In compiling this bibliography we discovered anew what others before us have discovered—the paucity of published work on argumentation in journals and presses prominent in the field of rhetoric and composition. Richard Fulkerson’s observation about the lack of scholarly debate about the teaching of argumentation was borne out by our own research. In response we broadened the scope of the bibliography slightly, including several book-length philosophical treatments of argument. We opted not to broaden the scope further on the grounds that it would likely make the bibliography less, not more, useful to our readers. Our primary focus is on works published within the past twenty years, with some important earlier works included. Any work that focused on the teaching of argument is listed here. A number of works referred to extensively in the body of this book—Toulmin, Perelman, and Burke—are left out on the grounds that one can derive a much fuller sense of their argument from reading the previous chapters. Few argument textbooks are included here. Those that are cited are included because of a unique focus. Our assumption is that readers may wish to consult these texts for ideas about teaching argument rather than adopting them wholesale for classroom use.


The authors provide a repertoire of alternative argument strategies that have been used to enact discursive change by writers who, historically, did not or felt they did not have the power to engage in the dominant discourse; however, Allen and Faigley do not make claims “for the utility of any strategy.” Strategies for social change that have been used are: creating new languages (such as “Laadan” for writer Suzette Haden Elgin); constructing new pronouns (such as “co” or “na”); us-
ing neologisms; reclaiming or redefining words (such as “spinster” or “dyke”); juxtaposing language and “creating struggle within and utterance” (as is demonstrated by Gloria Anzaldua’s Borderlands/La Frontera); using musical forms to structure written communication; utilizing “perspective by incongruity,” which puts “one assumed truth into an incongruous situation to undermine its truthfulness;” playing with language and metaphor and “calling without naming” (referring to Gertrude Stein’s prose); and using narratives as a way to make oneself heard politically. The authors assert that writing teachers need to rethink traditional assumptions about the validity and use of logical arguments and their ability to shift social structure, given the wide range of forced alternatives that have arisen out of power struggles throughout history.


This piece is a review of literature of the various models of argumentation formulated for educational settings during the past ten years. The first half of the article is used to delineate the various and competing definitions of argument and to ground the literature review in the process of developing arguments as opposed to the phenomenon of argument. Andrews positions logical constructions of argument at one extreme and rhetorical constructions at the other. As he examines the various models, suggestions are made as to their usefulness in the classroom. Andrews is concerned primarily with the pedagogical value of these models. The second half of the article focuses in on four models of argumentation: Toulmin, Mitchell and Riddle, Andrews, and Kaufer and Geisler. As theories such as the Toulmin model are outlined, Andrews pinpoints ways to “adapt” them for more suitable use in the classroom. He suggests that an analytic model, such as Toulmin, is better suited to test the strength of an early draft than to generate arguments, a charge that has often been leveled against Toulmin. According to Andrews, the generative value of these models for argument is a key to their usefulness in educational settings. At the end, there is brief section on visual argument and the value of argument in society.

In this response to Sean Williams’s article, “Process-Product Ambiguity: Theorizing a Perspective on World Wide Web Argumentation,” Bay applauds the attention that Williams draws to argument in cyberspace and his attempt at “retooling” Toulmin in order to “reconceptualize” argument on the Internet, but laments the lack of discussion of the “visual and performative aspects” of the Web and how these aspects affect argument and the writer’s sense of agency. Whereas Williams views “links” in webtexts as persuasive devices because the “author” selectively places them, Bay challenges whether this is a WWW argument theory or just a traditional theory applied to the Web. In short, Bay suggests that Williams assumes that the Web is a “text-based structure.” In fact, she implies that most pedagogical practices still rely on this classical model and value words over images. Bay calls for a rhetoric of the Web that accounts for its multimedia capabilities and attempts to open space for production and analysis of webtexts that are more than print arguments.


This collection of thirteen essays emphasizes the role of writing in everyday life and offers a variety of contemporary views on argumentation. The essays range from the theoretical (Andrew Wilkinson’s “Argument as a Primary Act of Mind”) to the practical (Anson and Beach’s “The Nature of Argument in Peer Dialogue Journals”) and it emphasizes a variety of non-traditional approaches drawn from non-Western and feminist models as well as traditional Western modes of argument. A number of the essays consider the relationship between argument and the learning process, focusing on use of peer dialogue journals as a learning tool and the use of New Rhetoric to respond to students’ argumentative writing. Other essays consider alternatives to the argument-as-war model, which treats argument as a means of transformation rather than negotiation. The final four essays focus on alternate cultural styles in argument.

The authors discuss the difficulties facing students as they begin to adopt rhetorical stances and public voices. Marginalized writers in particular face additional challenges beyond the conventional expectations of form, in that they often write from a perspective beyond the mainstream. The article examines a public email written by a deaf student at the Rochester Institute of Technology arguing for a faculty discussion of the role of interpreters in the classroom. Though the writer follows the conventions of argument—writing from a position of authority, using a collective voice for power, citing expert opinion—her argument had unintended consequences, generating a largely negative response from RIT’s deaf population, many of whom viewed the letter as presumptuous. Essentially, the writer failed to consider the complex views of the deaf community she purported to represent. The authors note several implications for teachers of argument, including the responsibilities and obligations in employing the collective voice, the particular challenges of argument in an electronic format, and the need for students to address “taken-for-granted” ideas in reading such as tone and author bias.


Booth’s book is a product of the author’s disciplinary background and its historical origins. It is based primarily on his experiences as a university administrator during the tumultuous nineteen-sixties and seventies. The most striking aspect of the rancorous disagreements that characterized the times was, according to Booth, the tendency of opponents to speak past each other, a state of affairs in marked contrast to civil and efficacious debates among members of various professions and academic disciplines. The failure to listen charitably to other arguments or the corresponding tendency to lapse into a slack-minded “I’m ok, you’re ok,” denial of differences motivates Booth’s argument. Hence his definition of rhetoric: “the art of discovering warrantable beliefs and improving those beliefs in shared discourse” (xiii). The major impediment to Booth’s rhetorical ideal is the dogma
of modernism, which according to Booth, splits facts off from value and renders values little more than expressions of feelings (motivism). Just as values are impoverished by their reduction to feelings, rational inquiry is reduced to instrumentalism calculation by being divorced from values. While the dogmas of modernism have been renounced in every field, they maintained their currency in the realm of public discourse. Booth’s book is an ambitious, often entertaining effort to unseat these dominant dogmas.


This extensively revised edition presents Bruffee’s argument regarding the necessity to redefine authority, teaching, and theories of knowledge construction in the university. He presents his approach, a model of collaborative learning based on a social constructionist theory of knowledge. The book is divided into two parts: the first defines the approach, explaining how and why it works. Included in this section is a model of collaborative learning (as distinguished from cooperative learning), an explanation of the role of writing in collaborative learning (and the role of collaborative learning in teaching writing), and a discussion of how colleges can institutionalize collaborative learning through peer tutors. The second part discusses university education from the perspective of the institution, explaining how in the past institutional concepts of knowledge have negatively affected not only education but also research. Writing plays a central role in collaborative learning because it relies upon interdependence—the ongoing conversations, verbal and print, that create and sustain knowledge within communities and academic disciplines. From this perspective, all writing is argumentative because it is a process of knowledge construction that is negotiated between people. It is simultaneously a communal act that requires a keen awareness of the “language games” that are acceptable in different communities and a tool that can be used to alter those communities.

Philip Burns draws on his experience with the Electronic Democracy Project to theorize the role of technology in teaching “deliberation” (argument). He contends that “normal discourse,” or literate practices, are increasingly linked to academic disciplines and should instead be taken from the public sphere. Because the Internet creates more space for public discourse, educators must shift focus away from the classroom and out towards the public sphere as a pedagogical site to engender a more civic understanding of argument. He is seeking a rhetoric that is less agonistic and more concerned with mediating asymmetrical interactions between individuals and groups. Burns draws from James Bohman to define “deliberation” as “dialogical interactions” that occur in a specific situation and that allow for the “give and take of reasons,” the end result being cooperation among members of the forum despite acknowledged differences. Borrowing from Mary Louise Pratt’s definition of the “contact zone” as a space in which inequalities of power always exist and are always challenged (yet not always significantly changed), Burns asserts that technology mediation (e-mail, listservs, and other Web-based sites of communication) provides such a contact zone in which exigency can occur naturally rather than being imposed without context through assigned readings.


Describing the nature and content of persuasive texts, Chambliss and Garner establish a frame through which an examination of audience, in this case, adults’ reading tendencies, can be viewed. The Toulmin model (claims, warrants, evidence) is used to evaluate structure and an Aristotelian analysis (artistic proofs—ethos, logos, pathos) is used for content. The running example throughout is an editorial that ran after the first Gulf War about the Middle East remaining very much the same as it had prior to war. This article examines how arguments, although they are designed to earn the reader’s warranted assent, can only work if the reader actually does agree in good faith to objectively read the argument. It is Chambliss and Garner’s belief that more often than not, adult readers tend to adhere rigidly to prior opinions regardless of new information that may be in the written argument.

Carroll’s essay is concerned with alerting students to the importance of “first steps” in creating arguments, which in this case is agreeing upon the definition of key concepts or contested terms to ensure that the argument is focused and fruitful. Another goal is to demonstrate to students the value of critically engaging with plurality of definition to find the definition that is most appropriate for the embedded situation instead of relying upon the dictionary as the arbiter of definitional correctness. In doing so, he draws upon invention techniques from Aristotle (commonplace of definition), Cicero (stasis theory) and Plato (dialectic) as possible methods to reach “winnowed” (movement away from universal) definitions that teachers could model for students. The author underscores the importance of considering the role of definition by drawing upon Chaim Perelman’s assertion that definition is not about clarifying meaning of an idea, but rather shaping the issue so that it will produce the persuasive effects sought.


In this posthumously published essay, Corder claims that we overlook many arguments that do not look like arguments—the quick barbs, slaps, and insults that are shorthand arguments which represent a clash between ways of seeing the world. He notes that rhetoric textbooks fail to acknowledge that arguments pit worldviews against one another. His main contention is that our experiences embed in us “completed rhetorics” or “models of the world” and we live them in our interactions with others. This means that identities are at stake in argumentative exchange. Because of this, when people rely upon their deep and steadfast convictions, which they call “good reasons,” “sense,” and “judgment,” argument is over when it begins since they are often unwilling to consider alternatives as viable options. Consequently, instead of focusing on proofs, he suggests we focus on narrative and description because arguers need less to declare than to show their thinking. Corder refers to this showing as “self-writing,” or writing which honestly reveals our motivations, which shows ourselves in the
world we live in. He admits that showing the rhetoric we are already in can be as hard as seeing the backs of our eyeballs, but we are always in a rhetoric, and so we must continually identify ourselves in our writing in order to acknowledge that rhetoric.


Crosswhite’s argument sets out to find a way for composition between the opposing threats of postmodernism on the one hand and scientism on the other. He rejects post-modernists generally and deconstruction specifically on the grounds that they overlook matters critical to his “rhetoric of reason,” particularly the latter’s commitment to resolving practical problems and making choices. While choice-making implies a sense of agency, Crosswhite rejects the idea of the agent as essential self. Instead of the self using claims and counter-claims to *express* a fixed identity, Crosswhite sees the self as the *product* of the choices, the claims and counter-claims, it makes through argument. In response to the corrosive skepticism of deconstruction, Crosswhite’s rhetoric of reason calls for the conversion of doubt to argument. The end of argument, meanwhile, is justice, the fair and equitable balancing of competing claims arising from differing “disclosures of the world.” He in turn rejects scientism with its “transmission” model of education in favor of a commitment to producing “a kind of ideal human being, philosophical, practical, articulate and beneficent” (14). It’s an ambitious and idealistic argument and constitutes an important theoretical defense of first year writing. The philosophic sources for Crosswhite’s argument are many and varied, but include Heidegger, Dewey, Habermas, Levinas and Cavell.


The major claim of this article is that Perelman’s notion of the “universal audience” might best be utilized in political critique, as opposed to its common use as a standard for rationality in argumentation. de Velasco aims to redirect conversation to the “political dimensions” of the concept or the way that the universal addressee can be viewed as
the partial and partisan advocate of claims about reality. By doing so, he is re-framing the primary critique of Perelman’s work, namely, the idea that a constructed universal audience is not useful in establishing a standard for rhetorical discourse. de Velasco’s contention is that “it is the potential for discourse to “transcend” differences, conflicts and inconsistencies in the social world that the concept of the “universal audience” so neatly captures” (50). This position posits that the differences of universal audience construction amongst groups will shine light on slippages in stability. The political dimension takes precedent in this model because it is through political critique that the struggle for rhetorical construction of the “universal audience takes place.” Perelman’s ideas are considered alongside those of political theorists Chantel Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau, as a means to discuss how “hegemonic forms of discourse” establish what is true in different rhetorical scenes.


Emmel asserts that any argument pedagogy must involve an “enthymematic approach” because it enables students to become aware of the processes by which they produce well-reasoned arguments. However, she recognizes that the enthymeme itself is often an alienating concept to teachers and students of writing. She believes that “teaching enthymematically” is focused on meta-cognition about “how communication, both written and otherwise, achieves the shape of shared conclusions and shared knowledge.” Instead of teaching the enthymeme as a “truncated syllogism,” Emmel advocates an approach that invites students to see the connection of the intention and the function of the claims that they make. She demonstrates this through a student example showing how enthymemes may be used heuristically as a way to both discover and shape arguments and to see the relationship of related claims that can be connected. The author is interested in creating an atmosphere where classroom discussions provide the necessary feedback for students as they develop, revise, and draft ideas and as students begin to understand why some claims need to be supported and others attain warranted assent. The “real” audience of peers is meant to subvert the problem of addressing a constructed audience in
the writing classroom. The author sees the enthymeme not as a form imposed on process, but rather a “form representative of how that process takes shape.”


Fahnestock begins her discussion by questioning the assertion that there should be a clear distinction between informing and persuading. Her position is that all communicative acts are persuasive, and failure to acknowledge this is tantamount to “self-deception” because the process of argumentative construction that determines which information is selected and omitted remains unquestioned. According to the author, this leads to much writing that is uncritical and unfit to survive scrutiny of actual audiences. Fahnestock and many of the other contributors to this collection are theorizing ways around the problem of teaching audience awareness and the rhetorical situation in a more authentic way, within the writing classroom, to better prepare students for the writing that they will do outside of the classroom. Here, she offers a stases-based method of inquiry to supplement the more analytic models of argument theory, such as Toulmin, that don’t emphasize the invention side of writing. She then proposes a methodology for introducing advanced composition writers to argument. Her most important contribution is to suggest that students adopt and expand one topic through the semester, at the end of which they are required to submit an actual proposal to a real audience. During the semester, students work through several stases, each one building upon the previous one, culminating in an authentic endeavor to offer suggestions for solving the problem that has been their focus project.


Ferris is interested in the variations of rhetorical structures across languages, and identifies elements of English persuasive writing that may be problematic for non-native speakers. Here, she offers an empirical comparative analysis between persuasive texts (considered synony-
mous with argument in this article) written by native English speakers (basic and advanced) and by non-native English speakers (basic and advanced), in first-year English, to pinpoint possible weaknesses. In her study, sixty persuasive texts were analyzed for thirty-three quantitative variables such as number of words and clauses, word length and clauses per sentence, topical structure percentage of parallel, sequential and extended parallel progressions, and topical depth. They were also analyzed for rhetorical variables; Toulmin scores were assigned for claims, data and warrant, openings and closings, rhetorical questions and counter-arguments. There were notable differences between native and non-native English speakers. The native English speakers wrote longer compositions, scored higher on the Toulmin analysis, cited counterarguments more, and had a lower subtopics-to-sentences ratio. Ferris suggests that differences in the texts produced by the non-native students derive largely from different sets of assumptions about rhetorical expectations. In addition, non-native speakers may have less exposure to formal persuasion and concepts such as Toulmin’s claim, data, warrant, counterargument, and modeling. This study calls attention to the need to study cultural differences in argument within the argument classroom where non-native speakers are asked to construct arguments, which the author states should take the form of instruction of “formal schemata required in English academic writing.”


For Fisher, narrative is a more fundamental aspect of human communication than argument or even rhetoric. Human beings are Homo narrans before they are citizens or partisans, and subsequently all discourse aims to tell a story of some sort. The kind of storytelling we would all recognize as such—anecdotes, novels, short stories, history—is that which “recounts” events. But even forms of discourse that appear not to tell stories attempt to “account” for the way things are and as such fall under Fisher’s broad notion of story understood as “symbolic interpretations of aspects of the world occurring in time and shaped by history, culture and character” (xiii). Each individual story offers “good reason” for believing something. The two criteria by which we judge the efficacy of a story’s reasons are coherence and
fidelity, which combine to form what Fisher terms “narrative rationality.” The tests for coherence or how well a story “hangs together,” involve comparisons of a given story to stories one knows to be true, consistency of the story’s argumentative points and, crucially, the reliability of the story’s characters—are their actions consistent with their words/values? Fidelity, meanwhile, corresponds with more traditional measures of what constitutes good reasons as adumbrated by theorists, such as Toulmin and Perelman. Fisher’s theory owes much to Alasdair MacIntyre’s *After Virtue* and its critique of the modern tendency to split fact off from value and the spiritual from the material. The concluding chapters of Fisher’s book offer some excellent analyses of political, literary and philosophical arguments grounded in narrative.


Frank examines the influence of The New Rhetoric Project (NRP), represented by the collective works of Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca, on the field of twentieth century argumentation. In reviewing the work of the NRP, Frank’s aim is to draw attention to the impact of this scholarship in cementing the “study of argument as a humane art” (267). The writer makes his claim in the face of two movements of argument that, in his terms, threaten the field: the fragmentation of argument into case studies, and argument theories of pragma-dialectics. Frank suggests that returning to the works of the NRP allows scholars to navigate “between fragmentation and enforced uniformity, and remains the most ethical and powerful framework available to scholars of argument” (268). Central to the NRP are recognizing the importance of internal dialogue and continually questioning received ideology. As well, Frank emphasizes that disagreement is not negative, as long as people resolve matters verbally; rather, it continually shines light on the diversity of beliefs. All of this is important because NRP proposes that “uniform agreement” is not the goal of argument. Argumentation is meant to cause action, but morality should trump even the call to action.


Fulkerson offers a clear, no-nonsense guide to teaching argument in the context of the writing class. Fulkerson surveys the major approaches to teaching argument and analyzes and evaluates each one, leaving the reader with a clear sense of how he views the strengths and weak-
nesses of each approach. He is wary of using Toulmin in the classroom on the grounds that it is primarily an analytic tool far more helpful to readers of argument than it is to writers of argument. He is particularly supportive of the stasis approach to argument and devotes much of the middle of the book to its use in the classroom. He is also supportive of the use of informal fallacies in teaching argument and very critical of how most writing textbooks treat the subject. He then discusses in some depth eleven major fallacies (including some subtypes) that in his view are most commonly found in argument. While the authors of this text are extremely wary of using informal fallacies in writing classes, we highly recommend Fulkerson’s treatment of the subject to anyone committed to the approach. By the same token, Fulkerson’s discussion of formal logic, a subject we definitely discourage in the writing classroom, is clear, if less thorough than his discussion of informal fallacies. Fulkerson also offers a discussion of statistical argument and a useful tool of argument evaluation, STAR (a generalization backed by a Sufficient number of Typical, Accurate, and Relevant instances).


Gage emphasizes student writers as responsible members of a discourse community. To that end, he proposes that students compose and revise enthymemes as an invention strategy, taking into account the rhetorical situation that has been created through classroom discussions and readings. These enthymemes represent the intention of the essay. The benefit of using the enthymeme in this manner is that it includes the possibility of helping students understand that the composing process is made responsible because it melds the writer’s aims with the audience’s needs. Consequently, audience becomes a resource to be used rather than an obstacle to be overcome. In Gage’s model the essence of rhetorical exchange is to construct knowledge out of what the writer contributes and what the audience already knows or acknowledges.


As the title indicates, this article explores the concept of the rhetorical situation as defined by Bitzer in 1968. Bitzer identified three main
elements necessary for a piece of discourse to emerge: exigency, constraints, and audience. Unlike Bitzer (who stressed exigency as the catalyst of the rhetorical situation) or Vatz (who favored the speaker), Garret and Xiao suggest that it is the audience that is the pivotal element of the rhetorical situation. The authors also argue that a culture's discourse tradition plays a significant role in shaping speaker and audience perceptions of the elements of the rhetorical situation. Finally, the authors suggest that the rhetorical situation is much more interactive and organic than previous scholarship has indicated.


Garrison sets out to salvage the Platonic notion of *eros*—defined as the truly desirable—vs. “sheer satisfaction” by placing it in the context of Dewey’s pragmatic understanding of the desirable outcome sought by practical wisdom. Garrison’s discussion has several implications for argument instructors concerned with the philosophical foundations of what they do. It offers a specific vision of the thinking we want to encourage in students, and envisions teaching and learning as a continual form of growth. Ideally, education creates ethical, creative thinkers who consider alternative possibilities, in search of the best options to create a better world.


Philosopher Eugene Garver draws heavily on Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* by way of expanding the definition of rationality so as to stress ethos (and pathos) as well as logos. Rather than justice, the end of argument for Garver is friendship. His model for argument, meanwhile, is not “bargaining between strangers,” but rather “deliberation among friends” (5). Garver rejects the methodical, universalistic model of rationality, in favor of practical reason, the Greeks’ *phronesis*. Such reasoning resists a prioris, ties rationality to character, and acknowledges the impact of context. In elaborating his theory of rationality, Garver analyzes a number of modern legal and political examples, including *Brown v. Board of Education* and the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. While he draws heavily on the work of Richard Rorty
in outlining his theory of practical reason, Garver is careful to distinguish his position from Rorty’s at several key junctures.


Godden discusses Michael Gilbert’s concept of Coalescent Argumentation (CA) and its implications for argumentation theory. The author offers a theoretical overview of Coalescent Argumentation, describing its three tenets: that argument is multi-modal, that it is position-based, and that it is goal oriented. Godden then discusses Gilbert’s criticisms of the CA model, including that it posits the wrong subject of study (something other than argument); that its purpose is for dispute resolution rather than theorizing argument; that it requires the wholesale abandonment of other argument models such as the critical-logical model (or that it mischaracterizes those other models); and that it is not inclusive of perspectival approaches. After refuting these points, Godden concludes by asserting that CA has much to offer argument theory, as long as critical-logical models and CA models are not put into opposition with one another.


Grant-Davie claims that teaching students to analyze the rhetorical situations from which rhetoric arises is one of the most important argumentative concepts. However, while Lloyd Bitzer’s term rhetorical situation is commonly used in argument, Grant-Davie believes that there is confusion as to what this term means. Thus, he attempts to clarify the original definition and re-cast the concept to account for theoretical advances in rhetoric since Bitzer first published. Grant-Davie defines the rhetorical situation as the situation in which a speaker/writer uses rhetoric to effect a change in reality. Using Bitzer’s division of exigence, audience, and constraints as a starting point, Grant-Davie argues for a more comprehensive analysis, that acknowledges the interconnectedness of exigence, rhetors, audiences, and constraints, each of which he claims could be plural, (i.e., multiple audiences and/or constraints). The possibility of plurality opens the door for discussion
of identity and the dynamic roles of rhetor and audience, which moves discussion away from general questions like, “who is the audience?,” and towards situational questions, such as, how does a discourse “define and create context for readers?”


Invoking postmodern social theories, Hardin argues for a critical pedagogy of resistance in composition studies, which he believes can empower composition students. While he recognizes the reality that students must learn to read and write within the standard conventions of cultural and academic discourses, he is most interested in teaching them skills of inquiry and resistance to ideological indoctrination. He positions himself as a scholar in favor of the writing classroom as a site of resistance; however, he believes that many critical pedagogy models need to be theorized more fully so that the critical inquiry is ethical, meaning that rhetoric and the production of argument, as opposed to the political messages that are analyzed, are central to the discussion. Much of the book is dedicated to addressing criticisms of critical models and offering suggestions for how to re-envision those models. He wants to encourage an ethics that is “driven by unrelenting and unending critique”—a self-reflexive critique and makes students feel ethically responsible for the choices that they make and empowers them through the composition class experience.


Nora Heidlebaugh focuses this work on the efficacy of values-laden debate. She notes the tendency to rely on the products of rhetoric (the actual arguments we observe) to pass judgment. However, because value systems differ, arguers tend to adhere to the values and beliefs that warrant their position. They assume that others should accept such values without question. The result is an impasse. Consequently, Heidlebaugh calls for more attention to the process of invention. She calls on parties to articulate their own argument in the context of op-
posing arguments and to begin to agree on “frames of reference” from which to discuss an issue. The author points to the rhetorical practices of the early Sophists and Greek poets as a model for overcoming the “problem of incommensurability” common in rhetorical practice and invention. Because the goal of an argument should be a productive outcome, this book’s primary value is its potential to help one understand habits of argumentation that lead to impasse.


Johnson is primarily concerned with how to evaluate and criticize argument. He advances a rhetorical position on argument, namely that it is a socializing activity that relies upon a complex process of constructing, critiquing, and revising argumentative positions that is bound by community standards, habits, and customs that are subject to change. However, he quickly separates process from product (privileging product) and defines “rationality” as “the ability to engage in the giving and receiving of reasons.” The goal of this book is to explain argumentation as the exercise of rationality and to reject traditional theories of argument based on formal and informal logic. Johnson’s notion of rationality is pragmatic. The criteria for a rational argument include: acceptability, truth, relevance and sufficiency. In turn, Johnson offers four principles that underlie argument evaluation: the principles of vulnerability, parity, logical neutrality, and discrimination.


Joliff’s attempt to move his Introduction to Literature class to discussions beyond the “antiphonal” and “genteel” and into “a more authentic classroom” led him to adopt Toulmin’s model of argument as a tool to “teach them how to fight” about literature and other ideas. Noting students’ apparent unfamiliarity with the methods of academic argument and the lack of time in a literature class to teach informal logic, he advocates introducing students to Toulmin’s use of claim, data, and warrant as a solution. In this model, students make a claim about a piece of literature, and support the claim with both data from the text
and a discussion of warrants from their own experience. Interpretive claims work best, Joliff maintains, but factual and thematic claims also keep students engaged in connecting a piece of literature with their own lives. In addition, the retrogressive nature of the Toulmin model requires students to continually re-engage with the details of the text in their search for data to support the claims underlying the original claim.


While relying upon the Western philosophical traditions’ theories of argumentation, Juthe attempts to fill the void in theoretical discussion about argument by analogy, a commonly used comparative technique in everyday conversation, as well as academic discourse. As this is an often used rhetorical technique in argument, Juthe believes that it is in need of more academic consideration. Juthe characterizes the structure and function of arguments by analogy, and details the differences between arguments by analogy and typical inductive, deductive, or abductive arguments. The writer explicates different types of argument structures, separating argument by conclusive argument from argument by inclusive analogy. Finally, Juthe argues that arguments by analogy are not reducible to any other type of argument, and have distinct characteristics which put them in their own argument classification.


In the foreword to this insightful anthology, Kaplan articulates a set of questions that directly relate to the teaching of argument in an ESL environment. These five questions examine areas such as topic selection, authority roles in argument, genres, and arrangement of evidence. Kaplan looks at different cultural systems and their direct influence in the area of rhetorical patterns and style of speakers of other languages who are writing arguments.

In this article, Knapp and Earnest describe the results of the final assignment in their “Lying and Deception” course. The project called for students to interview faculty members concerning perceptions of “truth” in their respective fields; grappling with the responses would give students first-hand experience into how we know, a fundamental goal of education. The authors analyze responses to seven interview questions (including such prompts as “How should students seek the truth?” and “How do scholars and educators in your field determine what is true?”), detailing a clear trend towards equivocation, contradiction, and ambiguity. Often, interviewee responses exhibit a struggle between a single concept of truth (the “Truth”) and multiple interpretations (truths) in their field, leading the researchers to wonder how students will react to this lack of certainty from their professors. In post-project reflective essays, however, many students displayed a subtle understanding of the complex, contextual nature of truth revealed through the exercise. Argument instructors will find this article applicable in several ways. Dealing explicitly with “truth-seeking,” it maps the very rhetorical ground which we ask students to tread, and its practical example can serve as the model for similar critical awakenings in the writing classroom.


Stating that most arguments about controversial topics have an “ethical edge,” Kroll warns argument teachers of the danger of students slipping into applied ethics that uses “theory-application,” a top-down approach that has one first settling on moral principles and then applying them deductively to conflicts, a process that tends to oversimplify complex issues. Instead, Kroll argues that teachers should encourage students to use casuist and pragmatic approaches, both of which begin with particularities of an ethical controversy. He urges argument teachers to help students to see that inquiry is a part of argument and to recognize the complexity of issues rather than rushing towards a simple solution. He suggests using writing assignments such as the
“issues brief” which asks students to present a fair-minded view of an issue, laying out fully and fairly the arguments on all sides of a dispute. This pedagogical model attempts to divert attention away from the intractable ethical differences at the center of a dispute and towards other contributing social factors that can be mediated across differences and possibly alter the circumstances that necessitated the original dispute. Kroll emphasizes making the goal of writing sustaining conversation and not necessarily resolving complex problems.


Lundsford writes this case study in a response to a call from Richard Fulkerson to conduct further research that examines the effectiveness of the Toulmin model in argument classes. Specifically, Toulmin’s claim that an argument’s participants inevitably inhabit a specific situation or context that must be taken into account when applying his model. A careful consideration of the “context” (sometimes used synonymously with “field” to problematic ends) will alert the reader to challenges that will probably arise because fields are governed by certain criteria that serve to limit rhetorical options. Lundsford is concerned with the ambiguity related to context, which she believes cannot be isolated to a particular moment because people within a group are always continually contextualizing. A detailed description of Toulmin’s model is provided with visual maps of the various terms and examples from Toulmin’s *Uses of Argument*, as well as a literature review of responses to Toulmin. The case study follows the events of a class of ten high school students who took a non-credit college writing course. Toulmin’s schema was slightly modified from its original form. The central question for Lundsford is, who situates context? The field (group)? The reader? Lundsford believes that although context is sometimes treated as universal, it needs to be co-constructed by the writer and the reader.

This article considers ways to get students to engage issues critically instead of separating them into two diametrically opposed positions and oversimplifying complex problems. The authors advocate a pedagogy that includes moments of conflict and agonistic positioning as well as moments of understanding and communication. This is an acknowledgement of the impact of agonistic public models of argument (i.e., talk radio and political news programs) on society in general and students in particular, and an attempt to theorize an argument for the writing classroom that is less competitive and more deliberative. The authors believe that opening a space where students can critically engage complex issues will make it easier to show them where they jump to conclusions, don’t thoroughly examine an issue and/or don’t move beyond impractical logical arguments. They also offer a defense of cooperative models of argument against claims that confrontation is a more useful means of shining light on the interconnectedness of social forces. Concrete examples of writing assignments and course goals are provided for two distinct argument classes to illustrate the value of using confrontation and cooperation to teach argument.


Facing a new “argument track” for first-year composition, Matalene evaluates twenty-four students’ responses to the new type of curriculum by reading their six-paper semester portfolios. Matalene notices the disjuncture of student voices between a public and private space, asserting through student writing samples that student voices seemed “disembodied.” In order to resist this bifurcation of public and private voice, Matalene asserts that students should begin writing from personal experience and then move into personal writing about public issues, rather than the opposite. This is a break from the more conventional position that personal experience is not as valuable, as an end product, in college writing classes as information that has been adjudicated by a third party. Matalene believes that asking students to divorce themselves (the private) from issues (the public) contributes to their lack of power and agency in the classroom. While her position is skeptical of placing argumentation at the center of first-year writing, the focus on “shaping personal knowledge for public communication”
effectively can be utilized in discussions of argument to negotiate the uncomfortable shift to an abstract, academic voice that she pinpoints as a problem.


McComiskey examines Gorgianic rhetoric from both a historic and contemporary point of view. Part One is devoted to an historical analysis of Gorgianic rhetoric by the examination of three of Gorgias’s classical texts, “On Non-Existence,” the “Encomium of Helen,” and the “Defense of Palamedes”. In Part Two, McComiskey views Gorgianic rhetoric through a contemporary lens, devoting time to appropriations of Gorgianic rhetoric by neosophistic scholars, the contributions such scholars have made to the field of rhetoric, and the impact of postmodernism on Gorgianic rhetoric. In his last chapter, the author discusses what implications Gorgianic rhetoric, specifically the concept of kairos, has on the concepts of multiculturalism and the idea of the “global village.” McComiskey includes an appendix of selected bibliographic sources for further reading on sophistic rhetoric and philosophy.


The authors address the decline in political participation from young people by proposing that a focus on deliberation—defined as “group discussion of a political issue with the specific intent of finding a resolution”—in the college classroom can positively affect attitudes towards civic involvement. Anecdotal experiences with students reveal that deliberative skills (such as balancing speaking with listening and building consensus) are often challenged by conventional notions of defending one’s point at all costs. That is, the traditional uses of rhetoric seem at odds with the goals of group deliberation, a dilemma the authors consider both research-rich and pedagogically useful. Argument instructors may find some application in this article—it highlights an age-old conflict about the purposes of rhetoric and dialectic within a contemporary classroom framework.

This study investigates the communication activities of majority and minority factions in small group decision-making discussions. In particular, the study focuses on the impact of argument on the final group outcomes. Even though this study examines speech communication, the Conversational Argument research program that it uses for its framework is a conglomeration of the work of Toulmin (formal argument), Perelman and Obrechts-Tyteca (interactional patterns of group argument), and Jackson and Jacobs (features of argument convergence). The authors believe that by using this framework, they can “connect two bodies of literature—majority-minority influence and argument—which, to date, have remained separate, but when connected, provide a basis for identifying communication as a central explanatory and predictive mechanism” (10). The results of the study indicated that majorities (the opinion supported by the most members of the group) win more often than minorities, that there are differences in how the subgroups argue, and that consistency (defined in this study as “maintenance of one’s position in interaction”) in argumentation is an important predictor of subgroup success. These concepts may be helpful to teachers and students of written argumentation, particularly when considering audience.


Struggling with whether or not argument is valuable to teach in the college classroom, Moxley begins by engaging in the question of teachers’ purposes in the writing classroom: are teachers giving students “something they need but do not yet have,” (a “Classical” notion of teaching) or are teachers giving students practice at abilities they already have a capacity for (a “Romantic” notion of teaching)? In order to answer these questions, Moxley evaluates three sample arguments based on Toulmin’s argumentative model, and then has both experienced and inexperienced college writers rank and evaluate these
Moxley’s findings about basic, first-year, and advanced composition students support both the Classical and Romantic hypothesis of what students know and need to know about arguments; he concludes by asserting that there is and should be a middle ground between these hypotheses.


Using specific concepts developed by Bertolt Brecht, Perkins uses dramatic theory to examine how instructors communicate with students in classrooms. The author notes that classrooms, like the stage, are inherently rhetorical in that they provide space for symbolic action (a concept explored mostly by Kenneth Burke). Brecht’s critique of theater indicts the dramatic genres of realism and naturalism, as they presume a universal depiction of human experience while serving as camouflage for transmitting dominant values and encouraging a passive audience role. In contrast, Brecht suggests that the stage should be explicitly addressed as a site of struggle through the tactical and ongoing use (and analysis) of alienation, historicization, and “gest.” Perkins applies each of these ideas to classroom instruction, arguing that they help create a rhetorically rich learning environment and promote critical awareness in students. This article offers instructors of argument solid theory along with specific examples for using classroom roles and behavior as texts for analysis.


Poggi, a social scientist, attempts to examine the role of persuader and persuadee intentions and goals through a logical, categorical treatment of argumentative exchange. The model used positions both parties as always consciously or unconsciously working towards particular “goals” or “super goals.” Like many other models, Poggi locates persuasion and thus argument at the center of social exchange. Social interaction is necessary because individuals don’t have the power to reach their desired ends on their own. Discourse is deemed valuable to people if it is “a useful means to some goal” (300). Poggi attempts
to theorize how Aristotle’s appeals (ethos, logos, pathos) function in persuasive interactions. His contention is that people persuade others through “goal hooking” or persuading Party A that his/her goal will be met through siding with Party B via appeals to ethos, logos and pathos, which are always present in persuasive discourse and subject to enhancement to maximize persuasive potential. While the prescriptive binaries, such as the distinction between persuasion and convincing, utilized in this article may not be all that rhetorical, the author’s overall point that argument is best envisioned as a non-coercive exchange between vested parties with free will is worthwhile.


Provis complicates notions of negotiation and argument, exploring both the accepted definitions of the two concepts, as well as the blurring between the two terms that often happens in argument scholarship. After examining argument cases that use both terms of argument (conflicting opinion or belief) and negotiation (conflicting goals or interest), Provis concludes that there are no distinct rules, principles, or norms which always apply to differentiate argument from negotiation. Instead, Provis asserts, we should look closely at the context and purpose of the interaction before trying to categorize it as negotiation or argument.


This essay proposes an alternative invention strategy to Toulmin and Aristotle for research-based argumentative writing. In particular it focuses on an examination of how hip-hop music constructs discourse through its complex method of laying sampled hooks on top of each other and how such rhetoric functions within an argument class. The call is for students to draw upon whatever contrasting voices are at their disposal and strategically sample to find out where they stand on an issue. For the purposes of this article, the year 1963 is used to locate disparate voices, but specific spaces of public discourse, contemporary issues, and physical space could also work. No specific pedagogy is
discussed, only hypothetical ways that students could engage issues; however, its grounding in cultural studies could prove helpful in the argument classroom.


Roberts-Miller calls on writing teachers to be more aware of the relationship between their pedagogy and their political theory. By political theory she does not have in mind a specific political ideology, liberal or conservative, so much as a “model of argument.” There are, she suggests, six models of argument in democracy and while any of the six (with one possible exception) might serve as the basis for an effective argument-based writing class, one in particular, the deliberative model, is most attractive. The six models include the following: (1) The liberal model of the public sphere which she calls utopian insofar as it exists only as an ideal, or an Enlightenment leftover that sees argument as a search for universal best interests; (2) the technocratic model which is less a full-blown model than a recurrent impulse that occurs within the context of one of the other models, calling on people to let experts decide what’s best for them; (3) the interest-based model which is almost purely subjectivist and hence incoherent, leaving one with no means by which to arbitrate competing claims; (4) the agonistic model which is more conflictual but more coherent than the interest-based model insofar as it is not necessarily subjectivist; (5) the communitarian model that rejects the liberal ideals of the autonomous individual and the “trashistorical foundations for democratic practices” (Roberts-Miller 5); (6) the deliberative model which is distinguished primarily for being broader than the other models, embracing narrative, the particulars a given situation, and emotion as part of rationality. The deliberative model emerges as the preferred model while the interest-based model is rejected as unusable in the classroom. The metric underlying Roberts-Miller’s judgment owes a good deal to Wayne Booth’s *Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent*, in particular his critique of the motivistic (subjectivist) and the scientismus (calculative rationality) approaches to argument.

Lamenting a dearth of applied evaluation argument, Schiappa compiles a collection of essays devoted to filling the void. In defining argument evaluation Schiappa stresses the narrower metric of cogency over more diffuse concerns with context values. One of the liveliest chapters in Schiappa’s book deals with abortion arguments and some of the perennial tropes that await those bold enough to tackle them.


In recent years, argumentative writing has become a central tenet of first-year writing. However, Schroeder suggests that the theories used to support argument pedagogy, namely the work of Stephen Toulmin, need to be questioned more, especially since he believes underprepared instructors are relying too heavily on Toulmin’s work (as relayed in textbooks), although he believes Toulmin has been an asset to argumentative writing theory. Among the many problems that Schroeder seems to have is that Toulmin’s work is too logic based—a mere iteration on traditional logocentric methods of inquiry. Schroeder seems to be assuming that Toulmin will be taught in a vacuum devoid of other rhetorical theory or somehow positioned as superior and not a related issue to audience awareness and other rhetorical theories. At its best Schroeder believes that Toulmin is helpful in the classroom because it asks students to analyze arguments. At its worst, he views it as relativistic.


Segal uses the topic of medical compliance to identify scientific rhetoric as fertile ground for further inquiry and to reach several conclusions about rhetorical theory and persuasive theory. She draws on the Burkeian concept of identification and Perelman’s notion of adherence
to support her claim that persuasion occurs most often when bonds are formed between parties, which is lacking in the Western medical tradition’s reliance on the asymmetrical patient/doctor dyad. Among her main points is that rhetorical theory and persuasion theory can and should inform each other, as each has traditionally explored separate spheres with little overlap. She also argues that rhetorical theory has too often ignored discommunity or situations where asymmetrical power relations are used as leverage to warrant assent and that rhetorical theory needs to be applied to disciplines in the social sciences to deconstruct the ways that they formulate arguments.


Shand, a philosopher, sets out to write a logic book that will prepare newcomers to the field for “thinking.” The importance of “sound logic” is espoused throughout. By sound logic, Shand means deductive soundness (true premises + valid arguments). In chapter two, Shand uses an art v. knack argument similar to Plato’s Socrates, from the *Gorgias*, to make the distinction between logic and rhetoric. Logic is concerned with the form of argument (e.g., people being justified in holding certain opinions); rhetoric solely with persuasion (e.g., convincing people within a certain context). The theoretical foundation of this book is deductive reasoning and there is no mention of any other way to “argue well.” There are also no pedagogical links made between this deductive structure and how it can be implemented in the classroom nor any mention of classical argument. (Shand’s book stands in here for a host of similar textbooks on logic, formal and informal, produced by philosophers over the past three decades.)


*Rationality Redeemed* extends the argument Siegel made eight years earlier in *Educating Reason*. His argument is that rationality and critical thinking “constitute a fundamental educational ideal.” For Siegel, critical thinking must involve the ability to evaluate reasons and to take stands on philosophical issues. It should be generalizable to all types of claims and be free from prejudice. In the second half of the book, Siegel considers his model in the context of contemporary phi-
losophy and responds to critics of *Educating Reason* who challenged his modernist theory of knowledge construction and use of metanarratives.


Slade argues against the claim that visual arguments function irrationally, and the equation made by many argument theorists between rationality and “linear, written, unemotional prose” (145). Using examples of advertisements to demonstrate her points, Slade outlines three tenets for a theory of visual argumentation, claiming that images may function as speech acts, that they should be interpreted in terms of specific semiotics, and that they contain their own argument structure.


The author argues that personal narrative, properly conceived, can achieve the ends of academic writing. She traces the personal to early theories of argumentation, situating its first dismissal in Plato, and its resurrection in Aristotle, who makes a case for personal narrative in epideictic, forensic, and deliberative argument. A comparison is made to generalizations drawn from the details of a narrative to “the missing middle term” of the enthymeme. Historically, the narrative has had a prominent role in persuasion, but was displaced, in the Enlightenment, by scientific objectivity. The current-traditional five-paragraph essay was the embodiment of this paradigm. In an age when even science acknowledges the limits of objectivity, personal writing narratives are seen by Spigelman as a means to segue into academic material. While personal narrative remains more difficult to evaluate than expository prose, Spigelman demonstrates that reasonable grounds for evaluation do exist.

Trail analyzes Orwell’s influential essay in its historical context both to explain its appeal and to underscore the importance of historical context to audience response. According to Trail, too much of Orwell’s appeal is attributed to the values he espouses and the strategies he employs. Trail’s argument also calls attention to the political nature of all writing and not just overtly “political writing.”


This collection of essays emerged from colloquia on dialectic and rhetoric held at the University of Amsterdam in 1999, New York University in 2000, and Northwestern University in 2001. The purpose of the volume is to clarify the characteristics of dialectic and rhetoric, particularly as they pertain to argumentative discourse and argument analysis. Essays analyze the similarities and differences between dialectic and rhetoric, covering topics such as Aristotelian approaches to rhetoric and dialectic; legal, forensic, and constitutional practices and processes of dialectic and rhetoric; and the relationship or “delicate balance” between the two traditions.


Based on pragma-dialectical approaches to argumentation, the authors provide an introduction to analyzing, evaluating, and presenting argument. In part one, Analysis, the authors discuss differences of opinion, the ideal model of critical discussion, standpoints and premises, and the structure of argument. Part two, Evaluation, covers how to determine the soundness of an argument, providing a comprehensive look at fallacies. The last section, Presentation, covers specifics on written and oral argument based on the approaches laid out in sections one and two, detailing analysis and evaluation of written and oral texts for the purpose of revising argumentative discourse.

A detailed study and survey of the enthymeme, this essay admits to a dual vision: (1) to establish that everyone enthymemes and (2) to demonstrate that the art of “enthymeming” requires exacting, demanding, disciplined study. The history details early Greek conceptions, explaining the relationship of the enthymeme to the syllogism and finding the same distinction Aristotle makes between rhetoric and dialectic: “anti-strophos,” a systematic difference combined with a similarity. Aristotle says enthymeme is essence. His contribution is “dialogic rationality.” Isocrates’s earlier conception combines style, kairos, ethos and pathos with a mastery of other rhetorical skills. Anaximenes’s approach is more technical, eristic and somewhat mechanical.

Walker claims that the ancient concepts of the enthymeme have a direct influence on contemporary practice, which goes unnoticed because few modern writers are trained in the concept. Because of this gap in their rhetorical theory, they do not realize that they are employing enthymemes in their arguments. The irony is that the enthymeme remains vital even when not understood: it remains a device connecting an idea with a rationale, relying on the audience’s ability to make that connection, which is precisely why enthymemes deserve more attention.


West claims that, as microcosms of a multicultural society, composition classrooms can use tensions and conflicts already present among students as a heuristic for them to examine their own beliefs. While teachers often view the classroom as a community, reducing differences to a pluralism where “everyone is entitled to his or her own opinion,” West suggests seeing it as a community of dissensus which acknowledges issues of race, gender, culture, class differences, privilege, disenfranchisement, and unequal access to the dominant culture. He argues that ignoring tensions between student/student, student/teacher, and reading/believing has a silencing effect. Instead, students should use issues as prompts to explore what and how they believe. Through reflection on their reading, writing, and beliefs, students can position themselves in relation to the range of competing discourses—academic, familial, work, religious. This is an attempt to cast conflict as a necessary part of advancing conversations, a principle that is central to the task of argument.

Westbrook treats nineteenth-century college literary societies as analogous to today’s critical pedagogies. The literary societies were extracurricular, student-run societies in which public issues of the day were debated in a pro-con format, then put to a popular vote. Like latter-day critical pedagogies, the societies challenged students to consider non-dominant perspectives, reexamine their individual positions, and critique the status quo. Based on a case study of one literary society, she recommends having students debate both sides of all issues so as to allow them to try out ideas as they are figuring out where they stand on issues of the day.


A central theme in theorizing Web-based forms of writing is the play between user’s choice and author’s structure. Williams agrees that the play inherent in Web-based writing is important; however, he believes that other theorists (Bolter, Landow, Joyce) have paid too much attention to the autonomy of the reader in constructing the message. His position is that Stephen Toulmin’s theory of “process-product ambiguity,” or the tension between the various messages that can be gleaned from a Web-text that an author creates, is in need of more theorizing because even in Web-based writing, the author has control over the possibilities that can come from navigating the various links within the document. The reader-writer dyad is relying upon a “shared rationality”; “given this formulation, interactivity becomes not only a matter of effective hypermedia design, but, in fact, a basis of persuasion” (381). This view assumes that the reader will be more persuaded by the work of an author who allows more room for the feeling of co-construction of ideas. Persuasiveness is judged by the openness of the context of relationships. A response by Jennifer Bay (see above) calls to question the limitation of Williams’s ideas to written words.

This article is an empirical study using quasi-experimental and case-study research methods. Two heuristics, (1) a pyramid heuristic based on Stephen Toulmin’s model and (2) a bridge heuristic based on a modern version stasis theory of classical rhetoric, were evaluated to measure their effectiveness in helping 116 middle-school students in four seventh-grade courses in two different schools to write argumentative essays. The student responses suggested that cultural minority students (Hispanic American, African American, and Asian American) benefited from being taught how to use the heuristics in writing an argument. Students in the experimental group were able to adapt their skills and transfer the heuristic knowledge to a range of topics. Students in this group also demonstrated more knowledge of argument structure and strategies in comparison to the control group. The results support the hypothesis that knowledge of argumentative procedures would improve student ability to generate arguments with adequate content and arrangement. The heuristics test seemed to have improved traditionally-underprepared students’ ability to write academic essays.