitates representations of true forms, and therefore it is extremely deceptive. To rationalize the rejection of poetic discourse altogether, Plato sets up a complicated chain of argument. First, Socrates asks his interlocutor,
Glaucön, to imagine painters as twice removed from reality by creating representations of beds and tables that are made by craftsmen who, in turn, are representing the ideal form of beds and tables (“made by God”). In turn, poets imitate images and thus are “thrice removed from truth.” Therefore, works of epic verse by Homer deceive audiences into believing that they reveal knowledge about their subjects, such as military tactics, virtue, or politics.

Plato’s theories of poetry as imitation and deception laid a foundation for future debates about its role in rhetoric. For Plato, a plain style ensured the clear transmission of ideas; therefore, the use of imagery, metaphor, and other devices could only lead people astray from greater truths about how to live and behave ethically. Plato, of course, was not the only classical theorist to disparage the sophists. Isocrates, for one, privileged invention over eloquence partly to avoid the label of sophist; he also dismissed sophists as preoccupied with style, as it was unhelpful in debates about civic matters. Aristotle privileged invention, and relegated style to the mere transmission of arguments. As I illustrate in later sections, in Aristotle’s view, the best that style could do was not get in the way of communication.

**Isocrates (Fifth and Fourth Centuries BCE)**

Although Isocrates was a rival of Plato and a student of Gorgias, the two shared a derision of the sophists as overly concerned with eloquence for its own sake. Isocrates situated rhetoric as a tool for democracy, and defined language as a foundation of civic society. As he argues in *Antidosis*, “there is no institution devised by man which the power of speech has not helped us to establish” (in Bizzell and Herzberg 75). Similar to Plato, Isocrates blames the sophists for the decay of Athenian society, saying they have “plunged [it] into such a state of topsy-turvy and confusion that some of our people no longer use words in their proper meaning but wrest them from the most honorable associations and apply them to the basest pursuits” (78). Isocrates refers here to sophistic practices such as *dissoi logoi* (the use of eloquence to make weaker arguments appear stronger), thus disrupting the supposedly rightful representational relationship between words and objects.

Isocrates did not completely share Plato’s aversion to style. He was, in fact, instrumental in the transition of style from oral to written dis-
course. Style often deals with the sounds of words and the rhythm of sentences, and the manipulation of these sounds for rhetorical effect. Isocrates was not skilled at speaking; he used writing as the central medium to express his thoughts on rhetorical education. What the sophists did with oral discourse, Isocrates did with prose. In David Christopher Ryan’s estimation, Isocrates’s emphasis on the stylistics of written prose rather than oratory played a significant role in Greece’s transition from an oral to literary culture, and his “literary paideia” had a profound influence on the Attic Orators Demosthenes, Aeschines, and Lysias, who all worked at “governing written language . . . to evoke an intellectual and aesthetic response by controlling the sound of written words” through “carefully crafted prose rhythm . . . meant to satisfy solitary readers who read prose works aloud” (71).

Until Isocrates, style was the domain of oral discourse. Written discourse primarily served as an aid to speech writers. Writing for any other purpose did not merit attention to style. Isocrates changed this by writing works intended for reading aloud, thus forming the beginnings of a literate reading public. As such, Isocrates devoted his attention to how his works sounded to the individual’s ear in private settings, rather than in public forums, where speeches were delivered. During later classical Greece, we see the spread of literacy and the composition of works that were not necessarily intended as speeches.

Today, when teachers encourage students to “read your work aloud,” they usually mean so to assist in finding typos and grammatical errors. However, this advice applies equally to prompting students to actually witness how their words and sentences fit together into larger pieces of discourse that have a similar effect on readers as a speech, even if they are reading silently. Therefore, it is important to note this period in history as a point in which prose style emerged as an adaptation of the criteria originally developed for elegant speeches and poetry. Many of the tropes and figures recovered by contemporary stylisticians for composition pedagogy were, in fact, designed to enhance speeches, and they were first used by poets.

**Aristotle (Fourth Century BCE)**

The term style as we know it today may owe largely to the work of Aristotle. According to Thomas Cole, the “sharp isolation of style and arrangement as a subject for independent treatment is probably
an Aristotelian innovation,” given that neither the sophists nor Plato discussed them separately from other aspects of rhetoric (11). It is still hard to make a conclusive statement that Aristotle was the absolute first to explicitly address style, given that handbooks on oratorical technique may have existed in the fifth century BCE, but did not survive (Worman; Cole; Schiappa; Kennedy). These included works by Polus and Antisthenes, both believed to be students of Gorgias. Nevertheless, as Nancy Worman notes, Aristotle played a crucial part in the transition of style from *kosmos*, a holistic trait that linked verbal, visual, and embodied eloquence with character (21), to the decoration or embellishment of words (*lexis*).

In *On Rhetoric*, Aristotle may have reluctantly added treatment of style because it “has some small necessary place in all teaching” of rhetoric, and “does make some difference in regard to clarity, though not a great difference” (3.1.6.1404a). Richard Graff situates Aristotle’s views on style within Greece’s evolution from orality to literacy, describing how “the Greek language did not come ready-fitted with a proper equivalent for the modern term ‘prose,’” and so were obliged to “understand their object in negative terms, as not-poetry or non-verse, and to discriminate between prose and poetry primarily at the level of expression or style” (305). As the earlier discussion of the sophists illustrates, Plato and Aristotle found the use of poetic devices for rhetorical discourse inappropriate because it concealed or distracted from the truths of dialectic and logical reasoning. Poetry necessarily dealt with representations and falsehoods, and so their use of figurative language was a given; but, rhetorical discourse should only use plain language and employ figurative language sparingly, and only to clearly explain ideas.

Aristotle’s *On Rhetoric* does not provide an extensive list of rhetorical devices (as later treatises would), nor does it directly mention figures of thought and speech. Aristotle concentrates his treatment of style on metaphor—defined as “an apt transference of words” (3.2.1405b), and maintains that metaphors “should not be far-fetched but taken from things that are related and of similar species, so that it is clear the term is related” (3.2.1405b). He also introduces the techniques of “bringing before the eyes,” understood as vivid imagery and *energeia*, the portrayal of things in motion—making them seem lively (3.11.1412a). Metaphor serves as the primary means of these techniques, when applied specifically to the representation of ideas or events. For instance,
Aristotle writes that a line such as “now then the Greeks darting forward on their feet” uses the metaphor of a dart to bring running “before the eyes” (3.11.1412a). Aristotle barely mentions other devices, though he classifies similes, proverbs, and well-done hyperbole as kinds of metaphor.

It is important to realize that while Aristotle often pulls examples from drama and poetry, he is trying to lay down principles for a prose style, governed by the restrained use of metaphor, for the purpose of imparting information or truths achieved through philosophical inquiry. Thus, for Aristotle, the four virtues of style consist of clarity (saphe), ordinary speech, correctness, and propriety (prepon). As he says, “the subject matter is less remarkable” in prose, as well as in formal speeches; therefore, style is a matter of plain speaking rather than ornament (3.2.1404b). In all such rhetorical situations, the rhetor “should compose without being noticed and should seem to speak not artificially but naturally” (3.2.1404b). In chapter 7 of Book III, Aristotle goes into even more detail regarding the appropriate rhetorical styles for different states of genus (e.g., man or woman, young or old, Spartan or Thessalian) and emotion (e.g., anger, passion, fear). For instance, excessive use of figurative language is appropriate to a state of anger or passion, even in rhetorical discourse.

Aristotle identifies the opposites of virtues as frigidities. The first mentioned is “doubling words”; we would understand this today as hyphenation. For example, Aristotle finds phrases like “beggar-mused flatterers” stylistically awkward because they disrupt rhythm. The second frigidity is gloss—when rhetoricians refer to common people and things through obscure descriptions. For instance, Lycophron refers to Xerxes as “a monster man.” The third frigidity is the use of “long or untimely” epithets, and Aristotle describes these as especially vexing when they substitute for substance. The fourth and final frigidity occurs in inappropriate metaphors, either because they are “laughable” when the subject is serious or “too lofty and tragic” when the subject is ordinary (3.3.1406b).

Regarding rhythm, Aristotle is very specific about the appropriate pace for rhetorical discourse or prose. George Kennedy’s commentary refers to Aristotle’s treatment as “unsatisfactory” because his distinctions between prose and poetry collapse, not only because lyric poetry often used the same rhythms reserved for prose, but also because the examples of rhythmic prose themselves are lines from poems (Ken-
nedy 213). Although the specifics of this section are not all that helpful for contemporary writing teachers, it is worth noting Aristotle’s emphasis on artifice. Like many writing textbooks and style manuals today, Aristotle held that the best style was the least noticeable—the plainest—and this manifests throughout his treatment of style, even regarding rhythm. Aristotle argues that prose “should be neither metrical nor unrhythmical” because, first, rhythmic prose “seems to have been consciously shaped” and, second, because it “diverts attention . . . for it causes [the listener] to pay attention to when the same foot will come again” (3.8.1409a.). Specifically, Aristotle warns against what he calls the heroic meter (dactyls), and ordinary meter (iambs). Instead, he recommends a third meter, referred to as the paean—three short syllables and one long.

Aristotle’s principles of style are often perfunctory, and are sometimes subjective. For instance, he shows disdain for hyperbole, and refers to it as “adolescent,” as evidence of how young men are apt to exaggerate (3.2.1413b). In Classical Rhetoric and Rhetoricians, Neil O’Sullivan defines Aristotle’s prescriptions for style as “at best idiosyncratic” and “an essentially subjective aesthetic judgment that has its roots in the polemic’s of Alcidamas’s [a student of Gorgias] generation about the nature of poetry and prose” (16). In a 2001 RSQ article, Richard Graff attributes Aristotle’s disdain for excessive poetic devices, those common in sophistic oratory, to his preference for written literary texts (19). As Graff argues, Aristotle’s “emphasis on the visual dimension of texts is especially prominent in the account of style . . . which at several points reveals Aristotle’s sensitivity to the opportunities and challenges presented by the medium of writing and the practice of reading” (20).

While conventional readings see Aristotle’s theory of style as mimetic and privileging transparency, not all scholars agree. In Rereading Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Jeanne Fahnestock interprets Book III of On Rhetoric in light of pragmatics, outlining Aristotle’s division of style into metaphor; antithesis, or “sentence patterning” that balances opposing ideas; and energeia (vividness). Fahnestock argues that Aristotle “groups them in chapter 10 on the basis of what they all can accomplish” (171) and finds parallels between figures of thought such as antithesis and lines of argument, as covered in Book II and The Topics (176). In general, a pragmatic perspective on style sees figures of thought and expression as “a stylistic prompt or syntactic frame for
invention,” despite modern epistemological “discomfort that any such notion of purely verbal invention produces” (178). The idea that poetic devices actively construct thought and meaning while being written or spoken disrupts the unidirectional flow of form and content and, when applied to Aristotle, it becomes a progressive reading of an ostensibly conservative treatise.

Aristotle’s definition of metaphor and his discussion of “bringing before the eyes” receive particular focus in historical scholarship on rhetoric. Kennedy’s translation references a large body of secondary sources on Aristotle’s conception of metaphor, defined in Poetics as “a movement [epiphora] of an alien [allotrios] name either from genus to species or from species to genus or from species to species or by analogy” (21.1457b7–9.). In Rhetoric, Aristotle elaborates on this definition through examples, describing “begging” and “praying” as two different species in the larger genus of asking. Therefore, one can adorn begging or denigrate praying by referring to one as the other.

A counterpart to metaphor appears later in Book III that Aristotle calls energeia (actualization). Energeia contributes to a “bringing before the eyes,” understood in contemporary terms as vividness or descriptive imagery. Sara Newman reads Rhetoric and Poetics in light of Aristotle’s philosophical works to assert that “bringing before the eyes . . . functions neither in the traditional, ornamental sense that it is accessory to persuasion, nor in the contemporary sense that . . . [it] constructs meaning” (22–23), but as a blend of the two. As Newman interprets Aristotle, vivid imagery does more than simply beautify an argument; though, it should not become a rhetor’s sole purpose, either. Similar to Fahnestock, Newman concludes that “style contributes substantively to argument” (23) in Aristotle’s framework, despite the conventional view that it works best as invisible. It is possible that Aristotle saw style as inventive, and that portions of Rhetoric that discuss are strongly worded to correct what he saw as the stylistic excess of the sophists. In short, Aristotle may have seen the sophists as privileging style to such an extent that they neglected other parts of rhetoric.

In both Rhetoric and Poetics, Aristotle declares that skill with language is innate and not teachable. In Rhetoric, he states, “Metaphor especially has clarity and sweetness and strangeness, and its use cannot be learned from someone else” (3.2.1405a). In Poetics, he says that “an ability to use metaphor is a ‘sign of natural ability’” (22.17). Yet, Aristotle’s treatment of rhetoric in general—namely invention and ar-
rangement—holds that rhetoric is a teachable *techne*, or art. As stated earlier, for Aristotle, poetic language stood apart from rhetorical language—meaning that while logical and persuasive discourse was teachable, poetry was a gift. One could learn to become a competent speaker by studying and practicing, but in the classical view, one had to be born a poet to benefit from any training.

As such, in *Poetics*, Aristotle lays no rules for the use of metaphor similar to those he states in *Rhetoric*. It could be said that poets were permitted more stylistic latitude than writers in other genres, and Aristotle distinguishes poetry from other genres not merely through use of rhythm or figurative language, but in its purpose. For Aristotle, while rhetorical discourse and prose convey particular truths, poetry deals with universal truths. Rather than reject poets as Plato does, Aristotle situates poetry as a necessary component of society, albeit one that can corrupt if enjoyed excessively. Hence, Aristotle sets up different stylistic fields for poetry and prose. Aristotle advises rhetors to use plain language; yet, for poets, he recommends a mix of plain language with rare words and metaphors. Whereas the point of rhetoric lies in the pursuit and use of persuasion toward truth, the point of poetry lies in a balance of distinction and clarity (1458b). He defends poetry against critics who “made fun of the tragedians because they employ phrases which no one would use in conversation,” arguing that figurative language “gives distinction to the diction” (1458b).

As Kennedy and others acknowledge, Aristotle was the first Western rhetorician to approach grammatical correctness systematically. For Aristotle, proper grammar is part of *lexis* (appropriate words in the right places), and it facilitates clarity—his chief aim for style. For Aristotle, grammar entails effective use of connectives (conjunctions); specific nouns rather than vague ones and circumlocutions; gender agreement (particiles were gendered); agreement in number for plural and singular nouns; and appropriate syntax (to avoid solecisms). Classical Greek definitions of grammatical units differ notably from modern grammar. For instance, no Greek treatise offers a definition of sentences, clauses, or phrases. Instead, they use the term “period” when referring to any unit that appears to have a vaguely defined sense of completeness. In an introduction to chapter five of Book III of the *Rhetoric*, Kennedy states: “Although Protagoras and other sophists had made a start at the study of grammar, it was in Aristotle’s time still a
relatively undeveloped field of study. . . . Systematic grammars of the Greek language did not appear until the second century B.C.E” (207).

Nonetheless, Aristotle’s views on correctness are historically important. Greek identity hinged on language, and those who did not speak Greek were considered barbarians. Later, the Romans followed a similar paradigm, in which identity, status, and morality involved proper, pure Latin without interference from other languages. (Even Greek was seen as inappropriate and distasteful in public forums.) The idea of linguistic purity and its social-political implications extend from this period through much of Western history. Moreover, debates about the homogeneity versus heterogeneity of language lie at the heart of contemporary issues, including the relationship of Standard English to other varieties. It is helpful to see such dominant codes as a set of stylistic conventions from which writers can depart, drawing from other vernaculars, dialects, and languages to decide what words and expressions to use, as well as decide about the grammar and syntax that varies from one variety of language to the next.

**ROMAN STYLE: CICERO AND QUINTILIAN**

Classical Greek rhetoricians presented the first theories of style. Almost all of our terminology for tropes, figures, and schemes comes from the annals of Roman rhetoric—especially Quintilian’s exhaustive catalogue of devices in *The Orator’s Education.* We also inherited the three levels of style (plain, middle, and grand) and four virtues of style from the Romans. These frameworks for rhetoric filtered down through nearly two thousand years, and still haunt contemporary style guides and handbooks. Although Theophrastus originated the four virtues of style, his works are lost; so, Quintilian’s detailed discussion of these virtues (an expansion of Cicero’s) had the greatest influence on subsequent generations of rhetors.

The virtues (*latinitas, dignitas, decorum, ornatus*) present a kind of rubric for classical eloquence that outlines the importance of correct speech, dignity, appropriateness to the occasion, and the ability to ornament discourse with tropes and figures. Romans used the term *amplificatio* (amplification) to describe the process of ornamenting or

8. Fortenbough also sees Roman treatises as important sources for the reconstruction of theories presented by rhetoricians such as Theophrastus (321).
stylizing discourse. (The Greeks referred to it as \textit{auxesis}). In the anonymous \textit{Rhetorica ad Herennium}, and later in Cicero, we also see the first discussion of the three-tiered system of style that has either been adopted wholesale, or adapted by almost every rhetorician since. Of course, the Roman systems of eloquence described here are not without problems. While thorough and detailed, they define style rigidly and preclude use of anything but pure Latin, without much room for deviation, innovation, or error. Only in Quintilian do we begin to see some allowance for breaking rules for stylistic effect.

Before proceeding, it may be helpful to briefly define a few terms used throughout the rest of this book: \textit{trope}, \textit{figure}, and \textit{scheme}. Here we are concerned with broad definitions rather than particular ones, because rhetoricians often quibble over stylistic devices that might fit into more than one of these categories. Roman rhetoricians broadly define \textit{trope} as the deviation from ordinary word use, including use of metaphor, defined by Aristotle as language that refers to one thing as another. Other tropes include \textit{synecdoche} (substituting a part for the whole), \textit{metonymy} (referring to a person or thing by one of its qualities), \textit{irony} (saying the opposite of what we mean), and \textit{oxymoron} (juxtaposing antithetical ideas).

Whereas tropes usually refer to individual words and phrases, a \textit{figure} refers to sentences and slightly longer stretches of discourse. In Book VIII of \textit{The Orator’s Education}, Quintilian defines figures as the use of language for effect. We might say that while all tropes are figures, not all figures are tropes. For example, rhetorical questions and impersonation are considered figures because they do not necessarily use metaphorical language, but are instead meant for effect; i.e., not meant literally as questions. In \textit{Rhetorical Figures in Science}, Jeanne Fahnestock provides an overview of how classical rhetoricians classified and re-classified certain patterns of language as tropes or figures. Ultimately, she proposes a functional definition of figures that is less concerned with categories, in order to account for the use of figurative language that may fall outside the use of formal terms from the classical tradition.\cite{9} Finally, \textit{schemes} refer to the alteration of word order. Examples of schemes include the use of sentence structures such as

\cite{9} Fahnestock also recognizes the difficulty of telling figurative language apart from literal, arguing that these distinctions often depend on rhetorical contexts. What seems literal or figurative can change between situations, genres, and disciplines.
parallelism (the use of parallel clauses) and climax (arranging clauses by order of importance). One especially effective example of a scheme is John F. Kennedy’s motto, as it uses an inversion of word order, called chiasmus: “Ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country.” People do not usually arrange sentences like this, but when they do, it is striking and memorable. Thus, an effective way to conclude a speech or even a paragraph is through a scheme.

Like Isocrates, Cicero regarded style and eloquence as inseparable from public affairs and ethics, in contrast to Aristotelian and sophist stances on style as morally neutral. Cicero’s best-known rhetorical treatise is *De Oratore*, written as a dialogue between two main characters named Crassus and Antonius. As Thomas Conley observes in his reading of Cicero’s *De Oratore* in *Rhetoric in the European Tradition*, “Crassus places his observations on the four basic requisites of a good style [discussed below] . . . in a broad context of right reason and virtuous action” (35). In the Roman sense, style is not just a kind of rhetoric, but is bound with ethics. A style is only “good” if it helps persuade others of virtuous ideas. Whereas Plato defined this as the job of philosophy and dialectic, Cicero is interested not in pursuing eternal truths, but in using eloquence to persuade citizens toward virtuous actions in everyday situations.

In *De Oratore*, Cicero makes style a central concern of rhetoric—not the mere decoration of words after the fact. In Book III, he even says that it is foolish to separate style from content, because one cannot exist without the other. Those who try are “half-educated people” who “find it easier to deal with things they cannot grasp in their entirety,” and so “split them apart and almost tear them to pieces” (3.24). His vision of the ideal orator treats eloquence as the expression of wisdom in a way that is pleasing and interesting to an audience. In his view, orators are more qualified as political leaders than as philosophers, because they have the power to persuade through the eloquent use of words.

Toward this end, Cicero introduces the four virtues of style (*latinitas*, *dignitas*, *decorum*, and *ornatus*). For Cicero, correct grammatical use of Latin and pronunciation is a prerequisite for style. A secondary component of *latinitas* is clarity. Discourse can be correct but still obscure—often through the overuse of ornament, awkward sentences, or

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10 *De Oratore* is the original Latin title for the English translation, *On the Ideal Orator*, cited here.
archaic words. Cicero regards distinction (*dignitas*) as not merely clear, but also apt word choice and even the effective use of rhythm—qualities that make one’s discourse seem unique. *Decorum* is discourse appropriate to the occasion that is effectively ornamented (*ornatus*) with the use of tropes and figures. The occasion of a rhetor’s speech determines their use of figurative language, leading Cicero to prefer a balance of plain and ornamented speech. Overuse of tropes and figures can undermine the purpose of a speech, much like too much sweetness can make someone sick (3.100).

Cicero is also the first rhetorician to propose a three-tiered system of style: the plain style, the middle style, and the grand style. He mentions these tiers briefly in *De Oratore* (3.177), and develops them more fully in a later treatise, *Orator*, where he explains how the level of style corresponds to different rhetorical purposes in a way meant to help orators determine the relationship between the virtues of ornament and appropriateness. Sometimes people want to be swept off their feet with flowery language; other times, they want only the facts explained clearly and quickly; still other times, they want language that renders a particular subject interesting or entertaining. The plain style is appropriate for teaching or imparting information, and consists only of clear, precise language in the way prescribed by Aristotle. The middle style permits some degree of ornamentation in order to emphasize points for an audience. It is also the most universally appealing style, appropriate for instruction, entertainment, and to some degree, persuasion. The third level of style could contain any and all rhetorical devices, at the rhetor’s discretion, to ignite the passions of an audience. The grand style is reserved for serious subjects, and if used for the wrong occasion, could make a speech appear overwrought or contrived.

These divisions also appear in Quintilian’s treatise, and are adapted by St. Augustine for religious rhetoric. The system may seem simplistic given the enormous variety of genres today, but may still help students and teachers think about writing situations within these three broad categories. After all, some genres require clarity and plain language foremost, whereas others might tolerate—or even call for—use of stylistic devices such as vivid imagery, metaphor, alliteration, or different sentence schemes.
For Cicero, the best style is the most expedient in a given situation. According to Elaine Fantham, Cicero’s notion of style as purposeful rather than decorative sets him apart from classical Greek rhetoricians—even the older sophists. Fantham describes Cicero’s stance on style in *De Oratore* as the notion that “discourse pleases because of its richness of content, the variety, not of applied ornament, but of serious topics well handled” (279). Fantham’s reading of Book III, specifically lines 96–198, focuses on Cicero’s distinction between *ornatus* as adornment versus ornament as purpose, as ornament is intrinsic to any speech because “what is necessary and useful is beautiful” (280). As Cicero originally states, “what possesses the greatest utility at the same time has the most dignity, and often even the most beauty” (3.178–80). Therefore, “Cicero is dealing with a type of *ornatus* not found in traditional stylistic theory—the charm, power and variety of speech” (Fantham 280) for the sake of fulfilling a purpose rather than decorating. The most equivalent Greek terms to Cicero’s notion of style lie between *poikilian* (verbal ornament) and *metabole* (transformation). Similar to Fantham’s reading, Cecil Wooten sees Cicero as privileging the functional value of variety (blends of plain, middle, and grand styles) and rhythm, praising them at length as the Attic orator Demosthenes in *Orator*.

Cicero’s own style flew against convention, and he elevates Demosthenes above the other Attic orators in *Brutus* to defend himself against descriptions of his bombastic style as sophistic and Asiatic (179); he explains it as unbecoming of any orator. What Cicero says here conflicts with his statements about the superiority of a stern, Attic style in *De Oratore*. We might think of his statements in *Brutus* as a partial revision of his earlier comments on style, largely intended to make him seem less hypocritical. Richard Leo Enos confirms this understanding of Cicero in *Classical Rhetoric and Rhetoricians*, stating that *Brutus*, in particular, responds to criticism of *De Oratore* by the Atticists, “many of who[m] favored a terser, plain style of rhetoric than what they believed Cicero presented” (107). Throughout Greek

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11. Cicero recommends the plain style whenever possible but, ironically, he does not always practice what he preaches. He was known as a firebrand who often gave wildly passionate speeches. Cicero’s contemporaries (known as the Atticists) criticized him for an “exuberant, emotional oratory” style in his speeches to the Roman senate and in the law courts (Wooten 178).
and Roman rhetorical treatises, excessive eloquence becomes associated with foreignness or Asianism.

Cicero’s work serves as a foundation for Quintilian’s much longer, more ambitious treatment of style in *The Orator’s Education*. In many ways, Quintilian was Cicero’s intellectual heir. Joy Connolly describes Quintilian’s perspectives on style in Books VIII and IX of *The Orator’s Education* as “the bedrock for compositional theory and rhetorical speech analysis even today” (327). Granted, Quintilian follows Aristotle and Theophrastus’s four virtues of style: “linguistic accuracy and purity, clarity, ornament, and propriety [appropriateness],” and he does not innovate as much as catalogue different devices (Connolly 327). However, the value for Connolly lies in this very cataloguing of figures of thought and speech—more than one hundred of them—and in their extensive illustration through examples in poetry and prose (including written speeches) that heavily influenced subsequent eras. Before Quintilian, no one had accomplished an exhaustive catalogue, not even in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. Discussions of devices and their effects were scattered across many different treatises and handbooks.

Quintilian maintained (following Cicero) the centrality of rhetoric to public affairs and ethics; therefore, stylistic eloquence had socio-political consequences. Because language persuaded others toward virtuous actions, eloquent speech was inherently virtuous. The ideal of the “good man speaking well,” explained by Quintilian in Book XII, was the pinnacle of rhetoric, and it could not be achieved by someone who was corrupt. According to Connolly, Quintilian also “condemns rhetoricians whose devotion to fine-tuning grammar or logic blinds them to the true nature of eloquence” (322). Doing so missed the forest for the trees.

Quintilian provides a much more detailed account of the four virtues than does Cicero. Addressing the stylistic virtue of *latinitas* (purity and correctness), Quintilian advises orators and writers against barbarisms, mistakes that render their speech or writing completely ineloquent and ugly. These barbarisms fall into three kinds: when the author

1. “inserts an African or Spanish term in Latin composition” (1.4.8);

2. is “said to have spoken like a barbarian” by making threatening or cruel remarks (1.4.9); or
3. is guilty of “adding a letter or syllable to any word he pleases, or taking one away, or substituting one for another, or putting one in place where it is not right for it to be” (1.4.10).

*Latinitas* is a political as well as moral virtue, Quintilian argues, and the absence of such barbarisms “declare[s] us to be natives of this city [Rome],” and shows “that our speech may appear truly Roman, and not merely to have been admitted [us] into citizenship” (8.1.3). Himself a foreigner from Spain, Quintilian places importance on utilizing style to access the prestige and political security of sounding Roman and, therefore, being treated more like an equal.

Quintilian discusses the virtue of clarity more in terms of what to avoid than what to seek out. For instance, he advises rhetors against circumlocution, overly long sentences, and overuse of parentheses—all of which obscure meaning and drag out what could be stated more simply. As he says, “just because [some rhetors] do not want to make the simple statement,” they “proceed to join this string of words up to another of the same kind, stir them together, and spin it all out beyond the limits of anyone’s breath” (8.2.18). Quintilian sees ornament as the real purpose of rhetoric, without which a speaker is unlikely to persuade an audience. Yet, Quintilian also warns that use of figures, tropes, and schemes “must be manly, strong, and chaste. It must not favor effeminate smoothness or false coloring of cosmetics; it must shine with health and vigor” (8.3.7). Concluding in the vein of Cicero, Quintilian states that “True beauty is never separated from usefulness” (8.3.11). Quintilian goes on to state that unrestrained use of ornament is appropriate for ceremonies, but less ornament is required for deliberative or political speeches, and still less for forensic speeches during trials. The rest of Book VIII deals largely with tropes, defined by Quintilian as “a shift of a word or phrase from its proper meaning to another,” and he dispenses with what he sees as relatively inane debates among grammarians over their classification by figures of thought or expression. Quintilian maintains that some figures “assist in meaning” (8.6.3), while others provide pure ornament. Quintilian also seems to include schemes as tropes, and briefly defines and illustrates tropes such as metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and hyperbole.

Appropriateness is the most important of the four virtues for Cicero because, unless one’s style “is adapted both to circumstances and to persons, it will not only fail to lend distinction . . . [it] will ruin it” (11.1.2). An effective rhetor must adjust style to different themes and
emotions that range from the serious to the trivial, joyful to sorrowful, and angry to despairing. Without directly mentioning Cicero’s three levels of style, Quintilian often references a kind of low or colloquial language necessary for addressing uneducated audiences, in contrast to more ornate, and even florid, styles for ceremonious occasions when one’s purpose is to display talent. Appropriateness is also determined by circumstance, as when orators defend court cases regarding minor versus grave offenses, as well as by time and place (11.1.45–48). There is no strict set of rules for what style to construct for different times and places, but a trained and eloquent speaker should know the differences between public and private settings, crowded and secluded ones—whether at home or abroad. Rhetors should be able to shape the styles of their speeches according to such variations in the rhetorical situation, using more or less ornament and varying rhythm and diction accordingly. For example, someone pleading innocence in a murder trial could alienate his or her audience by speaking in a style that is too eloquent and ornate. After all, Quintilian asks, what kind of innocent person would be in such a calm state of mind to construct such a fine speech? In this case, unadorned, even rough speech may do more to persuade judges.

Quintilian also offers a range of prescriptions about style that seem overly rigid, but he was the product of an extremely conservative time. Like the Greeks, Romans saw Latin as the difference between humans and all other forms of life—including slaves. For the Romans, language did not mean communicating on an equal footing with others. As Laura Pernot observes, “The two verbs meaning ‘to speak’ in Latin, fari and dicere, belong to two strong roots (fatum, fate) and (deik, dike, justice)” (85). To speak was not to engage in conversation or dialogue, but “to decree, foretell, or promulgate rules” and “[w]hen poorly used, it [was] dangerous, creating deadly innovations” (Pernot 85). Kirchner notes that Roman culture valued linguistic purity so strongly that it’s “corruption was also thought to be part and parcel of moral vice” (291).

Many teachers and scholars would now contest Quintilian’s view that stylistically effective writing requires conformity to a specific code, whether that code is Latin, Elizabethan English, or Standard English. What Quintilian dismissed as barbarisms, in particular the insertion of words from other languages into one’s writing, today can be appreciated as helping to make writing livelier, more personal, more
expressive, and more evocative—all traits that are associated with style. Progressive college writing teachers often celebrate the diversity of languages and dialects that students sometimes tap as resources. Contemporary work on language difference and voice encourages the use of multiple codes within a single essay in order to lend a distinctive quality to prose that we may understand as an individualized style. These views are explained in more detail in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.

**Greco-Roman Rhetorical Curriculum:**

**Imitation and the Progymnasmata**

A great deal of what is known about Roman schooling derives from Quintilian, who describes grammatical education as preceding rhetorical education in the vein of the Greek model. Quintilian did suggest an overlap between grammatical and rhetorical instruction, with younger students spending part of the day with a rhetorician, and the other part with a grammarian (2.1.13). Murphy’s chapter in *A Short History of Writing Instruction* describes the sequence of exercises in memorizing model texts, paraphrasing the models, and translating them. Memorization was meant to inculcate students with proper language use, paraphrase to facilitate the beginnings of a unique voice, and translation to develop efficiency and dexterity.

These imitation exercises accompanied the *progymnasmata* that, together, extended from grammatical to rhetorical education. The only major changes involved the complexity and length of the texts that students memorized, analyzed, and imitated. The movement proceeded from narrative-based forms such as allegories to more argument-based ones such as declamations and laws. Murphy points readers to the *progymnasmata* handbook by Hermogenes of Tarsus, the most reliable source for exercises used by the Romans; while written in the second century CE, it is the most faithful to the Roman curriculum.

The fourteen exercises known as the *progymnasmata* (preliminary exercises) trained young grammar-school students in amplification before the progressed to rhetorical study. As Jeanne Fahnestock explains in *Rhetorical Style*, amplification referred not only to the use of rhetorical devices, but also a more general facility or copiousness with language. These exercises began with relatively simple retellings of fables and concluded with difficult assignments in making arguments and proposing laws. They became especially important in Roman edu-
cation, and Quintilian discusses them at length in *Education of the Orator*. Many of these exercises performed a dual role in that they trained orators in stylistic dexterity as well as arrangement, since many of them closely modeled the different parts of forensic, deliberative, and epideictic speeches. Regarding style, even the earliest of the exercises required students’ attention to word choice, as they composed dialogue for characters to expand fables, and developed a repertoire for rephrasing and paraphrasing poems and stories. For example, the exercises referred to as *ethopoeia* (speech in character) called on students to construct a speech in the voice of a famous character from history or poetry. Thus, the *progymnasmata* instilled an awareness of linguistic choices and their appropriateness for different rhetorical purposes.

Richard Leo Enos’s chapter on Greek education in James J. Murphy’s collection, *A Short History of Writing Instruction*, narrates the teaching practices in Hellenistic culture as it transitioned from oral to literate. As Enos explains, the *progymnasmata* became central to the curriculum that was formalized in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE. This curriculum began with instruction to young children in the alphabet, and then proceeded from age seven to fourteen with instruction in grammar and literary criticism. Males underwent military service after this stage, and then, at the age of twenty, were permitted to study rhetoric. (The Romans followed this same progression.) The *progymnasmata* occupied the pre-rhetorical education of students, although, as Quintilian points out, the latter exercises were useful in rhetorical as well as grammatical education. In the edited volume, *Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity*, Ruth Webb summarizes several collections of *progymnasmata* to state that “handbooks from Theon onwards present all the exercises together,” attesting to the fact that “their authors and readers saw the exercises as parts of a unified system to be taught by one master, or at least within a single school” (297). According to Marrou, some rhetoric teachers may have followed Quintilian’s advice and taught all of the *progymnasmata*; others may have taught only the more advanced exercises.

As J. David Fleming describes them, these exercises constituted the second (or middle) stage of rhetorical practice—the first being *imitatio* (imitation) of models, and the third being *declamation*, or “composition proper” (107). The *progymnasmata* and imitation exercises went hand-in-hand, and their value to stylistic training cannot be understated. Often, individual exercises in these handbooks of *progymnas-
mata present sample texts for reading, analysis, and imitation even before instructing students to begin a particular exercise. Both Greeks and Romans viewed the development of a rhetor's style as incumbent upon the skilled interpretation and imitation of classic speeches and poems. It was through the imitation of many influences that students observed and practiced the use of style via word choice, rhythm, grammar, and rhetorical devices. In these exercises, the imitation of great orators and poets constituted the process by which young rhetors discovered and developed their own styles or voices.

Slight differences exist among the various handbooks, but they all contain the following exercises (for an elaborated definition of these exercises, see Kennedy’s translations of the progymnasmata handbooks):

1. Fable (the expansion or abbreviation of one of Aesop’s stories)
2. Narrative (the retelling of a story taken from epic poetry or history)
3. Saying (recounting and explaining an anecdote or pithy saying)
4. Proverb (a similar exercise explaining an anonymous saying)
5. Refutation (attacking the credibility of a myth or legend)
6. Confirmation (doing the opposite with a myth or legend)
7. Commonplace (elaborating on a virtue of vice)
8. Encomium (giving praise or blame to an historical figure)
9. Invective (the opposite of encomium)
10. Comparison (comparing two persons or things, a double encomium)
11. Impersonation (speech from the perspective of a character or historical figure)
12. Description (a vivid description of an object or person)
13. Thesis or Theme (analysis of a complex issue from two or more sides)
14. Law (proposal of a law and its merits, or sometimes the opposite)

The steps laid out for the exercises in these handbooks encouraged students to experiment by elaborating and expanding on the source material. Style might even be said to have served as the primary goal of exercises such as description and impersonation. Exercises in description encouraged students to construct compelling visual images from words, describing objects in nature or a character’s body language and facial expressions. In impersonation, students were judged on their
ability to capture the particular voice or speaking style of someone. Students needed to consider the differences in rhythm, diction, and syntax of different types of characters; for example, understanding how a servant would speak in contrast to someone like Odysseus, Priam, Achilles, or Helen.

One of the most challenging exercises that students encountered was transliteration, or re-writing texts from one genre to another. For instance, Quintilian recommends rewriting verse as prose, and vice versa (10.5.4). Like other exercises, transliteration intended to train students in the stylistic and structural aspects of language. Marrou’s *A History of Education in Antiquity* describes these educational practices in even greater detail, with emphasis on grammar, imitation, recitation, and analysis. Edward P. J. Corbett endeavors to recover transliteration for contemporary composition teaching in a 1971 *CCC* article and in his textbook, *Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student*.

**Later Greeks: Demetrius, Hermogenes, and Longinus (First — Fourth Century, CE)**

Demetrius was perhaps the first theorist to treat style in terms of syntax in his treatise, *On Style*.\(^\text{12}\) Aristotle had made some comments about grammar and rhythm in Book III of *Rhetoric*, but they were undeveloped. In the case of grammar, Aristotle did little more than name parts of speech, and distinguish periodic from progressive sentences. (Periodic sentences place the main clause at the end to build anticipation, at the expense of clarity.) Scott G. Reed states that Demetrius was the first to “relate style to sentence structure” (127), outlining the appropriate length of clauses and periods (sentences) for each of his four tiers of style: (1) elevated or “eloquent,” (2) graceful or elegant, (3) plain, and (4) forceful. Because of its “dynamic, fluid approach . . . teachers and theorists of writing may profit greatly from reclaiming Demetrius from the margins of history” (Reed 127).

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\(^\text{12}\) Much more scholarship exists on the contributions of Longinus than Demetrius. Reed attributes the marginal status of Demetrius to conflicting opinions on the authorship and date of the treatise, maintaining that 275 BCE remains the best estimate. Reed says that because of its problematic authenticity, “it does not even merit mention in Robert Connors’ chapter on the subject” in *Composition-Rhetoric*, which gives a history of style from the Roman era through the nineteenth century (127).
No surviving texts from earlier periods offer a very thorough or nuanced method for navigating the rhetorical situations where one might want a middle ground between the plain and the bombastic style (e.g., Gorgias). Demetrius gives us a third space, as it were, between Aristotelian and sophistic styles, one that teachers and writers can adapt to present-day circumstances. Each tier of style in Demetrius’s system corresponds to different techniques of using figures of thought and expression, diction, syntax, and rhythm. In the eloquent style, for example, long syllables are appropriate because it lengthens important words and lends dignity and gravity to sentences. Any meter is appropriate for elevated discourse, except iambic because “many people speak iambic lines without knowing it” in “ordinary talk” (Demetrius 2.42-45); therefore, the use of iambic makes the subject matter seem ordinary. Sentences or “periods” should have many clauses or “members” for the same reason: “they give the impression of length” (2.45-48). Ironically, elevated discourse should not be smooth, but instead benefits from “words hard to pronounce in combination,” because “their very excess brings out the greatness” of certain subjects. Demetrius goes on to prescribe appropriate syntax, sparing use of metaphor and simile, neologisms, effective vowel combinations, and “epiphonemes,” or phrases added to a sentence for the sole sake of “adornment” (2.105-108).

We might go about reclaiming Demetrius for college writing instruction by considering the broader point that certain stylistic traits of texts are more appropriate for some genres than others. In some ways, Demetrius anticipates Bakhtin’s case in “The Problem of Speech Genres,” nearly sixteen hundred years later, that a given set of stylistic conventions always accompanies a given genre. Arguable, Demetrius is the first to note this relationship between genre, stylistic purpose, and types of sentence construction. We will see similar arguments in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 from composition scholars who write about the rhetorical or stylistic effects of grammar—including Martha Kolln, Laura Micciche, Virginia Tufte, and Joseph Williams.

The core premise of Longinus’s On the Sublime rests on five principles, including: “full-blooded ideas”; “emotion”; “proper construction of figures”; “nobility of phrase”; and “general effect” (7.4-8). In Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity, Jeffrey Walker describes Longinus within the sophistic tradition, a return to Gorgianic hypnosis and rapture. Ned O’Gorman elevates the status of On the Sublime (generally seen as a style manual) to that of a pivotal treatise, “where the art of rheto-
ric is presented as possessing its own end and essence, freeing it from subordination and . . . external judgment” (O’Gorman 72). Longinus’s sublime uses stylistic devices not as “the available means of persuasion or the well-being of the public per se,” as Isocrates and Cicero mandated, “but the road (methodos) to ecstasy (ekstasis) via ‘height’ or hypsos” (73). By situating ecstasy and sublimity (height, hypsos) as the end goal of every trope and figure, creating an “irresistible power of mastery [in order to] get the upper hand with every member of the audience” (Longinus 1.2-11). Longinus defines an end cause of rhetoric (ecstasy) that goes beyond persuading or moving an audience.

Longinus indeed gives style a different role in rhetoric than does Aristotle or Plato, defining style as the use of figurative language to make an audience focus simply on the emotional presence conveyed by a speech. Aristotle positioned style as the clear transmission of ideas, and therefore pushed for a plain, literal style in most rhetorical situations. Longinus’s treatise liberates orators from these constraints and opens rhetoric once again to poetry and play in language. Teachers might consider whether it is possible to explain ideas clearly, on the one hand, while also bringing readers to a state of excitement about a given subject through the use of figurative language and rhythm. Many contemporary approaches to style in rhetoric and composition suggest that it is possible.

Another later Greek treatise by Hermogenes revised and elaborated on Roman theories of style by expanding the three tiers of style. In his work, On Types of Style, Hermogenes offers seven ideas of style that could be blended for a range of different occasions: clarity (making sure audiences understand); grandeur (impressing them); beauty (eliciting pleasure); rapidity or speed (avoiding boredom); ethos (adapting style to one’s reputation and personality); verity or sincerity (style that conveys trust); and gravity (style moving audiences to action). Each aspect of style could be achieved through different tropes and figures. Rhetors wanting to express anger would use grandeur, in particular the subtype he calls asperity, by composing in short abrupt clauses, harsh alliteration, and a range of figures. When rhetors wish to project confidence, they would practice verity and use figures such as apostrophe, parenthesis, and an overall plainer style that listeners would associate with honesty and frankness. The seventh style, gravity, involves the appropriate use of the other six types at one’s discretion. As with
Quintilian, Hermogenes places responsibility for negotiating the types of style within particular situations on the rhetor. Cecil Wooten’s introduction to his translation of Hermogenes states the influence of the work in later antiquity, noting that it all but replaced the Roman, three-tiered style. It became a common textbook in Byzantine schools, and in the mid-1400s it was introduced to Western Europe by George of Trebizond. Once translated into Latin, Hermogenes’s *On Types of Style* had a major influence on the study and teaching of style during the European Renaissance. Its influence is discussed in the forthcoming section on Renaissance style.

**Feminist and Non-Western Styles in the Classical and Ancient World**

Conventional histories often have a blind spot regarding the presence of linguistic others. These linguistic others include genders, cultures, and ethnicities—as well as other regions of the world where other rhetorics form. In many cases, not enough extant texts remain to construct a comprehensive portrait of non-masculine, non-Attic styles. Nonetheless, a growing body of work includes Cheryl Glenn’s *Rhetoric Retold*, Roberta Binkley and Carol S. Lipson’s *Rhetoric Before and Beyond the Greeks*, another collection by the same editors titled *Ancient Non-Greek Rhetorics*, Damian Baca and Victor Villanueva’s *Rhetorics of the Americas*, and Andrea Lunsford’s *Reclaiming Rhetorica*. A number of primary texts are gathered in the 2001 anthology, *Available Means: An Anthology of Women’s Rhetoric*. Although the volume is heavily slanted toward the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it does contain works by Aspasia, Sappho, Diotima, Hortensia, and Heloise.

Feminist historiography guiding such recovery work is critical not only of the exalted status of men in the rhetorical tradition, but also the phallogocentric discourse that dictates the ways histories are structured. A special 1992 issue of *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* outlines other possibilities than merely adding women to the existing historical narratives. Many feminist historical methods also rethink concepts such as linearity, order, and hierarchy. Michelle Ballif articulates the project as a question of liberation:

> What “hitherto unrecognized possibilities” could we explore if our narratives had no syllogistic, metonymic, linear or trian-
regular structure? If we broke the sequence (and the sentence)? What if there were no conditions of a narrative, no universal criteria for judging the Truth or legitimacy of a narrative? (96)

As such, understanding feminist contributions to the study of classical rhetoric mandates the re-evaluation of the theories of classical rhetoricians.

The project that Ballif describes has become central to the recovery work of the sophists, and Susan Jarratt in particular has mobilized sophistic views of language and eloquence toward interpretations of Helena Cixous’s *écriture féminine* (women’s writing) and Julia Kristeva’s *jouissance*. These ways of writing and crafting sentences carry with them alternative modes of thinking and organizing experience. Regarding style, rethinking the classical canon involves “rethinking the sentence” and the idea of speech, poetry, or prose as ideally transparent or, by contrast, opaque. It means envisioning roles for rhetorical style other than informing, delighting, and persuading. Work by Cheryl Glenn on rhetorical silence in *Unspoken* offers such a rhetorical frame, working from the idea that “[a]ll silence has meaning” (11) because it encompasses language, rather than acting as its opposite or absence. Glenn draws on work in linguistics to show how speakers often intentionally use silence for a variety of purposes that include indicating agreement, doubt, caution, anger, and also to emphasize points or signal a change in direction. For Glenn, silence serves to explain and gesture toward enigmas, hidden insights, or ideas and experiences that language does not fully capture. Phrases such as “the joy was beyond words” or “I’ll tell you about that later” allude to silence that exceeds the ideology of clear expression through language.

All of these uses of silence depend on context, and writing often portrays silence through statements about what an author will not discuss or plans to delay. The strategic, or stylistic, use of silence creates a range of tones or voices outside the Western, Aristotelian notion of conveying ideas clearly: defiant, resilient, playful, suspenseful, haunting, or woeful. Glenn’s rhetorical silence is a third way between the sophistic style, meant to overwhelm, and the Aristotelian style, meant to inform. Such a framework might lead researchers in stylistic studies to ask what role such devices as ellipses, pauses, breaks, and other ruptures in speech play in writing and its effect on audiences.

Greco-Roman culture did not simply discriminate against women; their language and rhetorical practices were based on an idea of exclud-
ing anything that did not conform to Hellenistic ideals—a plain and masculine Attic style in speaking and writing. Ian Smith’s *Race and Rhetoric in the Renaissance* contains an insightful chapter on these early forms of language hegemony and their representation in the rhetorical and literary culture of classical Greece. In conventional histories like those by Kennedy and Enos, Isocrates is portrayed as an important figure in the advancement of literacy and Hellenismos (Greek nationality). As a counterpoint, Smith highlights the incitement of anxiety and the fear of cultural others that drives Isocrates’s *Pangericus*, in which he urges war on Persia. A similar xenophobia appears in *Antidosis*, where Isocrates describes “the race of the Hellenes above the barbarians, namely, in the fact that you have been educated as have no other people in wisdom and speech” (*Antidosis* 293–94). The term “barbarian,” or *barbarous*, itself meant non-Greek, and referred specifically to those who did not speak Greek and were thus considered sub-human. Barbarian speech was even stylistically parodied in Greek drama. As Smith points out, “Playwrights used a variety of acoustic effects to simulate the cacophony and disorder of barbarian speech as in Aeschylus’s long list of pseudo-Persian military and place names deliberately contrived to be jarring” (28). In particular, he directs readers to *Persians* 598–61, 966–72, 993–9. This is not an isolated case, either. Smith provides several examples, including Aristophanes’s *Women at the Thesmophoria*, where he describes “a representative figure of barbarian vulgarity and gullibility, an object lesson in the disasters that await the barbarian appropriation of power” (27). The distinct quality of barbarian speech as parodied in Greek tragedy was so pronounced that even translators have made efforts to convey it by appropriating elements of African American Vernacular (AAVE). Smith quotes from Greg Delanty’s translation of *Orestes*, when a Phrygian slave relays news of a disaster befalling Helen of Troy:

> When dey grabbed her around her knees we, her slaves, jumped up, mumbling to each udder dat someding dodgy was up. A few of us taut dat was all baloney, but udders would have no truck wit dat and had dose two buckoes taped. Dey twigged dat a strike was going to be pulled on Hele by dat snake who did away wit his own Ma. (qtd. in Smith 28)

These perspectives show that style has always had an exchange value. It can mark distinction among eloquent speakers and writers while
also excluding other groups according to pre-determined conventions governing the use of language. Especially, Smith’s work reveals the lengths to which certain groups will go to establish themselves as linguistically dominant. Style is therefore not merely an ornament or even a method of invention, but also a means of asserting value claims and either reinforcing or undermining hierarchies.

A growing range of scholarship has begun addressing style in the rhetorical traditions of non-Western cultures. Such scholarship is useful for teachers that face increasingly diverse and international student populations. Understanding historical work on the role of style in other rhetorical traditions assists in the negotiation of students’ stylistic decisions by contextualizing them. For instance, in the ancient Chinese rhetorical tradition, views on style oscillated between the pianwen (ornate) and guwen, or Confucian (plain). In *Chinese Rhetoric and Writing*, Andy Kirkpatrick and Zhichang Xu describe pianwen as “florid and verbose” (37), much like the sophistic rhetorical style of fourth century Greece that Aristotle dismissed. It became prominent during the mid-fifth century CE as a turn away from the simpler Confucian style that favored indirect and inductive argumentative strategies. The term pianwen most closely translates as “parallel prose” in English, and part of its verboseness stems from its structure. This style relied on “the use of four and six word parallel phrases, with four words in the first phrase, six words in the second and so on” to create “contrasting tone patterns across the phrases” (Kirkpatrick and Xu 39). The earliest manual devoted to rhetoric, Chen Kui’s *Wen Ze* (*The Rules of Writing*), insists on the guwen style. Like Aristotle, Kui believed that “form should serve meaning” and include “the use of words, syntax and sentence construction” (57). Thus, the most appropriate style was always the clearest and most concise.

The Chinese rhetorical tradition yields both a direct and an indirect style of argument, although the indirect style is more common, hailing from the Confucian period. As Kirkpatrick and Xu explain, it is more common to use a frame-main sentence construction, meaning that sentences begin with subordinate clauses rather than direct ones. For example, an American might say, “You can’t enter the building because there has been a fire” (25). A Chinese writer is more likely to say, “Because there has been a fire, you can’t enter the building.” Whereas the direct, agonist style of argument in the Western tradition emanated from the courts, in China there were no such courts, and so no foren-
sic rhetoric. Since rhetors were always persuading, they had to phrase arguments indirectly as to seem less threatening to political superiors.

Other rhetorical traditions in the Middle East may challenge our assumptions about histories of style in the West. In the edited collection, *Rhetoric Before and Beyond the Greeks*, William W. Hallo briefly describes rhetorical training in Sumerian scribal schools before discussing rhetorical devices used in the opening lines of the epic of Gilgamesh and other works in cuneiform dating back to the twenty-third century BCE. The use of eloquent language appears to reinforce the power of ritual and harmony in such cultures, not necessarily the forensic (legal) or deliberative (political) forms of persuasion, as in Greece and Rome. In this vein, Roberta Binkley recovers the ancient Sumerian figure Enheduanna, whose *Exaltation of Inanna* makes use of repetition and metonymy in a 150-line poem interweaving praise of the deity Inanna with the narrative of her own banishment and return to power as high priestess of Ur. Binkley’s discussion of Enheduanna’s poetry and historical context in the twenty-third century BCE questions our discipline’s emphasis on Athens and Rome as the primary sites of the early development of rhetoric. This recovery work suggests that a history of prose style, understanding its debts to oral discourse and poetry, extends back much further than classical Greece, and that Aristotle was the “first” to discuss style only in the sense of the Western tradition, whose texts are more familiar and accessible to contemporary teachers in the US. Meanwhile, a great deal of historical material from ancient Mesopotamia and other regions remains untranslated.

Although prior scholars have tried to map Greco-Roman stylistic devices onto the literary works of these cultures, scholars in comparative rhetoric express skepticism of such projects, as non-Western texts do not “provide us with a neatly prepackaged corpus of theoretical prescriptions or practical illustrations of the art of persuasion in public speaking” or in writing (Hallo 25). In another essay in the same collection, Jan Swearingen advocates an “emic” approach to rhetorical history, meaning the “study of ‘rhetoric’ of the Other in its own terms rather than in ours” (213). In other words, in many non-Western rhetorical traditions, there is no equivalent to Book III of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* or the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* of which we know. The construction of theories and approaches to style requires induction from
close study of their surviving texts, not from applying ready-made theories of style from the Western tradition.

**Augustine of Hippo (Fourth and Fifth Centuries CE)**

Augustine defined stylistic eloquence mainly as a means of lending potency and clarity to sermons, and his approach to rhetoric is often compared to Plato’s in the “Phaedrus” (Conley 77). Augustine himself was trained in the classical tradition, and studied law before his conversion to Christianity in 387 CE. Bizzell and Herzberg contextualize Augustine as an early philosopher of Christianity in a period when it was a growing, but not quite yet the universal European faith it would become in the medieval era. His book, *De Doctrina Christiana* (*On Christian Doctrine*) was the first to treat scripture as a literary text in need of interpretation; Book II and Book III of the treatise lay out a theory of signs to interpret the Bible allegorically, rather than always literally. For Augustine, it was a priest’s responsibility to learn correct and responsible interpretation of scripture, including the ability to discern the difference between literal language and language that serves a metaphorical or allegorical purpose.13

Book 4 of *On Christian Doctrine* devotes attention to style, although it “contains little if anything that cannot be found in the *De Oratore*” (Conley 77). While it is true that Augustine did not compose an original theory of style per se, we should appreciate his application of style to the emerging genre of sermons. Augustine’s discussion of style and eloquence is important for defending its use against early theologians such as Tertullian (160–224 CE) and Jerome, who denied the role of Ciceronian eloquence in clerical matters. These scholars found the classical tradition unsuitable for any discussion of religious discourse not only because it was designed by pagans, but also because faith and persuasion were irreconcilable. There should be no need to make one’s discourse more persuasive if already speaking the truth of God; therefore, any rhetorical approach to religious discourse was suspect.

Augustine realized the need to convey religious truths to different audiences in different situations, and Part IV of *On Christian Doctrine*

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13. Augustine actually classifies language, or “signs,” into four categories: unknown, literal and figurative; and ambiguous, literal and figurative. Unknown signs require knowledge of Hebrew and Greek in order to compare translations. Ambiguous signs require careful reading and interpretation in light of the overall context and purpose of a passage.
explains this task for the preacher who faces a range of audiences, including skeptics. Preaching does not require invention in the classical sense, only the discovery and interpretation of God’s truths through scripture. Roxanne Mountford discusses Augustine’s negotiation of rhetorical dimensions of religious discourse, stating that his primary goal lies in clear expression that “should always be chosen above grace” (79). As Augustine asks, “who is moved if he does not understand what is said, or whose attention is held if he is not pleased?” (4.58). In other words, clarity is the foundation of a sermon, as it is a necessary component of style throughout the classical tradition.

That said, preachers still needed to persuade listeners of divine truths, and sermons that were merely clear would not necessarily succeed in converting followers or inspiring them to divine action. Augustine authorizes preachers to use the principles of classical style, namely tropes and figures along with Cicero’s three tiers of style: plain, middle, and grand. Augustine often refers to the plain style as “subdued,” and is concerned mainly with imparting facts as a teacher does to students. The middle style can use some tropes and figures, but “if it does not have them at hand, it does not seek them out” (4.42). Augustine means here that an orator should provide detail, but should not go out of his or her way to amplify the emotion of a claim, since it may call attention to itself rather than to the content of the sermon. Augustine describes the grand style as appropriate “when something ought to be done, and we are speaking to those who ought to do it, although they do not wish to” (4.38). Mountford paraphrases Augustine on the three tiers: “The plain style is suited for moving the understanding, the moderate style for moving the will, the grand style for inspiring obedience” (79).

Augustine elaborates on the three tiers of style by arguing that a given speech can alternate between them; in fact, it should do so. He states, “No one should suppose that it is against the rule to mingle these three styles” and, in fact, “when a speech is surfeited with one style, it does not keep the listener’s attention” (4.51). Preaching manuals from Augustine onward follow a four-part or six-part division following classical models of speeches. Here, Augustine does not provide orators with detailed rules about which level of style to use in each part, but instead instructs them to vary levels of style according to their purposes throughout a sermon. The typical progression of a sermon, like most speeches, is to begin with an introduction and then to
proceed through the narration and evaluation of events, concluding on
a strong note to compel listeners to action. As such, we can see speeches
beginning with a subdued style and gradually rising to the grand
style. Augustine illustrates this theory by describing a sermon he him-
selves gave to citizens at Maurtania to persuade them to give up their
violent celebration of Mars, held annually in the month of October,
in which men carried on a kind of gladiator-style combat. At the end
of his sermon, he says, “I pleaded indeed in the grand style to the best
of my power, to root out and dispel by my words so cruel and inveter-
ate an evil from their hearts and lives” (4.53). According to Augustine,
eight years passed after his sermon without the violent celebrations.

This chapter has covered views on style from the ancient through
the classical eras, ending with Augustine, who was, in many ways,
the last writer in antiquity to explicitly theorize rhetoric. During the
periods discussed here, rhetoric emerged as a discrete discipline under
Aristotle, and evolved through iterations by Roman and later Greek
rhetoricians ranging from Cicero to Hermogenes. During these peri-
ods, rhetorics evolved outside of the Western patriarchal arena in ways
that have important implications for researching and teaching style.
Classical rhetoricians had less influence during the Middle Ages, as
discussed in the next chapter, but their views on style survived through
Augustine and echoed through the genres of letter writing, sermons,
and poetry. The next chapter describes the historical shifts that oc-
curred during the fifth and sixth centuries CE, spurred by Boethius’s
elevation of logic, leading to the diffusion of rhetoric into these other
genres. The next chapter also covers historical eras such as the Re-
naisance and the Enlightenment—when classical rhetoric was revived
and once again to influence debates about the role of style in writing
and discourse.