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Historical Review: Issues in Rhetorical Invention

The inventional issues discussed in Chapter 1 extend back through rhetorical history to the Sophists. Many of the oppositional positions seen in contemporary work on invention can be found in previous eras. Major rhetoricians and their subsequent interpreters have disagreed over the nature, purpose, and epistemology of invention. Contemporary scholars also point out that in earlier periods rhetoricians held narrow views of who could hold the subject position of rhetor, i.e., who could engage in rhetoric and hence in invention. This text offers a sample of these divergent points of view on invention, as the following quotations and the remainder of the chapter illustrate:

As things are now, those who have composed *Arts of Speech* have worked on a small part of the subject; for only *pisteis* [proofs] are artistic (other things are supplementary), and these writers say nothing about enthymemes, which is the “body” of persuasion, while they give most of their attention to matters external to the subject. (Aristotle, *On Rhetoric* 30)

There are two parts of rhetoric: Style (*elocutio*) and Delivery (*prenuntiatio*); these are of course the only parts, the ones proper to the art. [...] Rhetoric therefore will keep this particular task, that it takes the matter found and related by Dialectic, and laid out in clear and correct speech by Grammar, and then it
embellishes it with the splendor of the ornaments of style, and renders it acceptable with the grace of vocal tone and gesture. (Peter Ramus, Arguments against Quintilian, 27-28)

The invention of speech or argument is not properly an invention: for to invent is to discover that we know not, and not to recover or resummon that which we already know: and the use of this invention is no other but, out of the knowledge whereof our mind is already possessed, to draw forth or call before us that which may be pertinent to the purpose which we take into our consideration. So as to speak truly it is no invention, but a remembrance or suggestion, with an application; which is the cause why the schools do place it after judgment, as subsequent and not precedent. Nevertheless, because we do account it a chase as well of deer in an enclosed park as in a forest at large, and that it hath already obtained the name, let it be called invention: so as it be perceived and discerned, that the scope and the end of this invention is readiness and present use of our knowledge, and not addition or amplification thereof. (Francis Bacon, Advancement of Learning, 58)

Knowledge and science must furnish the materials that form the body and substance of any valuable composition. Rhetoric serves to add the polish. (Hugh Blair, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Letters, 32)

The finding of arguments with a view to the proof of truth—technically termed invention—belongs to the rhetorical process. (M.B. Hope, The Princeton Textbook in Rhetoric, 17)
Part 1: Theoretical Issues

As the above quotes illustrate, invention has been positioned differently in rhetorical history. In the sections that follow I will examine the three issues discussed in Chapter 1: differences over what constitutes invention, over its purpose, and over its underlying epistemology.*

Greek Views

There were three dominant Greek conceptions of invention, emphasizing different features and emanating from different epistemologies. The Sophists concentrated on the earliest moment of discourse, *kairos*, and subscribed to a *dissoi logoi* epistemology. Plato emphasized the invitational role of dialogue, but his commentators have argued over his purposes for invention and its epistemology. Aristotle developed the most explicit theory of invention, providing a conception of its nature, articulating his view of its purpose (which interpreters have contested), and explicating its probable epistemology.

*Interpretations of Sophistic Invention*

To the extent that one can speak of the Sophists as a group (Schiappa, 1992), scholars have discussed the Sophists’ interest in the earliest act of discourse, its initiation, foregrounding the term *kairos*. Most agree that for the Sophists conflict or dissonance triggered the start of discourse; modern commentators, however, have disagreed over whether *kairos* controlled the discourser or the discourser controlled *kairos*. Scholars have also argued over the character and implications of the *dissoi logoi* and have differed over whether Gorgias and other Sophists were skeptics, relativists, tragic philosophers, or social constructers of knowledge.

In the *Dissoi Logoi*, an unknown author demonstrated that it is possible to argue on two sides of a matter, making a case for the difference and sameness of good and bad, the seemly and disgraceful, the just and unjust, truth and falsehood, and so on. The author in one case stated that “To sum up, everything done at the right time is seem-

* The scholarship cited in the discussion of these issues is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive—an impossibility in this kind of text.
ly and everything done at the wrong time is disgraceful” (283). The statement contains an apparently contradictory way of knowing and a theory of *kairos*, “the right time.” Mario Untersteiner described *kairos* as the right moment, an instant in which the intimate connection between things is realized (111). *Kairos* implied contrast and conflict as the starting point of the treatment of *logos*. Untersteiner pointed out that Gorgias’s *Helen* and *Palamedes* started with contraries, both of which could be true, while Gorgias’s *On Being* started with contraries and argued for one side and disproved the other. Untersteiner went on to explain that justice and right decisions could be achieved if the judgment is made at the right moment. *Kairos* entailed the decision to accept one of the alternative *logoi*, breaking up the cycle of antithesis and creating something new (161). John Poulakas associated a sense of urgency and risk with *kairos* because the rhetor confronted contingent elements of the situation. *Kairos* dictated what must be said. He called *kairos* the radical principle of occasionality (“Toward a Definition of Sophistic Rhetoric”). Bernard Miller related the sophistic notion of *kairos* to Heidegger’s idea of an ontological dimension of language that possesses humankind: *kairos* is the *augenblick* in which Being is nearest to humans. Miller described *kairos* as qualitative time, based on competing *logoi*, the moment of decision. James Kinneavy maintained that *kairos* “brings timeless ideas down into the human situations of historical time. It thus imposes value on the ideas and forces humans to make free decisions about these values” (“Kairos” 88). Michael Carter argued that for the Pythagoreans, including Empedocles, the universe is a collection of agonistic relationships originating in the opposition of monad and dyad, which are bound together in harmony though the principle of *kairos*, thus creating the universe. He maintained that for Gorgias, *kairos* was the principle of conflict and resolution and for Protagoras, the rhetor could discriminate between the greater and lesser probability of truth within a community (*Stasis* and *Kairos* 103). He also noted that the concept of right in *kairos* contained an ethical dimension—what at the crucial time seemed to be the truest *logos*. Carter maintained that later, especially in the Roman period, the development of *status*, identifying the point at issue, offered a way for the rhetor to gain some control over the moment. Thus, most of these interpreters described this initiating moment of discourse as entailing contrasts, conflicts, competing *logoi*, opposites, or contradictions. They differed, however, in the extent to which the rhetor could control
kairos or be overwhelmed by it, propelled to discourse as Miller’s Heideggarian interpretation posited.

Another aspect of invention that has received considerable scholarly attention has been sophistic epistemology. Kathleen Freeman explained that in Protagoras’s theory of knowledge “each individual’s perceptions are immediately true for him at any given moment, and that there is no means of deciding which of several opinions about the same thing is the true one; there is no such thing as ‘truer’ though there is such a thing as ‘better’” (The Pre-Socratic Philosophers 348). Freeman pointed out that this precept led Protagoras “to deny the Law of Contradictories, which rules that the same attribute cannot at the same time both belong and not belong to the same subject in the same respect” (349). He asserted instead that “there were two contradictory propositions on every matter” (349). According to Freeman, Plato considered these precepts to reduce all knowledge to sensation, doing away with “any possibility of stable knowledge of any kind” (349). This view was also “taken to mean that objects do not exist except while someone is perceiving them” (349). She cited Protagoras’ instruction as a study of opinions and their means, constituting the art of persuasion (Pre-Socratic). Janet Atwill claimed that “Protagoras’s theory of knowledge is his theory of value; epistemology collapses into axiology” (Rhetoric Reclaimed 139). She further demonstrated that while his theory of knowledge is relativistic, it does not give way to skepticism or solipsism. Richard Enos posited that for Empedocles, the “juxtaposition of antithetical [opposing or contrasting] concepts was more a matter of correlative balancing of thesis and antithesis than it was of intellectual inconsistency” (“The Epistemology” 40). He explained that Gorgias’s epistemology was “based on a system of investigation in which probable knowledge or opinion was revealed as a synthesis from dichotomous antithetical positions” (“The Epistemology” 50; see also Greek Rhetoric before Aristotle).

Untersteiner argued that Gorgias was neither a skeptic nor a relativist but “a tragic philosopher and an irrationalist. Knowledge of the power possessed by the irrational constituted the victory of the tragic” (159). Man could not escape antitheses. Untersteiner noted that for Gorgias, there were two kinds of knowledge: that of perpetually recurring doubt and that driven by the force generated by the tragic element. Knowing the irreconcilable conflicts, man yet acted (159). Decision was based on kairos, which “breaks up the cycle of antith-
eses and creates an irrational epistemological process of deception and persuasion” (161). In Untersteiner’s interpretation of Gorgias, “truth” could not be incarnated in logos: the universal was split by the irrational concurrence of certain special circumstances. Antithesis opposed one philosophical system to another, canceling them out on the purely logical plane but rescuing them in the practical sphere by persuasion (141). For Gorgias, then, according to Untersteiner, persuasion was a force in the face of the ambivalence of logos, a position that Helen and Palamedes illustrated. The purpose of the logos in these works was to create happiness by creating a new situation in the human mind (114). In Helen, man did not rule the world with logos but the logos of the contradictory world ruled man. The world was not a creation of the mind, capable of endowing it with order and harmony. In Palamedes, it was impossible to prove the truth of what happened and what was willed. The problem lay in the hearers, leaving the final appeal for kindness and time (122). Untersteiner also pointed out that Gorgias considered persuasion to be “deception” because one convinced the audience of one meaning knowing that the opposite also had probability (111).

In Rereading the Sophists: Classical Rhetoric Refigured, Susan Jarrett argued against the dualistic view of mythos/logos during the fifth century BCE, demonstrating the evolutionary rather than revolutionary changes during this period. She challenged the idea of a “mythic” consciousness in Homer and analyzed the “mixed discourse” in Gorgias and Protagoras, positing that “Acknowledging an epistemological status for probability demands in discourse a flexible process of ordering or arranging, a feature of both nomos (a social construct involving ordering) and narrative” (47). She noted that Protagoras likely understood the dissoi logoi as a means of discovering a truth, a starting point for rhetorical work. He rejected any truth outside of human experience. For Gorgias, she argued the logos was a holistic process of verbal creation and reception different from the rational conception of Aristotle and Plato. Agreeing with Jacqueline de Romilly, she noted that Gorgias’s power came from the rational control of techne (art), a self-conscious relation to discourse. For the Sophists, then, she maintained that nomos was a “middle term between mythos and logos,” “a self-conscious arrangement of discourse to create politically and socially significant knowledge” (60).
Bruce McComiskey interpreted Gorgias’s *On Non-Existence*, the *Encomium of Helen*, and the *Defense of Palamedes* as “a wholistic statement about communal and ethical issues of *logos*” (*Gorgias and the New Sophistic Rhetoric* 12). In these texts he found Gorgias articulating “a relativist epistemology within which his *kairos*-based methodology was perfectly consistent” (12), unlike its characterization in Plato’s *Gorgias*. McComiskey argued that *On Non-Existence* “theorizes the impact external realities have on the human psyche, the *Helen* explores the unethical workings of persuasion on the human psyche, and the *Palamedes* illustrates *topoi* (places) for the invention of ethical arguments” (12). He demonstrated that for Gorgias “all human beliefs and communicative situations are relative to a particular *kairos* or “right moment” (22) and that this epistemology grounds his “belief in the distorting process of sensory perception.” (23). McComiskey complicated this view of Gorgias’s epistemology by saying that Gorgias did “believe in certain conceptions of ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’ and in some circumstances ‘opinion’ was insufficient” (24). Further he commented that from the Greek terms it is clear that “Gorgias’s word for knowledge (*eidô*) is different from Plato’s word (*episteme*) for the same English concept of knowledge. Plato’s word implies an understanding that exists prior to any given situation in which it might be applied” (25) Gorgias’s term entails “an understanding that is derived empirically from a situation” (25). Speaking of the purpose of Gorgianic rhetoric, he argued that it was concerned with the greatest good of the community (27-28). (See also “Gorgias, *On Non-Existence*: Sextus Empiricus.)

Thus, scholars have differed over Sophists’ views of the nature of the initiation of discourse, the role of persuasion in relation to *logos*, the power of *kairos*, and the epistemologies of various Sophists. Again, the examples below illustrate but do not exhaust the discussion of these issues.

*Interpretations of Plato’s Views of Invention*

Plato’s mature view of invention can be found in the *Phaedrus*, which illustrated rather than systematizes the topics. He does, however, mention or exemplify four sources for the initiation of discourse: inspiration of the muses (13, 16, 17, 54), dissonance between the two speeches that prompts the third speech, adaptation to the situation (*kairos*) by knowing the souls of the audience (58, 67, 70), and love
itself. The modern commentator, Martha Nussbaum, in *The Fragility of Goodness*, argued that the entire *Phaedrus* was an apologia for *eros* as the motivator or initiator of philosophical discourse: to reach insight one needed personal love and passion, the ferment of the entire personality, even certain aspects of madness. She demonstrated that these ideas represented Plato’s recantation of some of his former positions.

A number of interpreters have differed over Plato’s view of the purpose and epistemology of invention. Some have maintained that Plato considered invention’s goal to be locating support for judgments and truth found outside of rhetoric and then adapting these truths to various audiences. In a set of articles in *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*, several prominent rhetoricians held that for Plato, invention and rhetoric were not epistemic. Donald Bryant contended that for Plato the art of persuasion was needed to communicate truths mastered and understood elsewhere (10). Richard Enos took the same position, holding that for Plato dialectical knowledge was a precondition for rhetoric (17). Michael Leff said that Plato rendered the conception of genuine rhetoric paradoxical. Language remained incorrigible on the metaphysical level yet “performed a morally justifiable function by imparting a tendency toward truth in the soul of the auditor” (22). As Leff concluded, for Plato true rhetoric was possible only with “an intuitive grasp of the truths that extend beyond language” (23). In *Plato, Derrida, and Writing*, Jasper Neel contended that Plato defined what counted as thinking: Truth was separable from and superior to the knower and couldn’t be found in writing; Plato refused to see writing as the originator of thinking.

In contrast, others have claimed that Plato viewed invention as a process of inquiry and reasoning. William Covino held that the *Phaedrus* is about the art of wondering and about rhetoric, writing, and reading as play within an expanding horizon (21). Jan Swearingen, in “The Rhetor as Eiron,” argued that Plato considered dialogue the true rhetoric, a mode of philosophical reasoning, a midwifery that brings forth meaning, and an analysis that leads to synthesis or truth. She maintained that “the Platonic *episteme*, means of knowing, were [. . .] distinctly different from the instrumentalist rhetoric of the sophists” (295). For Plato, “‘intent’ was not only a determinant of semantic meaning, but also a criterion for epistemological and ethical evaluation” (308). In “Dialogue and Dialectic,” Swearingen described Plato’s dialogue as a “ritual of communal philosophizing and philosophy
as a way of knowing that can only be conducted dialogically” (49). In an encyclopedic essay on Plato, she commented that in the *Phaedrus*, Plato sketched a true rhetoric—“a dialogical-dialectical method that strongly resembles modern paradigms for a ‘rhetoric of inquiry’” (526). Swearingen commented on Plato’s use of the feminine metaphors of midwifery and weaving to characterize knowledge construction (“Eiron”). Page duBOIS, on the other hand, critiqued Plato for appropriating the reproductive metaphors for male philosophers in order to authorize them, an argument that Swearingen subsequently rebutted. (See also Swearingen, *Rhetoric and Irony*.) Charles Griswold theorized that the *Phaedrus* was concerned primarily with self-knowledge realized through the dialectic of rhetoric—that *logos* itself was fundamentally rhetorical (161). Ronna Burger argued that for Plato writing was a necessary precondition for the development of thought, freeing human memory from preserving common opinions and creating a distance from the authority of tradition. Writing and rhetoric were processes of erotic dialectic.

Thus, scholars have differed over Plato’s views of the purposes and epistemology of rhetoric; creating knowledge or only conveying it; dealing with truth outside of rhetoric or rhetorical dialogic.

**Inventional Issues in Aristotle’s Rhetoric**

In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle delineated several acts of invention and constructed arts (strategies or principles) for analyzing the discourse situation and categorizing its matter; arts for exploring using the 28 common topics (lines of argument that could be used across types of discourse, e.g., definition) and the special topics (categories that prompted the rhetor to find appropriate content); and arts for framing its probable rhetorical epistemology facilitated by the enthymeme and the example (informal versions of deduction and induction). As the following examples of scholarship reveal, these elements have been differently interpreted.

Scholars have disagreed over whether Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* included a discussion of the initiation of discourse. Kinneavy, for example, originally maintained that Aristotle had no concept of *kairos*, but later he and Catherine Eskin discussed the crucial role of *kairos* in the *Rhetoric*, basing their interpretation on the fact that the text was built around the concept of “in each case.” Yameng Liu argued that despite Aristotle’s familiarity with *stasis*, he had serious reservations about its ap-
plicability to rhetoric because he saw it as only occasionally useful for local functions (55). Also, he argued that because Aristotle emphasized deliberative discourse, *stasis*, which was typically proposed for forensic discourse, was not helpful (56). William Grimaldi claimed that Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* had a different initiating strategy, explaining that the possible/impossible, past fact/future fact, and size were not topics but common requisites or preconditions for rhetoric into one of which the subject had to fit before the rhetor could responsibly engage in discourse (*Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle’s Rhetoric*). Others interpreters like Otto Dieter, Wayne Thompson, and J. Backes concluded that Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* had elements of *stasis*.

Scholars also have differed over Aristotle’s conception of the purposes of the common topics. Several have taken the position that the topics engaged the rhetor in reasoning, constructing knowledge, or creating interpretations. Grimaldi characterized the 28 common topics as “natural ways the mind thinks” (*Studies* 130) in order to locate lines of reasoning and inferential patterns. He maintained that Aristotle viewed rhetoric as a general art of human discourse, a theory of language for serious communicators when they “seek to determine truth or fallacy in real situations” (*Studies* 18). He held that Aristotle considered rhetoric as enabling language to become a medium for apprehending reality (*Studies* 124-26). Also taking an epistemic view of the topics, Richard Enos and Janice Lauer described Aristotle’s topics as socially shared instruments for creating probable knowledge (24, 37-44).

Other scholars have contended that the topics did not have an epistemic function but rather operated to communicate what was already known. E.M. Cope called the topics aids to memory, haunts, mines, and stores. Thomas Conley described them as a process of reasoning backward from “given” conclusions in order to find premises that would lead the hearer to a conclusion (“‘Logical Hylomorphism’ and Aristotle’s *Konoi Topoi*” 94). Arguing that both the special and common topics could be viewed as warrants, James Murphy in *A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric* considered the topical search as finding rather than creating, conscious choice among a fixed stock of alternatives (57), while Donovan Ochs In “Aristotle’s Concept of Formal Topics,” deemed the topics ways of relating predicates to subjects. Other interpretations of Aristotle’s purposes for invention include Michael Leff’s view of the topics as principles or strategies to “enable the
arguer to connect reasons with conclusions for the purpose of effecting a proof” ("The Topics of Argumentative Invention" 25). According to Leff, inferences depend on the connections between propositions taken as whole units relative to the audience addressed and thus arising from and verified by social knowledge in a community (25). Ellen Quandahl considered the topics as part of a method of interpretation. Carolyn Miller, in “The Aristotelian Topos: Hunting for Novelty,” drew on the venetic (hunting) tradition and the spatial metaphor of topos (place) to argue that Aristotle’s topics can be sources of novelty with generative capacity, functioning within the epistemology of the hunt, which concerns the individual case, not universal knowledge, and probability rather than certainty. She maintained that in “the Platonic realm of Being, invention can only be discovery, but in the Aristotelian world of Becoming, it can also be creation” (137).

Scholars have generally considered the purpose of the special topics to be finding and examining subject matter or analyzing the audience. For example, Grimaldi described the special topics as offering the matter for propositions, the sources to be examined (Studies 124-26) in order to find content regarding “the time, the place, the circumstances and the emotional involvement” (133).

Diverse points of view also can be found about Aristotle’s conception of rhetorical epistemology. Some examples follow. John Gage maintained that Aristotle’s rhetoric was legitimate inquiry into probable knowledge. He stated that for Aristotle knowledge was created through invention in the activity of discourse. The enthymeme brought together the rhetor’s search for mutually agreed upon grounds for probable knowledge and the audience’s premises ("An Adequate Epistemology for Composition"). Lloyd Bitzer differentiated the rhetorical enthymeme from the demonstrative and dialectical syllogism, arguing that the distinction rested on how the premises were secured. In the case of Aristotle’s rhetoric they came from the audience (“Aristotle’s Enthymeme Revisited”). According to Eugene Garver, who argued for the modesty of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, those who think of composition as critical thinking and problem-solving aim to reunite wisdom and eloquence and thus extend rhetoric to things as Cicero did but not as Aristotle would have done. In his view, Aristotle was not interested in creating specialized knowledge but in finding the available arguments. Although Martha Nussbaum did not write about Aristotle’s Rhetoric, she argued that Aristotle’s epistemology was based on “appearances”:
the world as perceived, demarcated, and interpreted by human beings and their beliefs. She offered the following translation of a passage from the *Posterior Analytics*: “So goodbye to the Platonic Forms, they are *teretismata* [dum-de-dum-dums] and have nothing to do with our speech” (256). For Aristotle, she contended, truth and appearances were not opposed—but truth existed where we communicate inside the circle of appearances.

**Subject Positions**

During this Greek period, the position of writer/speaker was largely limited to men, excluding slaves and women, although we now know of some women like Sappho, Praxilla, Aspasia, and Diotima, who occupied that position. (See Snyder; Swearingen, “A Lover’s Discourse” and “Plato’s Women”; Glenn, *Rhetoric Retold*, “Locating Aspasia”; Jarratt and Rory; and Jarratt, “Sappho’s Memory”; Fantham, *Women in the Classical World*; and Donawerth, *Rhetorical Theory*, “Bibliography.”)

**Review: Greek Rhetorical Invention**

As the above discussions of Greek views of invention illustrate, issues abound among the Sophists, Plato, and Aristotle as well as among their interpreters. Differences exist over which inventional acts and arts are included in the texts: e.g., *kairos* and *status* as initiators of discourse; special and common topics as exploratory arts; *dissoi logoi*, enthymeme, example or dialogue as forms of rhetorical reasoning; and probability, truth, or certainty as rhetorical epistemologies. They also disagree over the purposes of invention, e.g., initiating discourse with questions, issues, or contradictions, creating knowledge, reaching probable judgment, finding arguments to support existing theses, communicating truths or supporting persuasive propositions.

**Roman Views**

The Romans further codified invention, sometimes placing it under types of discourse. This was a significant move away from topics as a set of alternative prompts across types of discourse to ones that were text bound to develop a type of discourse or a section of the text, i.e., to provide content. This move blurred the distinction between special and common topics. Further, some Romans complicated the
enthymeme, making it less flexible. Interpreters of these Roman rhetoricians, discussing their epistemologies, have often described their concept of rhetorical invention as a practical art concerned with the “how,” not the “why.” Examples of these interpretations illustrate views on these issues. Further, in this culture, subject positions for rhetors continued to be limited.

Invention in Rhetorica ad Herennium

The first complete Roman rhetoric, *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, became the text used for centuries in rhetorical education. It outlined the inventional strategy of *status* to help the rhetor begin judicial discourse (in the court) by determining the type of issue that was at stake: either the conjectural (an issue of fact); the legal (an issue of the letter and spirit, conflicting laws, ambiguity, definition, or analogy) or the juridical (an issue of the rightness or wrongness of an act). Although the anonymous author did not discuss *status* for deliberative discourse (in the political forum) or epideictic discourse (in ceremonial sites), these two types of writing could nevertheless be initiated with a question or point at issue. Raymond Nadeau traced the changing history of *status*, beginning with Hermagoras, who identified four issues: conjecture, definition, quality, and translation (“Hermogenes’ *On Stasis*”). For centuries this inventional procedure directed the first composing act, helping the writer to determine which point at issue needed investigation.

In *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, the topics became text bound topics, losing their power as a set of investigative heuristics for the process of knowledge creation or inquiry. Instead they became a search for material to develop parts of the text. The distinction between common and special topics disappeared. Lists of topics proliferated, intermingled, and were placed under the parts of the discourse: Introduction, Narration, Division, Distribution, Proof, and Conclusion. The topics for the introduction helped to prepare the hearer’s mind for attention; for narration, they assisted the rhetor in setting up the events; for division they helped make clear what was agreed upon or contested; and for proof, they offered alternative lines of argument (4). Under the proof, topics were further classified within the types of discourse: judicial, deliberative, and epideictic. Judicial topics were divided into conjectural, legal, and juridical. Deliberative topics were represented under the headings of security and honor. Epideictic topics of praise were
grouped into external circumstances, physical attributes, and qualities of character. For the conclusion, topics for amplification were enumerated. The anonymous author cited the purpose of invention as “devising of matter, true or plausible, that would make the case convincing” (3).

The Roman emphasis on arrangement was further reflected in a more complex logical argument structure—the epicheireme, with five parts: the proposition, reason (premises), proof of the reason, embellishment, and resume (Rhetorica ad Herennium 107). D. Church and R. Cathgart cited George Thiele, who contended that the epicheireme rejected the enthymeme and tried to accommodate the logical syllogism to the needs of rhetoric. He contended that it doesn’t “recognize the true nature of the enthymeme and seriously perverts the purpose and methods of rhetorical invention” (142). The authors claimed that in consequence reasoning lost “the persuasive force of an enthymeme that is derived through rhetorical invention rather than dialectical consideration” (147). It was the epicheireme, Church and Cathgart noted, that prevailed as the “cornerstone of rhetorical argument for fifteen centuries” (147). This text-bound invention system with its formulaic reasoning process drastically changed the more flexible and nuanced previous views of rhetorical invention.

Cicero’s Conceptions of Invention

In Cicero’s mature discussion of rhetoric, De Oratore, Crassus and Antonius (the two major discussants in the text) treated invention more subtly. Although both of them downplayed their own reliance on invention strategies in favor of their natural abilities, in a number of places the conversation revealed their knowledge of status and the topics. Both showed familiarity with the three types of issues: conjecture (fact), definition, and quality. Crassus referred to the commonplaces for each type of discourse (40) and bemoaned the fact that philosophers had usurped the common topics. Antonius compared the commonplaces to letters in a word, immediately occurring to us and useful only to the experienced person (117-18), holding that if the commonplaces were fixed in the memory and mind, nothing would escape the orator (131). In his discussion of the topics, he mentioned a selection of common topics such as definition, resemblance and difference, cause and effect, greater and lesser (127-30), and topics for epideictic
Neither he nor Crassus distinguished between common and special topics.

Donovan Ochs maintained that Cicero’s system for speculative inquiry had as its object “the study and understanding of an arguable question or principle of behavior” (“Cicero” 219). He found this system to be coherent, functional, and teachable, reflecting the teaching of various schools, including the Skeptics, Stoics, and Epicureans. Ochs contended that using this system of inquiry gave a rhetor the possibility of both eloquence and wisdom (“Cicero” 227). In “The Topics of Argumentative Invention in Latin Rhetorical Theory from Cicero to Boethius,” Leff described Cicero’s early topical system in *De Inventione* as divided into topics of person and act in contrast to Aristotle’s system. He explained that these two topics provided raw material for arguments and shifted from “the discovery of inferential connectives to the discovery of the materials for arguments” (29). Leff characterized Cicero’s treatment of the topics in *De Oratore* as an invention process resulting in the discovery of material, giving greater emphasis to logical relationships and creating categories of topics based on the subject of the discourse (30-31). Hence, Cicero’s system blurred dialectical and rhetorical theories of invention. Leff also explained that Cicero distinguished between his topics and necessary and probable inference and induction and deduction (29). George Kennedy maintained that Cicero’s notion of invention was more Aristotelian than that of *Rhetorica ad Herennium* because Cicero did not place invention under the parts of the oration (*The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World*).

Discussing Cicero’s epistemology, Prentice Meador explained that Cicero’s idea of probability stemmed from the Skeptic theory of perception, in which a fallible perception was the source of knowledge upon which man acted. Thus, rhetoric and especially invention were not only socially possible but also necessary. Enos pointed to principles of dialectic and ethics as the philosophical foundation of Cicero’s litigation strategies. He explained that Cicero was influenced by the Skeptic’s notion of probability and the belief that the dialectic of inquiry was held between the jurors, rhetor, and populace. He also pointed out that the Skeptics held that judgment was suspended and moral commitment to the reasonable obtained (*The Literate Mode of Cicero’s Legal Rhetori*). William Covino called Cicero’s epistemology shifting dialogic points of view in a frame of irresolution, ambiguity, and open speculation (34). Cicero’s rhetoric, according to Covino, en-
compassed a range of perspectives across time with multiple constructions of history, tradition, and facts, and layers of recollected narrative. For Covino, Cicero’s work as a whole was a collection of contradictory and complementary perspectives. Thomas Sloane argued that both Crassus and Antonius agreed on the nature of invention as pro/con thinking, with even *De Oratore’s* form demonstrating this dialogic. In this conception of invention, one had to debate all sides or one would not have fully invented. He noted that when the Renaissance humanists discovered Cicero’s work, they thought they had found a new philosophy of practical reasoning in which invention was essentially an analytic process—a process of *stasis* (“Reinventing *Inventio*” 466). (See also Sloane’s *On the Contrary.* ) Renato Barilli claimed that Cicero overturned Aristotle’s model of dialectic over rhetoric because Cicero valued the forum over the chamber. He maintained that Cicero refused to privilege content and meaning over modes, signifiers, situations or contexts and that the probable for Cicero had an historical and temporal dimension (27-28). Michael Mendelson pointed out that Cicero in *De Oratore* dramatized *controversia* (two opposing claims in juxtaposition) in order to show his students’ argument in action. Mendelson took this to mean that Cicero thought all matters were subject to interpretation and opposing positions. He further argued that for Cicero differences of interpretation were the starting point of argument whose goals were to articulate differences within the dynamic of ongoing discourse and to calculate the degrees of probability to provide grounds for action.

The dialogic format of *De Oratore* enabled Cicero to review several positions on the nature, purpose, and epistemology of invention. As seasoned rhetorical performers, Crassus and Antonius privileged their talent and interaction with the rhetorical situation as causes of their rhetorical success although their rhetorical education in invention was evident in the conversation. Such a position is understandable since as prominent rhetors they had by then internalized their education and had used it to enhance their own powers. Also, as the commentators pointed out, Cicero’s probable epistemology reflected the climate of his day and the preeminent position of rhetoric over philosophy in Rome.
Inventional Issues in Quintilian’s Rhetoric

Quintilian’s twelve-volume *Institutio Oratoria* provided a history of some of the inventional issues prior to his day, especially different views of rhetoric as an art and *status*. He continued the text-bound treatment of the topics used in *Rhetorica ad Herennium* as well as the two superordinate categories of topics found in Cicero’s earlier work, *De Inventione*: person and act. Further, he included the enthymeme, the epicheireme, and the example as means of rhetorical argument. His work offered a comprehensive description of invention up to that point but not an original theory of invention.

Quintilian’s history traced competing views of *status*. He recounted that his early conception had entailed four issues: conjectural, qualitative, definition, and legal, but that later he had changed to the first three. He defined *status* as the kind of question that arises from the first collision between the parties to a dispute (3.6.4). He also claimed that one could begin discourse by invoking the strategy of *status* in all types of discourse although it was not necessary for all subjects (3.5.3). The use of *status* was consequential for the Romans because the type of *status* that the rhetor selected gave direction to the entire investigative process.

Unlike some aspects of rhetoric like *status* for which he provided long histories of different points of view, Quintilian did not trace the history of the topics nor did he elaborate extensively on their purpose. He instead positioned the topics under the types of discourse—epideictic, deliberative, and forensic, ignoring the distinction between common and special topics. Epideictic topics directed the rhetor to subject matters under the categories of gods, men, cities, and public works (3.7.1-28). Deliberative topics included the resources of the state, the character of people, topics of honor and expedience, various virtues like justice and piety, and general topics including comparison and degree (3.8.14-38). Under forensic discourse, he employed the broad categories of “persons” (e.g., birth, education, occupation, personal ambitions) and “things,” which included “actions” such as why, where, how, and by what means; causes, definition, consequences and contradictions (5.8.4-95). He thanked the creators of the art for giving us “a shortcut to knowledge,” but warned that if the rhetor only knew the “places,” he had “a dumb science” (5.10.119-125) unless he also practiced, had discrimination, and understood the context in which he discoursed (213).
Quintilian’s notion of rhetorical epistemology can be found in his discussion of certainties in conjunction with his treatment of the enthymeme and epicheireme. He claimed that something in every case must need no proof, which either was or was believed to be true (5.10.11-12). The person who was to “handle arguments correctly must know the nature and meaning of everything and their usual effects” in order to arrive at probable arguments (5.11.1-35). Furthermore, Quintilian gave considerable attention to the example as an argument, describing historic parallels, past actions, quotes from poets, similes, and analogies (271-93). John O’Banion argued that Quintilian considered narration as “a primary mode of thought” and as “a key to strategy” (325), the most important department of rhetoric in practice. He explained that Quintilian integrated narration and logic into a complex dialectic to serve the arrangement or order in which principles were adjusted to specific cases. Narration provided the link between the major and minor premise.

Subject Positions

During these Roman centuries, the rhetor position was occupied predominantly by a male citizen although we now know of women’s discourses such as Cornelia’s letters and Hortensia’s address to the Roman forum, both persuasive discourses entailing arguments (Glenn, *Rhetoric Retold*; Snyder).

Review: Roman Rhetorical Invention

As the above discussion illustrates, conceptions of invention in these major Roman rhetorical texts differed from those of the Greeks and among themselves and their interpreters. Two rhetoricians placed *status* and the topics (now a mixture of common and special) under parts of the discourse. The epicheireme was added to the enthymeme and example as means of rhetorical reasoning. Invention was largely viewed as finding support for judgments and material for sections of the text. Some scholars commented on the situatedness of the inventional practices and the initiation of discourse with issues. Commentators on Cicero generally agreed on his probable epistemology and rhetoric’s preeminence over logic. These conceptions of invention, particularly in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, would prevail through hundreds of years. They influenced theory and practice through the Renaissance
and still characterize a number of pedagogies and textbooks today: 1) the tendency to multiply topics and restrict them to finding content for parts of a text or only for certain kinds of texts rather than acting as heuristic sets to explore for insights and judgments; 2) a preference for more complex logical frameworks rather than informal reasoning based on the audience's knowledge; and 3) the valuing of natural abilities over the guidance of rhetorical arts. A few textbooks and pedagogies today reflect the Roman use of a status-like art to begin the process of discoursing by identifying points at issue in the situation or framing questions instead of starting with a thesis or a subject.

Inventional Issues in Second Sophistic, Medieval, and Renaissance Rhetorics

During the second sophistic period (roughly from the second century CE to the fall of the Roman Empire in 410 CE in the West and to around the sixth century in the East), little new inventional theory was developed. The term sophistic was used because it represented in the eyes of the historians of the time some features of Greek sophistic rhetoric: an emphasis on decoration, polish, and stylistic eloquence, preferring discourses with little political or even judicial import over those leading to probable civic judgments and new knowledge. Classical conceptions of invention and rhetoric continued to be taught in the Roman empire in the ephebia (two years of higher education) until the fall of the empire. As Christianity spread, rhetorical scholars tried to reconcile rhetorical probability with Christian belief in Divine truth, turning inquiry into interpreting the Scriptures and finding material to promulgate Divine truths. Throughout the medieval period, efforts to save the classical rhetoric texts resulted in preserving shortened versions of rhetorical invention in encyclopedias and stripping the arts of their authorizing and explanatory theory. Invention was also channeled into advice for letter writing, preaching, and writing poetry, not as epistemic guides but as advice for generating content. McKeon argued that rhetorical invention went underground, was often subordinated to logic or philosophy, and eventually contributed to the formation of the scholastic and scientific methods. During the Renaissance, invention took three basic directions: classical rhetorical invention found its way into vernacular rhetorical texts; treatises on schemes (syntactic alternatives) and tropes (figures of speech) nudged
invention out of many rhetorical texts; proclamations by individuals such as Ramus banished invention from rhetoric, leaving it with style and delivery; and finally, others like Francis Bacon relegated rhetorical invention to the non-epistemic process of finding the known.

Second Sophistic Issues

The rise of the Roman Empire drove rhetoric from the courtrooms and assemblies into ceremonial and academic sites. Invention followed. Epideictic (ceremonial) rhetoric prevailed, with competitive oratory in some cases becoming a substitute for the gladiator matches. Kennedy, drawing from Vasile Florescu, called the period one of letteraturizzazione, a time in which style became central and invention functioned as a means of discovering ethical and pathetic appeals to advance the values and ideas of the emperor and imperial policies, and hence rarely served an epistemic purpose (Classical Rhetoric 5).

Also during this time, Christianity gradually gained ascendancy. Latin and Byzantine rhetoricians such as Chrysostom, Jerome, Origen, Tertullian, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Augustine struggled over the relationship between Christianity and rhetoric, pondering the connection between faith and argument and between Divine truths and probability. Here inventional acts took a hermeneutical turn as they were deployed to interpret the Scriptures and embellish sermons (La Tourneau). As George Kennedy explained, preaching the Christian kerygma, the good news, was a proclamation, where the truth of the message had to be apprehended by the listener, not proved by the speaker (Classical Rhetoric 145-46). Through God’s help, not rhetoric, the listener was able to believe in the person of Christ and understand the wisdom of the Scriptures. James Kinneavy investigated the correspondence between the notion of Christian faith and persuasion as pistis, or proof, where faith was an epistemological state of conviction, freely chosen and based on trust, assent, and knowledge (Greek Rhetorical). For Augustine, invention was an art of exegesis that guided the discovery of meaning in the Scriptures. He also examined some inquiry purposes. In Book II of De Doctrina, he considered the science of disputation useful for understanding and solving scriptural questions (31) and noted that ambiguity required faith to unravel. For Augustine, the purpose of rhetoric with all of its powers was to serve the communication of the truth. In Greek Rhetoric under the Christian Emperors, Kennedy maintained that Augustine developed a set of
commonplaces from the Bible (183). Kathy Eden argued that the basis of Augustine’s interpretation was a distinction between the Scriptures and the writer’s intention, “regarding the dianoetic (rational) meaning as prior to and privileged above the semantic meaning” (50). Because one who was charitably disposed couldn’t lie, Augustine required that an interpreter’s grasp of the meaning of the text must entail ethical theory.

In the East, a fifth-century Chinese scholar, Liu Xie wrote a treatise on rhetoric entitled *Wen Xin Diao Long* (“The Literary Mind and the Carving of Dragons”). HePing Zhao explained that one of the meanings of *wen* is writing in a generic sense, indicating that writing is composed of patterns (another meaning of *wen*), thereby establishing “a powerful analogy in which writing, a human creation, is likened to nature, the creation of some ‘primal’ force” (73). The text has chapters entitled: “Spiritual Thought or Imagination,” “Style and Nature,” “The Wind and the Bone,” and “Flexible Adaptability to Varying Situations,” which “discuss discovering ideas, making judgments about observations, and exploring for supporting materials” (Zhao 148-49). Zhao pointed out that there are interactions between content-oriented inventional acts and form-oriented inventional acts.

*Inventional Issues in Medieval Rhetoric*

What we understand about medieval theories of invention is based in part on observing what was truncated, omitted, or assigned to another field. During this long period, views of the nature and purpose of invention were often reductive and their course circuitous. As Richard McKeon explained, invention during this period influenced three lines of intellectual development: rhetorical theory, theology, and logic. Rhetorical treatises presented short versions of *status*, thesis/hypothesis arguments about whether rhetoric encompassed both abstract and concrete questions or only concrete cases, and the three types of rhetoric (deliberative, judicial, and demonstrative) in civil philosophy (176). Encyclopedists such as Boethius, Cassiodorus, and Isidore of Seville summarized complex classical treatises on rhetoric, reducing their explanations sometimes to two sentences or brief definitions and often thereby losing more subtle understandings like that of rhetorical reasoning and epistemological invention. These encyclopedists emphasized *status* over the topics and the syllogism over the enthymeme and the example, moves which eventually gave way to deduction and
induction. In Book IV of *De topicis differentius*, Boethius described a four-category *status*, differentiating rhetoric from philosophy. He confined the system of rhetorical topics to the attributes of person and action, assigning the common topics to dialectics and the special topics to rhetoric. He also asserted that the rhetorician had to proceed from the dialectical topics (within the study of logic) but the dialectician could stay with his own topics (Stump 94). Leff maintained that Boethius subordinated the rhetorical to the dialectical topics, asserting that the only difference between the two was the kind of subject dealt with: concrete or abstract issues (“Topics”). McKeon commented that Boethius identified the problem of distinguishing principles as the problem of discovering arguments or things (“Rhetoric in the Middle Ages”).

P. Osmund Lewry pointed out that at this time dialectic and rhetoric shared the realm of the probable though one did so in view of the truth and the other in order to play on the emotions (49). According to Joseph Miller, Michael Prosser, and Thomas Benson, Cassiodorus, relying on Cicero and Fortunatianus, discussed such invention concepts as *status*, the syllogism, and the enthymeme (78). Isidore of Seville divided *status* into the syllogistic and the legal, common places into “before, during, and after,” and separated rhetoric from dialectic, identifying the syllogism as composed of induction and rationation (Miller et al. 88). These treatments, as discussed above, began to shift invention to logic.

As three new medieval rhetorical arts developed (letter writing, preaching, and poetry), the topics became means for remembering, amplifying, and describing material for these types of rhetoric. A well-known example of the art of letter writing, Anonymous of Bologna’s *The Principles of Letter-Writing (Rationes dictandi)*, focused on securing good will largely through the construction of appropriate salutations and subject matters. Geoffrey of Vinsauf, according to Martin Camargo, linked the arrangement of the letter to the enthymeme, division, and definition (176-77). Robert of Basevorn’s *The Form of Preaching (Forma praedicandi)* advocated the invention of themes in the use of topics for preaching. He described a “good invention of a theme as concurring with a feast, begetting full understanding, based on an unchanged Bible text, containing only three statements or less, having sufficient concordances with these statements, and having a theme that could serve as an antetheme or protheme” (Murphy, *Rheto-*)
ric in the Middle Ages 348). Murphy recounted that for Alain de Lille, the Scriptures were “a double source book for invention” (Rhetoric in the Middle Ages 309): ideas to present to his hearers and direct quotations to prove his ideas. Alain also relied heavily on example and authority (Murphy, Rhetoric in the Middle Ages 306). In the art of poetry, inventional practices were transformed. In discussing Geoffrey of Vinsauf’s influence on Robert Henryson, Robert Kindrick argued that Geoffrey’s “emphasis on deliberation and planning encouraged a more intellectual approach to invention” (61). Kindrick stated that Geoffrey extended grammatical precepts into invention, making invention more content-oriented and genre specific.

According to McKeon, rhetorical invention also influenced theology by offering methods for interpreting Scriptures. For example, formal methods were defined for three approaches to reading sacred texts: allegorical, moral, and analogical. The Augustan distinction between things and signs was used to solve theoretical problems (“Rhetoric in the Middle Ages” 178). Thus, discovery became what should be understood (“Rhetoric in the Middle Ages” 178). Later in the period, rhetorical invention shaped the scholastic method of inquiry. According to this method, one began with questions and apparent contradictions, then used topics to sort out theoretical problems by exploring their causes and effects, definitions, and so forth. The method also stressed the importance of sentences (authorities) (“Rhetoric in the Middle Ages” 197-98). According to McKeon, rhetorical invention also shaped logic during phases of the medieval period. The Old Logic used topics for discovery while analytics provided judgment. The New Logic separated logic and dialectic, making rhetoric the counterpart of dialectic and separating scientific proof from probable proof (“Rhetoric in the Middle Ages” 191). In the later Middle Ages, the topics were used as the inspiration for the scientific method—to discover things, not arguments.

In the East, Arab philosophers and rhetoricians such as al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroës, wrote commentaries on Hellenic rhetorics, especially Aristotle’s. Averroës used Islamic examples in his commentaries (Schaub). All three discussed religious discourse about the nature of God, the principle of the first cause, and the possibility of bodily resurrection, as well as rhetoric’s function to convert the masses and its role in securing consent in the community. However, all three thinkers also viewed “dialectic as a more ‘certain’ way than rhetoric to attain
and convey truth” (Schaub 241), but Butterworth argued that Averroës stressed rhetoric’s investigative capacities (Schaub 242), particularly in getting at what is presumed to be true in a community of faith (Schaub 246).

*Renaissance Conceptions of Invention*

The Renaissance revived classical rhetoric, re-igniting debates over the nature, purposes, and epistemology of invention. In *The Arte of Rhetorike*, the first full rhetoric written in English, Thomas Wilson restored several classical invention strategies but ignored others. It has been conjectured that this rhetoric, with its eight editions, was written to educate young gentlemen and noblemen for the Inns of Court (Ong, “Tudor” 54). In judicial rhetoric, Wilson included status not as an initiating act of question posing, but as the stating of a foundation or principal point that revolved around the classical categories of conjectural, legal, and judicial (120-24). Under demonstrative (ceremonial) rhetoric, he included the special topics of person, deeds, and things (54-65), referring his readers to his treatise on logic for the common topics such as definition, causes, parts, and things adjoining (30). For deliberative discourse (writing to one’s neighbor) he offered a version of special topics such as honest, profitable, pleasant, easy, hard, and necessary (70-78). For judicial discourse, he listed various topics under each type of status:

- under conjectural: power, time, presence, etc.
- under legal: definition, contraries, ambiguities, etc.
- under judicial: nature, law, custom, assumption, etc. (125-132).

He also included topics for pathos (100-3) and special topics for ethos in the introduction of a text, especially for the establishment of good will (133-39). Notable was his omission of the enthymeme, the example, and a discussion of epistemology. Lois Agnew maintained that Wilson’s rhetoric served as a vehicle through which individuals could bind wisdom to eloquence to create knowledge.

While Wilson adapted classical and medieval inventional practices to the circumstances of his day, Peter Ramus argued that invention belonged to logic. In his treatise, *Logike*, he listed topics from prior logical texts and outlined the proposition and the syllogism. He also
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described his method or organizational schema (a movement from general to specific, followed by the use of definition and examples), a method to be used in all texts and in education itself. In *Rhetorica*, written with Omer Talon, he dealt only with style (see Dudley Fenner’s edition). As Fr. Walter Ong explained in *Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology*, Ramus simplified complex discursive arts and emphasized analyzing models to find something to say. In *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue*, Ong described this eviscerating of rhetoric and invention:

This studied maneuvering of his sources enables Ramus to moor one item of his dialectic here, another item there, in classical antiquity. But neither in this passage, nor elsewhere does he explain the cavalier picking and choosing which results in his particular mix. There is certainly no insight into processes of cognition or communication or into logical structure to give his amalgam an interior consistency inviting theoretical explanation. (43)

Ramus’s influence, however, prevailed so that as the Renaissance progressed, other rhetorical texts ignored invention and treated only schemes and tropes, including Sherry’s *A Treatise of Schemes and Tropes*, Peacham’s *The Garden of Eloquence*, and Fraunce’s *The Arcadian Rhetorike*.

In 1701, Mary Astell, in *A Serious Proposal, Part II*, provided a method of logic and an art of rhetoric appropriate for women and based on conversation with neighbors. Following Peter Ramus, she places invention in logic and develops her own method of the reasoning process:

thoroughly defining and gaining knowledge of the question, subjects, and terms used; setting aside irrelevant issues; ordering thoughts from simple to complex; dividing the subject into parts for examination so that nothing is left unexamined; concentrating on the subject without digression throughout; and treating as truth only what one evidently knows, sometimes settling for probability only. (Donawerth, *Rhetorical Theory* 101)
Her rhetoric aimed at allaying the passions of the audience so that they could ponder the subject without bias (Donawerth, Rhetorical Theory 101).

In the later Renaissance, Francis Bacon in *The Advancement of Learning* assigned finding the known to rhetorical invention, while creating new knowledge became the province of the sciences. He proclaimed (without offering an argument):

The invention of speech or argument is not properly an invention: for to invent is to discover that we know not, and not to recover or resummon that which we already know: and the use of the invention is no other but out of the knowledge whereof our mind is already possessed, to draw forth or call before us that which may be pertinent to the purpose which we take into our consideration. So as to speak truly, it is no invention, but a remembrance or suggestion, with an application; [. . .] that it hath already obtained the name, let it be called invention. (58)

*Subject Positions*

Throughout the second sophistic, medieval, and renaissance periods, women increasingly occupied subject positions as writers. Although they did not compose treatises on rhetorical invention, their work exemplified its fruits. During the second sophistic, women writers worked in different genres. The Alexandrian, Hypatia, a philosopher, astronomer, and mathematician, wrote scientific treatises. Pamphilia authored 33 books of historical materials under her husband’s name (Anderson and Zinsser). Vida Perpetua recorded her days in an African prison cell leading up to her death in the Roman arena (Anderson and Zinsser and Thiebaux). Egeria composed a travel diary (Snyder; Thiebaux). Amalasuntha of Italy wrote letters to the Roman senate and Justinian, and Dhuoda of Uzes authored a handbook of moral guidelines for her son (Thiebaux). (See also Donawerth, *Rhetorical Theory*; “Conversations”; “Bibliography”.)

In the medieval period, women occupied more writer positions. Leola of England and Germany wrote letters and poems (Thiebaux). Hrotswitha (Hrotsvit) of Gandersheim authored lives of the saints, drama, and epics; Marie de France wrote three books dealing with sec-
Hildegard of Bingen produced drama, lyrics, two books on her secret language, a book of exegesis on the psalms, letters to kings, archbishops, abbots, and abbesses, and books on the saints’ lives. Heloise composed letters citing the Old and New Testaments, fathers of the Church, and classical authors as well as *Problemata*, included questions on divine law, justice, mercy, and contradictions among the Gospels. Julian of Norwich produced theological treatises; Margery Kempe authored a spiritual autobiography; and Christine de Pizan produced ballads, epistles, and biographies (Glenn *Rhetoric Retold* and “Reexamining”; Sutherland and Sutcliffe; Ward; Barratt; Ferrante; Wilson; Vitz).

During the Renaissance, women found and created more complex writer and speaker positions. In Italy, Isotta Nogarol authored orations, letters, and poetry; Laura Cereta wrote letters about the death of her husband and her reactions to male and female critics; Cassandra Fedele delivered public orations and wrote in Latin; Gaspara Stampa published poetry; and Antonia authored religious plays in the vernacular. In England, Margaret More Roper wrote a commentary on Erasmus; Jane Anger sent a letter “To Gentlewomen of England”; and Anne Askew composed an account of her torture and examination. Mary Astell authored political pamphlets, argued for women’s rights and education, and challenged John Locke; Elizabeth Grymeston wrote a collection of meditations offering a scholarly synthesis of the Church fathers and Scriptures; and Elizabeth Richardson authored three books of prayers. A book on nursing was written by Elizabeth Clinton while Dorothy Leigh authored *A Mother’s Blessing*, which offered advice to her children and argued for the value of women’s roles. In addition, women in the English court like Catherine of Aragon, Queen Elizabeth, Princess Mary, Anne Boleyn, and Catherine Parr produced many compositions. (Glenn, *Rhetoric Retold*; Herberg; King; Migiel and Schiesari; Redfern; Sutherland; Tebeaux and Lay; and Travitsky; Willard).

*Review: Invention in Second Sophistic, Medieval, and Renaissance Rhetorics*

During the Second Sophistic period in the Roman empire invention was narrowed to function largely in ceremonial discourse and rarely served an epistemic purpose. In Christianity, rhetoricians seeking to reconcile rhetoric with their Christian faith, assigned to invention the
hermeneutic purpose of interpreting the Scriptures. During the long medieval period, invention splintered and penetrated other fields, playing different roles in new types of discourse. Still, interpretation was privileged over investigation and logic and dialectic overshadowed rhetoric as “truths” rather than probabilities. The classical status and topics were transfigured for new generic purposes. The epistemic function of rhetorical invention virtually disappeared, giving way to theology and the emerging scientific method. During the Renaissance, a version of classical invention was adapted for the vernacular culture, as seen in Thomas Wilson’s first complete rhetoric in English. Earlier, Ramus relegated rhetorical invention to logic and left style and delivery in rhetoric. Bacon dealt a final blow to invention by proclaiming that rhetorical invention dealt only with retrieving the known, while science created new knowledge through an inductive investigation.

Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Discussions of Invention

These centuries gave rhetorical invention little attention. Vasile Florescu traced this marginalization through Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, and Croce. Descartes’s theory of knowledge was thoroughly antirhetorical, for it based knowledge on self-evidence, clarity, and the distinctiveness of ideas. For Spinoza, rhetoric was to be a kind of “naked communication,” whose goal was to transmit ideas without participating in their creation. Kant considered ars oratoria to be an inconsequential, personal art, and finally for Hegel rhetoric was calculated artifice that contrasted with poetry. Florescu further studied the fate of rhetoric and invention in the work of Croce, whose concepts of intuition and expression, he argued, formed an indestructible unity, thus eliminating rhetoric from “the esthetic problematic” (202).

Eighteenth-Century Invention

In the eighteenth century, Hugh Blair, George Campbell, Adam Smith, and Gregorio Mayans y Siscar held the epistemological position of common sense realism. Using Ong’s concept of noetic fields, James Berlin characterized eighteenth-century Scottish common-sense realism as the apprehension of sense data through an extra-lingual process of induction (Writing Instruction). Consequently, most of these rhetoricians relegated rhetoric to the function of communicating the results of inquiry conducted elsewhere, although interpreters of
Campbell differ about his epistemic position. In this context, rhetoric was a kind of “managerial” art. Its purpose was not to investigate or create, but rather to organize and present arguments through moral reasoning and empirical evidence. Science and philosophy continued to usurp the role of rhetorical invention.

Hugh Blair in Lectures on Rhetoric and Belle Lettres announced that invention’s purpose was to convey arguments and subject matter that had been generated elsewhere. According to Blair, “what is truly solid and persuasive, must be drawn ‘ex visceribu causae,’ from a thorough knowledge of the subject, and profound meditation on it” (118). “For it is one thing,” he wrote, “to discover the reasons that are most proper to convince men, and another to manage these reasons with the most advantage. The latter is all that rhetoric can pretend to do” (117).

In The Philosophy of Rhetoric George Campbell delineated the kinds of reasoning that related to the different faculties of understanding, imagination, emotion, and will. He categorized truths into intuitive, common sense, and deductive and placed moral reasoning in the province of rhetoric. Moral reasoning, he claimed, moved from particulars to the general and was more direct and useful in gaining new knowledge (182-83), encompassing several of what he called “tribes”: experience, analogy, testimony, and calculations of chance (184). According to Campbell, the aim of logic was to evince truth and the aim of rhetoric was to convince the hearer (73). Lloyd Bitzer pointed out that Campbell borrowed from Hume, stressing the importance of imagination and feeling, the attitudes of empiricism, and the doctrine of association of ideas (“Hume’s Philosophy”). Hagaman explained that Campbell’s acceptance of empiricism led him to think of invention as “an expression of confidence in the mind’s ability to observe the natural world and draw inferences, discern opposing evidence, and draw inductive conclusions that are open to continuing examination” (“Campbell’s Philosophy” 148).

As Vincent Bevilacqua explained, Adam Smith held a similar conception of the relationship between logic and rhetoric. Smith believed the two were grounded in a common mental faculty; however, logic was concerned with invention, judgment, and memory; rhetoric with communication (“Adam Smith”). According to Howell, Smith shunned the artistic proofs and topical arguments in favor of non-artistic arguments and direct proof. This attention to the “psychological task of verbal expression “ made invention an extra-rhetorical act (564).
Mayans y Siscar’s *Rhetórica* also distinguished rhetorical invention from “true” scientific invention. Don Abbott explained that Siscar viewed rhetoric as one of four rational arts and defined it as “the art of Transmitting, or of producing and expressing to others those things which have been invented, judged, and laid up in memory” (“Mayans’ Rhetürica,” 168). Siscar held that invention preceded rhetoric, and defined invention as “the action with which the understanding looks for useful ideas, arguments, affects, and manners of speaking in order to form a persuasive oration (Abbott, 168-69). He also discussed status, the four causes, and rhetorical arguments (topics) (170).

In contrast, Giambattista Vico tried to retain a classical sense of rhetorical invention and probable epistemology. Catherine Peadon in “Language and Rhetoric in Locke, Condillac and Vico” demonstrated that Vico united language and ideas, thus abandoning a Lockean separation of words and ideas and embracing an epistemology resting on “a mutually implicated language and thought” (180). She also maintained that he set his topical invention in opposition to Cartesian critical philosophy in an effort to overcome the dualism of *pathos* and *logos* and to deconstruct the invention/judgment binary (222). Catherine Hobbs, in *Rhetoric on the Margins of Modernity*, maintained that Vico taught and wrote to unite wisdom and eloquence to serve the social body, with the topics as an inventory of shared consciousness. He viewed language as basically metaphorical and the foundation of common sense in the culture. As an alternative to Cartesian critical thought, he emphasized the faculties of memory, *ingenium*, imagination, and common sense, forming topical thought (66). For Vico metaphorical thought underscored three types of thinking: the hieroglyphic, the symbolic, and the vulgar—corresponding to the ages of gods, heroes, and humans (69), with the movement from metaphoric to conventional language being a “continual, cyclical activity” (70). According to Hobbs, Vico held that “invention and poetic imagination unfold before judgment in both the individual and society” (72). The arts of topics, criticism, and method governed respectively three mental operations: perception, judgment, and reasoning. Considering all knowledge rhetorical, Vico developed a rhetoric of social invention with a logic of status and topics. Hobbs claimed that Vico deconstructed the critical-creative binary and the rhetoric-science binary, with the sublime art of metaphor constructing truths (73) and foregrounding probability rather than certainty (92). Mark Williams and Theresa Enos also pointed to Vico’s epistemology
of the probable by showing how his conception of triangular invention was contingent on history and context.

In contrast to the general view that the eighteenth century saw the demise of invention, Elizabeth Larsen argued invention was "less abandoned than transformed over time from a specific act associated with particular features (inventio) to a generic act (invention) associated with pedagogical features" (183). According to Larson, Alexander Gerard’s *An Essay on Genius* viewed invention as a mental capacity, a human process of composing that entailed complex powers: re-visioning, negotiating between judgment and the imagination, and induction (186).

Although Vico’s theories of invention had an influence on his immediate context, it was the work of Ramus and Bacon that directed the course of invention until the twentieth century. Just as Ramus’s reduction of rhetoric precluded a rhetorical way of reasoning in the realm of probability, so Bacon’s view of rhetorical invention robbed it of an epistemic function, two diminishments of rhetoric that continued for centuries.

*Nineteenth-Century Invention*

In the nineteenth century, epistemic rhetorical invention still took a back seat to logic, inspiration, and observation. For the most part, rhetorical invention served only to find content, proofs, and organization for the products of the mental faculties. Romanticism contributed to the diminishment of invention by stressing intuition and inspiration as the sources of ideas and motivations for writing. Eventually invention gave way to linguistics and criticism. Finally invention virtually disappeared.

In Britain, Richard Whately’s *Elements of Rhetoric* distinguished between rules of inference by which one discovers the truth and rules of proof by which one convinces others of its truth (281). The former belonged to logic, he maintained, while the latter was rhetorical invention’s purpose. Lois Einhorn contended that his notion of rhetoric as an offshoot of logic significantly altered his perception of the function of rhetorical invention because he eliminated the process of first becoming aware of something and substituted a process of refinement or an “*inventio* of ‘management’” (50). Raymie McKerrow argued that Whately offered a subjective interpretation of probability and advanced a rhetorical conception of proof that depended
on using argument ("Probable Argument"). In discussing Whately’s notion of the role of the audience, McKerrow said that Whately was subject rather than audience oriented, with the audience functioning as a judge but not as a creator of knowledge ("Ethical Implications" 324). Thus Whately’s rhetoric was not seen as epistemic. Berlin argued that Whately was a significant force in shaping “Current-Traditional Rhetoric,” the model for teaching writing that dominated English departments in America in the nineteenth and early twentieth century (“Richard Whately”). He also speculated that Whately’s rational emphasis might have led to a distrust of persuasion (“Richard Whately”). Describing nineteenth-century romanticism, Berlin spoke of knowing reality through an interaction of the observer and observed, of interpreting underlying reality, of constructing reality through synthesizing all faculties, and of the analogical method of expressing what transcends material reality (Writing Instruction).

In the United States, holders of the prestigious rhetorical position, the Boylston Chair at Harvard, represented the various fates that had befallen invention by the nineteenth century. According to Ronald Reid, John Quincy Adams adhered to the classical tradition of rhetoric, refuting Blair’s repudiation of invention and modifying the notion of status to fit the American legal system. Joseph McKean, following John Ward’s A System of Oratory, divided invention into intellectual resources and artificial analyses. Departing from Ward, however, he followed Campbell treatments of understanding, imagination, and memory. While McKean defended the usefulness of invention, he warned against mechanical use of the topics and viewed them as helpful for young, inexperienced orators. He questioned the usefulness of status for all types of discourse, but acknowledged its value for judicial oratory (344). Edward Channing identified rhetoric with criticism, while Francis Child ignored rhetoric to focus on linguistics and criticism. Adam Sherman Hill changed the term rhetoric to composition and abandoned oratory for writing. His assistant Barrett Wendell advanced a new idea for pedagogy, based on practice and criticism (not theory), ignoring invention, and subsuming persuasion under argument. Discussing romanticism, Berlin pointed out that Emerson’s orator was motivated to speak by inspiration obtained from the occasions that arose in a democracy (Writing Instruction 53) and had to “rely primarily on his intuition to provide the higher truths which men seek” (Writing Instruction 45).
Sharon Crowley described three parts to nineteenth-century invention: 1) the use of prior knowledge and natural ability; 2) disciplined exercise of the mental faculties through reading, conversation, meditation, and observation; and 3) textual order as the method of planning (“Invention”). In *Methodical Memory*, she suggested that some of these conceptions were based on the popular pedagogy known as mental discipline, derived from faculty psychology. These conceptions led to an impoverished view of invention as simply a process of selecting, narrowing, and amplifying. Thus invention was subsumed under the modes of discourse: EDNA—exposition, description, narration, and argument, which became the basis for textbooks and curricula. Crowley also called attention to Henry Day’s *The Art of Discourse*, which presented an inventional scheme for expository writing based on informal logic. Invention involved stating a proposition and analyzing and dividing the proposition into its constituent parts (“Invention” 150). Crowley suggested that John Genung’s concept of invention, which included preparation, deducing and stating a theme, creating a title, planning, and amplification (“Invention” 151) was the most inventive because it enabled writers to generate arguments for discourse. (See also Arthur Applebee, Michael Halloran, Nan Johnson, Albert Kitzhaber, and William Woods for discussions of nineteenth-century rhetoric, composition, and invention.)

**Subject Positions**

The eighteenth century saw a number of women assuming writer and speaker positions including Mary Wollstonecraft, Hester Thrale, Hester Ann Rogers, Sarah Crosby, Sarah Mallett, Mary Fletcher, Margaret Davidson, Jane Newland, Sarah Grubb, Mara Edgeworth, and Fanny Burney (see Barlowe; Butler and Todd; Donawerth, *Rhetorical Theory*; Ferguson and Todd; Lorch; Poovey; Conway). In the nineteenth century, as higher education became more available to women, more positions opened up for them, including the role of rhetorical theorist. At the University of Michigan under the direction of Fred Newton Scott, Gertrude Buck wrote her MA thesis, “The Figures of Rhetoric,” which Donald Stewart described as an effort to develop a sound psychological basis for the use of figurative language. Her PhD dissertation was entitled “The Metaphor—A Study in the Psychology of Rhetoric,” which Albert Kitzhaber praised for its innovative use of experimental psychology (*Rhetoric* 291). After hiring
Gertrude Buck at Vassar, the English department offered courses that encouraged students to develop “reflective, creative, and critical thinking applicable to society’s needs” (Ricks 76).

Many other nineteenth-century women occupied subject positions as writers and speakers: Margaret Fuller, Catherine Beecher, Mary Lyon, Harriet Beecher Stowe, Elizabeth Stuart Phelps, Susan Warner, Maria Cummins, Lydia Maria Child, Lucy Stone, Sarah Hale, Jane Addams, and Anna Cooper. Jacqueline Jones Royster wrote about black women writers including Ida B. Wells, Frances Harper, Alice Dunbar, Maria Stewart, Harriet Tubman, and Fannie Barrier Williams. Shirley Wilson Logan edited a collection of African-American speeches, and a book on the persuasive writing of black women, including Sarah Parker Remond, Frances Ellen Watkins Harper, Lucy Wilmot Smith, Lucy Craft Laney, and Victoria Earle Matthews. Ann Marie Mann Simpkins described the textual strategies of two African-American women publishers, Mary Miles and Mary Ann Shadd Cary. For further discussions of nineteenth-century women rhetors and rhetoricians see Suzanne Bordelon; Karlyn Campbell; Jo Anne Campbell; Gregory Clark and Michael Halloran; Catherine Hobbs, Nineteenth Century; Annette Kolodny; Barbara L’Eplattenier; Drema Lipscomb; Shirley Wilson Logan; Bridget O’Rourke; Carla Peterson; Louise Phelps and Janet Emig; Joy Rouse; Nicole Tonkovich; and Joanne Wagner.

Review: Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Invention

During the eighteenth century, Scottish and British rhetoricians, following Ramus and Bacon, considered logic the home of invention while rhetoric was assigned to communication. Invention was also compartmentalized into the faculties of understanding, imagination, emotion, and will. George Campbell considered rhetoric as moral reasoning while Adam Smith and Mayans y Siscar considered invention outside of rhetoric.

In the nineteenth century, Richard Whately continued to hold the view that rhetoric’s purpose was to convince others of the truth, constructing a rhetoric of management. In the United States, various holders of the Boylston Chair at Harvard helped to marginalize invention in favor of criticism and linguistics. The very term rhetoric was replaced with composition, which was devoted to practice and criticism. Genung subsumed invention under the modes of discourse;
description, narration, exposition, and argument. Current-Traditional pedagogy divided into two polar positions, one teaching composition as style and correctness and the other teaching writing as an act of genius, with both positions ignoring invention. During this century, however, women rhetorical theorists brought new interests to composition: metaphor and its psychological bases, creative thinking, new subject matters, and concerns for society’s needs.

Part II: Pedagogical Issues

The development of the rhetor has been a longstanding issue in rhetorical history. Since the time of the Greeks, rhetoricians have debated the relative merits of four factors in rhetorical instruction: natural ability, imitation, practice, and art. Eras of discourse instruction have been marked by an emphasis on one or the other of these broad teaching approaches though in some cases all four were integrated. Natural ability pedagogies, what some today call romantic or vitalist teaching, provide encouraging contexts, assignments that motivate students, and feedback on completed texts or drafts, but avoid offering strategies or direct instruction on invention. Students rely for guidance on their native talent and teacher responses to specific texts. Imitation pedagogies provide students with readings and examples, either as stimuli for ideas or as models of invention. The popularity of contemporary readers testifies to the longevity of this pedagogy. Practice pedagogies engage students in frequent, sometimes daily writing, as a way to develop their abilities. Often these practices are decontextualized exercises; some are done in genuine contexts. Art pedagogies provide students with strategies or guides for invention. Richard Young discussed this pedagogy in “Arts, Crafts, Gifts, and Knacks and the Teaching of Writing,” contrasting what he called New Romanticism with New Classicism. New Romanticists, according to Young, consider composing as free of deliberate control—imagination is primary and the development of ability is a mysterious growth. The New Classicists emphasize heuristic procedures through which rhetorical knowledge can be carried from one situation to the other, and rational control of the writing processes that can be taught. Lauer also examined this issue in “Instructional Practices: Toward an Integration,” arguing for using elements of all four approaches to teach composition.
Greek Discussions of Inventional Pedagogy

The Greeks were interested in the notion of an art as a particular kind of knowledge used to guide activities like rhetoric. A key feature of an art was that it could be taught.

Art (techne)

The Greek concept of art (techne) has been at the center of historical discussions of rhetorical pedagogy. Scholars have studied its meaning in different rhetoricians’ work and have also researched its history. Janet Atwill in *Rhetoric Reclaimed* traced the concept of techne back to the Odyssey, where it signified both implement and boundary, prompting her interpretation that ”the accomplishments of art are, paradoxically, tied to its boundaries” (47). She explained that whenever a boundary or limit was recognized, art created a path that transgressed and redefined the boundary (48). Outlining the ancient conceptions of techne, she offered the following definition of the ancient concept of techne:

1) A techne is never a static normative body of knowledge. It may be described as a dynamis (or power), transferable guides and strategies, a cunningly conceived plan—even a trick or a trap. This knowledge is stable enough to be taught and transferred but flexible enough to be adapted to particular situations and purposes.

2) A techne resists identification with a normative subject. The subjects identified with techne are often in a state of flux or transformation. [. . .] Since a techne is always transferable, no matter how brilliant the plan or strategy, it is never confined to a specific human or god. In other words, techne is never “private” knowledge, a mysterious faculty, or the product of unique genius.

3) Techne marks a domain of intervention and invention. A techne is never knowledge as representation. Techne appears when one is outnumbered by foes or overpowered by force. It not only enables the transgression of boundaries but also attempts to rectify transgressions. (48)

She explained that in the mythic traditions of the Prometheus accounts, techne is depicted as a trick, contrivance, or stratagem, as well
as a method of making or doing that is set against nature (physis) and force (bia). *Techne* is a uniquely temporal and situated kind of knowledge. In discussing the relationship between *techne* and *kairos*, for example, she pointed out that “knowing how” and “knowing when” to deploy an art distinguishes *techne* from “rule-governed activities that are less constrained by temporal conditions” (59). She further used the work of Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant to argue that ancient conceptions of *techne* are identified with cunning intelligence (*metis*), not practical wisdom (*phronesis*). As such, *techne* is a kind of knowledge that is used to challenge given circumstances and create not only new relations of power but also new subjectivities. She maintained, for example, that for Isocrates the art of rhetoric was as concerned with transforming subjectivities as with transferring rhetorical knowledge.

**Sophists**

Protagoras was one of the first to articulate the relationship between art, endowment, practice, and models in the development of a rhetor. He said that natural talent was a necessary ingredient, but also that “art without practice, and practice without art, are nothing “ (Kathleen Freeman, *Ancilla* 127). In the *Graeci-Syrian Maxims*, Protagoras asserted: “Toil and work [practice] and instruction and education [art] and wisdom [talent] are the garland of fame which is woven from the flowers of an eloquent tongue” (Freeman, *Ancilla* 127).

Scholars, however, differ over whether the Sophists really developed an art. Below are some examples. Richard Enos held that it was “the mark of the 5th century BCE that abstraction of notions leading to a *techne* is made conscious and explicit” (*Greek Rhetoric* 60). John Poullakos claimed that Protagoras and Gorgias called their work art not demonstrative knowledge (“Toward a Definition”; see also “Terms”). Susan Jarratt, disagreeing with the idea that the Sophists were vitalists, insisted that they educated for empowerment, allowing anyone who could pay fees to learn rhetoric for the assembly, the council, and the courts (“The First Sophists” and “Performing Histories”). In *Re-reading the Sophists*, she viewed this education as having goals similar to the twentieth-century efforts to provide an ethical education in civic virtue and to empower students to participate in democracy (83). She also discussed the critical potential of sophistic rhetoric for today: “Gorgias’s apagogic of argument—the exploration of various alterna-
tive positions—likewise offers the opportunity to reflect on the contradictory nature of propositions” (103). The technique of antilogic gave the students an ability to gain distance from the hegemony of custom and law—“the ability to stand outside of and perhaps control aspects of it” (104) and to engage in a “critical analysis of popular belief” (104). Bruce McComiskey contended that “the primary goal of Gorgias’s techne is the desired action of the audience” and that “moving audiences to action is aesthetic, using the emotional response of an audience to the immediate rhetorical context” (Gorgias 28). Contesting Socrates’ claim that Gorgias’s rhetoric was a mere knack, McComiskey argued that for Gorgias, “logos could be part of both the content and the articulatory method of a techne” (Gorgias 30). Moreover, he maintained that Gorgias favored “the topical invention of ethical arguments over the magical invention of false arguments” (Gorgias 32). Part of Gorgias’s techne was to analyze different types of souls and to test the most effective means of influencing them (Gorgias 31). In analyzing Palamedes, McComiskey divided the arguments from probability into those that “(1) explore past, present, and future probabilities, (2) describe the character of the speakers, and (3) limit the ethical uses of emotion in forensic discourse” (Gorgias 31).

On the other side, Thomas Cole argued that there was no art until Plato because for the rhetorician to control the medium of transmission, two developments had to take place: 1) “audiences and composers had to acquire the habit of abstracting essential messages from verbal contexts” (x); and 2) “written’ eloquence had to come into being—that is, a body of prose texts which might be read or delivered verbatim and still suggest the excitement, atmosphere and commitment of spontaneous oral performance or debate” (x). Robert Connors maintained that prior to Corax and Tisias rhetoric was considered a gift, not an art, related to memory and poetic abilities, but they taught poetic devices as a techne (“Greek Rhetoric” 41, 48). Edward Schiappa argued that various Sophists, such as Empedocles, Corax, and Protagoras, did not use the term rhêtorikê, representing the study of rhetoric as a discrete field focused on persuasion (RHÈTORIKÊ 81). Instead the older Sophists taught an art of logos, a more comprehensive term that challenged the hegemony of poetic discourse and called for arguing, not telling (RHÈTORIKÊ 89-91). (See also Schiappa’s The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece.) H. Marrou claimed that Protagoras’s teaching was based on antilogy, which Marrou described as a
practice of “low cunning” (51). Freeman stated that Gorgias taught by modeling and practice (The Pre-Socratic Philosophers).

Plato

In the Phaedrus, Plato defined the characteristics of an art and outlined a conception of rhetoric that met those standards. He compared rhetoric and medicine as arts because they both analyzed the nature of something, either the soul or the body (61); he further insisted that art entailed knowing how to apply it to appropriate situations. He believed that the art of rhetoric centered in kairos, knowing different kinds of souls and the appropriate time and circumstances in which to appeal to them (64).

Interpretations differ, however, on Plato’s conception of a rhetorical art—as the following examples illustrate. Charles Griswold traced Plato’s descriptions of rhetoric as being either artful or lacking it, pointing out that Socrates views techne as “an intellectual procedure [. . .] that involves a determinate series of steps [. . .] that operates on complexes of elements via division and collection, that is a means to a goal, and that is teachable” (160). For Plato, according to Griswold, techne accomplishes part of the complex task of inducing souls to think (167). He further explained that for Plato, “opinion unravels its intuitions unreflectively; techne grapples with them and imposes an order, and dialectic forces reflection on them by means of questions” (176). David Roochnik argued that the conventional view of Plato that links techne with moral knowledge needs to be modified because wisdom cannot be rendered by a techne (“Is Rhetoric an Art?”). Atwill argued that Plato separates logos from techne, “redefining knowledge in terms of subject matter and making techne equivalent to social function” (Rhetoric 126-27). She explained that in contrast to any sense of knowledge as production, Platonic knowledge is a process of recollection. In Plato’s view, art defines one’s function, determining one’s place in the hierarchy of the state (Rhetoric Reclaimed 130).

In the Phaedrus, Plato also addressed the issue of the development of the rhetor, referring to rhetoric as engaging nature, knowledge, practice and stargazing (60). Griswold also pointed out that Plato saw natural ability, episteme, and practice as operative in rhetorical activity (183).
Aristotle offered a more extensive treatment of art and rhetoric. At the beginning of his treatise on rhetoric, he defined an art as a path based on observations of the “cause why some succeed by habit and others accidentally, and all would at once agree that such observation is the activity of an art [tekhnē]” (1354a). An art, then, for Aristotle, entailed knowledge of effective rhetorical strategies and provided a guide for rhetorical action. Scholars have offered different interpretations of Aristotle’s concept of an art, as the examples of scholarship below reveal. E.M. Cope described Aristotle’s notion of an art as a process of generalizing from particulars, which provides knowledge of causes, and gives us the power to teach what we know. Cope commented that even though a skill derived from experience may be more useful than an art, that skill is always tied to the particular and acquired by mere repetition. But the master craftsman is wiser than the handicraftsman because he knows why and therefore can teach others (14ff). Cope went on to characterize Aristotle’s view of an art as systematic, rational, governed by rules derived from experience, guided by general principles, whose end is act, practice, and the production of a concrete work. Aristotle’s art, in his view, was two-fold, a power of mind and a body of principles. Gerard Hauser described Aristotle’s conception of rhetoric as an art in terms of “a habit of mind which realizes a capacity to find what in each particular case has the potential to gain accedence (“Most Significant” 14). William Grimaldi explained that Aristotle contrasts art with spontaneity and habit, calling art instead a reasoned method, a path. The principles in an art must be capable of being taught (Studies). The artist knows causes, having an established capacity for making, conjoined with true reasoning. J. Dunne distinguished between technai that contrive through strategy and talent to bring about a desired outcome and technai that work on stable materials in a straightforward process of fabrication. Atwill in Rhetoric Reclaimed demonstrated that of Aristotle’s three kinds of knowledge (theoretical or episteme, practical or phronesis, and productive or techne), historical interpretations of Aristotle’s rhetoric have ignored productive knowledge, situating his rhetoric in a theory/practice binary. She explained that those who have interpreted Aristotle’s rhetoric as theoretical (e.g., Grimaldi) relate rhetoric to philosophy; those who ally it with practical knowledge (Cope and Kennedy) treat it within a handbook tradition or a statesman/orator tradition. In contrast, she argued that
Aristotle considered rhetoric productive knowledge so that rhetoric could neither authorize itself as knowledge for its own sake nor be the instrument of a specific social and political objective. Rhetoric as *techne* for Aristotle, then, she explained, is situated wherever values are in conflict, is assessed according to competing situational demands, is epistemologically and ethically indeterminate, depends on the situation and time, and can never be a private possession. Aristotle’s notion of productive knowledge, she concluded, is concerned with contingent and socially useful knowledge, originating in the artist, allowing for critique, directed toward the user, and requiring an active use by the receiver.

**Roman Discussions of Inventional Pedagogy**

Roman rhetoricians paid less attention to the nature and purpose of art but continued to address the issue of what was most important in the education of a rhetor: art, talent, imitation, or practice. *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, a practical treatise with little theoretical commentary, offered succinct directives for the student, reducing art to “a set of rules” that provided a method to follow. In *De Oratore* Cicero assumed the existence of an art and devoted more attention to the relative contribution of talent or practice in the development of the ideal rhetor. Quintilian sketched a history of points of view on rhetoric as an art, including a history of status. None of these rhetoricians provided original theories of an art or of invention pedagogies.

*Rhetorica ad Herennium*

The author of *Rhetorica ad Herennium* made only passing references to the notion of art: “To avoid prolixity, I shall now begin my discussion of the subject, as soon as I have given you this one injunction: Theory [in Latin *artem*] without continuous practice in speaking is of little avail; from this you may understand that the precepts of theory here offered ought to be applied in practice” (5). Later he commented “All these faculties [invention, arrangement, style, memory and delivery] we can acquire by three means: Theory [art], Imitation, and Practice. By theory is meant a set of rules that provide a definite method and system of speaking. Imitation stimulates us to attain, in accordance with a studied method, the effectiveness of certain models in speaking. Practice is assiduous exercise and experience in speaking” (7-9).
In this text, invention’s function was reduced to supplying ideas, subject matter, and arguments to flesh out the introduction, the statement of facts, and the proof or the refutation for judicial, deliberative, and epideictic discourse. The author listed directives and strategies to elaborate the point to adjudicate, the course of action to be taken, and the points of praise or censure.

Cicero

In *De Oratore*, Crassus and Antonius discussed the relative merits of talent, art, imitation, and practice in the development of the ideal orator. Crassus referred to rhetoric as an art of how men of skill have performed, one that gives coherence to widely scattered practices (32-39). He held that art is the offspring of eloquence and that it made talented orators even better. Crassus agreed that there is a single art teachable to all but that different users of the art must adapt it. He gave priority, however, to natural ability, the talent to be swift in invention, copious in exposition, and steadfast in recollection (34). To practice he accorded some benefit if done in genuine situations (45-46), but he was cautious about the value of imitation, preferring the use of freer translations of the best Greek orators (43). Antonius was ambivalent about the value of art, claiming in one place that oratory derives distinction from ability but owes little to art (89-91). He stated that nature comes first but did acknowledge that rhetoric resembles an art of observing the causes why some speak better than others and that artful direction may be given to move feelings and gain favor (91). He explained that there are three requisites for finding arguments: genius, method (art), and diligence (123) and also recognized the value of imitation and frequent and laborious exercise (107-9). It is understandable that both Crassus and Antonius, at the pinnacles of their careers as great orators, would foreground ability and downplay art, even though throughout the text they evidenced knowledge of most of the strategies of the art.

Quintilian later said that Antonius concealed his art, emphasizing that his performance was a knack derived form experience. Examples of other scholars who weighed in on this issue include George Kennedy, who asserted that Cicero makes too much of the inadequacy of rules in the light of the debt of many portions of his text to rhetorical theory (*The Art of Rhetoric*). Thomas Sloane characterized Crassus as advocating extensive learning combined with practical experience
while Antonius emphasizes practice in technique (“Reinventing”). Michael Leff maintained that Cicero taught “less by abstract dicta and more by example,” that he instructed by *imitatio*, and that readers grasped the principles in a text and reconstructed them in production of another text (“Topics” 119). In other words, according to Leff, *De Oratore* is not a rhetorical textbook but instructs by being what it cannot explain. In “Genre and Paradox in the Second Book of *De Oratore*,” he argues that Cicero struggles with “the opposition between a perspective grounded in practice and a perspective oriented toward the abstract principles that define rhetoric as a coherent realm of experience” (308). Leff maintains that Cicero’s effort becomes “intelligible as part of a subtle effort to balance conflicting theoretical principles within a single ironic structure” (309). Conversely, Brady Gilleland argued that in all of Cicero’s works it is assumed that the orator must know rhetorical principles. In the section below, I will present illustrations, not exhaustive treatments, of different positions on these issues.

**Quintilian**

In *Institutio Oratoria*, Quintilian defined art as a power reaching its end by a definite path, that is, by ordered methods. He traced the history of the debate about whether rhetoric is an art, citing several criteria for an art and showing that rhetoric met them:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Rhetoric</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arts have their own subject matter.</td>
<td>Rhetoric has its subject matter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No art acquiesces in false opinions.</td>
<td>The orator deceives others not himself.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Every art has a definite goal.</td>
<td>Rhetoric has a definite goal: the art and artist are independent of the results and the action of speaking well, not results, is the goal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artists know when they have attained the end.</td>
<td>Speakers also know when they have reached the end.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No art uses vices to serve its end.</td>
<td>As long as the motive is good, it’s all right.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orators speak indifferently on both sides.</td>
<td>Rhetors reach more or less probability.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Criteria | Rhetoric
--- | ---
Art deals with the known. | Nothing is certain; the reasonable is what is important. (2.17.16-67)

On the question of whether eloquence derives from nature or education, Quintilian said that the ideal orator must have both (2.19.2): “The average orator owes most to nature, while the perfect orator owes more to education” (2.19.2). He went on to assert: “Without natural gifts, technical rules are useless” (1.Pr. 26), but natural gifts are of “no profit in themselves unless cultivated by skillful teaching, persistent study, and continuous and extensive practice” (1.Pr. 27). He also stated that “everything which art has brought to perfection originated in nature” (2.17.9). He warned, however, that the topics are a dumb science without practice, self-control, and nature (5.10.119).

Scholars have commented on Quintilian’s views of art and pedagogy. Important examples include Kennedy, who explained that Quintilian so valued the concept of rhetoric as an art that he used it as a structural principle in *Institutio*, dividing the text into *ars* (art), *artifex* (artist), and *opus* (work) (*The Art of Rhetoric*). Michael Winterbottom recounted that Quintilian criticized those who relied solely on talent, saying ironically: they are eloquent “without work, without method and without discipline” (“Quintilian” 95). David Roochnik argued that Quintilian offered an extended defense of rhetoric as an art. He wondered whether Quintilian viewed rhetoric as “a stochastic *techne*, a set of informal and flexible rules of thumb” rather than of mechanical or systematic rules” (“Is Rhetoric an Art?” 145). James Murphy described how Quintilian prescribed methods for students to learn the art (e.g., memorizing the topics) and to engage in imitation using a seven-step process (“Roman Writing” 41-68). Jonathan Barnes in “Is Rhetoric an Art?” examined four texts on this question: Quintilian’s *Institutio*, Sextus Empiricus’s *Against the Mathematicians*, Cicero’s *De Oratore*, and Philodemus’s *Rhetorica*. He agreed with Sextus and Philodemus’s arguments that rhetoric is not an art.

Elaine Fantham focused on the role of nature in Quintilian’s pedagogy, pointing to four themes in Quintilian’s treatment of nature:

1) the relative contributions of nature and art (both theory and training) to the orator’s excellence
2) the apparent oppositions between nature and imitation (also part of training)

3) the natural origin of artistic expression in society and the individual

4) the varying roles of externalized nature in prescribing the thought (inventio) and empowering the expression (elocutio) of artistic eloquence. (127)

She argued that Quintilian was uncertain whether eloquence or moral virtue was natural, that is, imparted by nature unaided by education. In Book XII, she found Quintilian holding as axiomatic that “both natural eloquence and natural virtue need professional support [. . .] people need both doctrina, theory, and discipline to develop their character and doctrina for their intellectual development” (126). Conversely, she pointed to a number of allusions to externalized Nature as the agent directing acts of invention and disposition. She concluded by saying that in the end Quintilian “has vindicated the idea of human nature as the full potential of humanity, and externalized Nature as our ally in developing art. Nature is revealed as the efficient cause of artistic eloquence and the patroness of the Institutio” (136).

Review: Roman Inventional Pedagogy

During the Roman period, Rhetorica ad Herennium served as the main textbook of rhetorical strategies, including status, topics, and enthymeme. Instead of representing these guides as transferable strategies across types of discourse and as sets of alternative perspectives, the anonymous author presented them as rules to follow, positioned under the parts of the discourse, and geared to only one type of discourse, thus limiting their flexibility and epistemic power. Cicero, however, in De Oratore, referred to them as more generic strategies but somewhat ambiguously reduced their importance in the development of the ideal orator. Quintilian offered many artistic precepts: common and special topics, status, the enthymeme, the example, and the epicheireme. By positioning these guides under types of discourse, however, he restricted their applicability and generative power.
Inventional Pedagogy in the Second Sophistic and Medieval Periods

During these two long periods, discussions about the development of rhetorical powers, especially invention, were minimal. Instead rhetorical instruction focused more on style because epideictic or ceremonial rhetoric prevailed. Rhetoric continued to be taught in the Greek ephebia. With the spread of Christianity, rhetoricians struggled with the relationship between faith, divine truth, and rhetorical probability. During the long medieval period when instruction in writing was often limited to the clergy, efforts were made to preserve and teach some classical rhetorical theories and practices in what medieval scholars call “encyclopedic” form. Texts were also written to guide minimal inventional practices for new rhetorical genres (letter writing, preaching, and poetry). Scholars paid little attention to the issue of the relative effectiveness of talent, art, imitation, and practice in developing a rhetor.

Second Sophistic Period

In the second sophistic period (around the second century CE to the fall of Rome in 410 in the West and to the sixth century CE in the East), the Roman empire dominated the education of a vast political domain. The pedagogical issues discussed in the classical periods above did not preoccupy rhetoricians even though the teaching of rhetoric crowned the education that young men received in the Roman Empire’s ephebia, a required two-year military and rhetorical training through which they were prepared for participation in the Empire. Epideictic discourse flourished while deliberative and even judicial discourse withered under imperial rule, despite the fact that some emperors were patrons of rhetoric (Enos, “The Effects”). Discussions of the art of invention were marginalized in the face of an increasing emphasis on written style, narration, personal discourse, and literature (see letteraturizzazione, Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric 5). Later in this period, rhetorical teachers such as Tertullian, Origen, John Chrysostom, Jerome, Cyprian, Ambrose, and Augustine focused more on the issue of how to reconcile rhetoric with Christianity than on how to teach invention.

A predominant pedagogy during this time was the progymnasmata, graduated exercises for writing different types of discourse that
relied heavily on models. These exercises were based on the work of Hermogenes of Tarsus, who recorded an already stereotyped system of techniques, and Aphthonius, who later worked out examples. Students learned to write types of discourse in a developmental sequence of exercises ranging from the fable and proverb to the declamation. Such instruction focused on analyzing, memorizing, imitating models, and recreating these types of discourse, rather than using status (deciding what was at issue) and the topics (exploring alternative arguments and subject matters). Yet John Hagaman argued that the pro-gymnasmata, taken as a whole, was a general heuristic (a structured yet flexible system) that engaged students in viewing their subjects from multiple perspectives, progressing from concrete to abstract tasks in various rhetorical situations (“Modern Use”). Frank D’Angelo also claimed that this pedagogy introduced writers to a genuine rhetorical understanding of invention, providing a bridge to real world practices (Composition 1). This teaching curriculum remained strong through the Renaissance.

Medieval Period

During the long medieval period, the encyclopedic treatises discussed in Part I occasionally mentioned pedagogy. Boethius referred to rhetoric as a faculty (“An Overview” 70) and Isidore of Seville mentioned the importance of natural ability, training, practice, and studied eloquence in preparing a rhetor (81): “Nature furnishes the bent; training, the knowledge; and practice, the skill” (81). Richard McKeon made an interesting distinction between two medieval tendencies: 1) the tendency to “intellectualize the art and change its orientation to subject matter and its peculiarities into problems of inquiry and understanding” and 2) the tendency to emphasize the orator, “morals and eloquence, concerning the relation of art and wisdom, and concerning the definition of rhetoric as a virtue or an art or a discipline” (“Rhetoric in the Middle Ages” 189). These differences bear some resemblance to the contrasts made between art and knack today (Young, “Arts”).
Inventional Pedagogy from the Renaissance through the Nineteenth Century

After a brief resurgence of classical invention in the Renaissance as discussed in Part I, a major trend in these periods was the gradual elimination of the art of invention from rhetorical education.

Renaissance

In the Renaissance, rhetorical pedagogy split into two directions: one continued the Aristotelian view of art and its importance for education; the other banished invention from rhetoric altogether. Thomas Wilson’s *Art of Rhetoric* extended the classical tradition of combining art or knowledge, wit and aptness (talent), practice, and the use of models in the education of a rhetor. Having written the first complete rhetorical treatise in English, Wilson obviously foregrounded art or *techne*. Russell Wagner commented that Wilson considered an art to be principles derived from effective speakers in real situations, a programmatic, dynamic body of principles. Sister Miriam Joseph in *Rhetoric in Shakespeare’s Time* explained that the “Elizabethean literary critics and poets, not less than the rhetoricians and logicians, insisted on the importance of precepts and theory in the creation of literature” (5). She pointed out that “a lack of art was regarded as intolerable by Thomas Nashe who said, “Nothing is more odious to the Auditor then the artlesse tongue of a tedious dolt” (6). She went on to say that a “thorough training in the arts of language was the fundamental aim of the grammar schools of Tudor England” (8). Richard Rainholde in his rhetorical treatise also commented that “art supplements and perfects the gifts of nature“ (6). Don Abbott contended that the major process for composing themes in the Grammar school was to gather material for imitation. Ray Nadeau translated the work of Thomas Farnaby, who discussed the role of practice in Renaissance education, saying: “The first requisites of Nature and the details of the Art have been explained. There remains the aids of Practice, without which the other two attributes rush hither and yon and are helpless” (“A Renaissance” 172).

In contrast, Peter Ramus, after transferring the art of invention to logic, developed a “method” for teaching all subjects, a multipurpose pedagogy entailing an invariant movement from the general to the specific followed by the use of definition and then by divisions and
examples. Albert Duhamel called this method formulaic and argued that it confused the arts of teaching and performing (“The Logic”). Fr. Walter Ong said that Ramus emphasized the analysis of models in order to find something to say (Rhetoric, Romance). In Ramus, Method and the Decay of Dialogue, he commented: “Ramus persists here in regarding the order of teaching, and through this, all intellectual order, as reducible by rough analogy to some simple spatial arrangement or rearrangement of intellectual atoms” (247). This method, devoid of any notion of art or natural ability or invention, had widespread influence.

Mary Astell advocated imitation as the primary means of learning to speak and write well (Donawerth, Rhetorical Theory 101). She also claimed that

As nature teaches us logic, so does it instruct us in rhetoric much better than rules of art, which, if they are good ones are nothing else but those judicious observations which men of sense have drawn from nature, and which all who reflect on the operations of their own minds will find themselves. The common precepts of rhetoric may teach us how to reduce the ingenious ways of speaking to a certain rule, but they do not teach us how to invent them; this is nature’s best work and she does it best. (Astell 102)

Anticipating faculty psychology, she wrote that the great secret of writing is a just proportion so that the reader’s “understanding is enlightened, his affections subdued, and his will duly regulated” (Astell 104).

Eighteenth Century

In the eighteenth century, Hugh Blair foregrounded natural ability in the development of eloquence. “Whether nature or art contribute most to form the orator is a trifling inquiry. In all attainments whatever, nature must be the prime agent” (129). For such development he credited five means of improvement: personal character and disposition, a fund of knowledge, the habit of application and industry, attention to the best models, and frequent exercise in composing. “He recommended a strong, lively, and warm imagination; quick sensibility of heart, joined with solid judgment, good sense, and presence of mind; all improved
by great and long attention to style and composition” (128). Vincent Bevilacqua explained that Blair’s philosophical assumptions were that rhetoric originates in various natural senses and powers of the mind and the improvement of rhetoric entails improvement in the mind (Philosophical Assumptions”).

George Campbell in Philosophy of Rhetoric spoke of rhetoric as an art that was first developed by the methodization of the natural persuasive abilities of people, then the perfection of the rules of art, and finally the move to general principles. As the art matured, so did the invention aspect of rhetoric. Campbell paradoxically described a pedagogy that entailed common sense as validated by intuition, scientific inquiry, and moral reasoning based on experience, analogy, testimony, and calculations of chance. This empirical turn also affected American rhetorical education. Michael Halloran pointed out that in the eighteenth century in American colleges “topical invention and deductive argument were de-emphasized, under the influence of the new empirical philosophy” (“From Rhetoric to Composition” 155).

Nineteenth-Century Britain

In nineteenth-century Britain, Richard Whately in Elements of Rhetoric returned to what he called the Aristotelian rules drawn from the invariable practice of all (289). He commented that practitioners in his day hid their art (286). Responding to arguments against art, he qualified his view, saying that art could not equalize men of different abilities and that a system should not be judged according to learners (287). He remarked that the general view of his day was that a natural gift and practice, not art, were involved in the development of a writer (287). But he countered by calling rhetoric “the Art of Composition”—such ‘rules as every good Composition must conform to’ whether the author of it had them in his mind or not” (289). He went on to say, however, that the rules should be constructed on broad philosophical principles. He also commended practice, the use of real occasions and interesting subjects. He advised students to fashion exercises out of their current experiences as opposed to earlier uses of Latin epigrams, recommending that they outline before composing and outline the compositions of others. Whately’s Elements was widely used as a writing textbook in American colleges in the middle decades of the nineteenth century. James Berlin argued that Whately contributed to current-traditional rhetoric by substituting an invention of management for the invention
of classical rhetoric (“Richard Whately” 14). Thus, Whately valued art but a very different one from classical rhetoric.

*Nineteenth-Century United States*

In the United States, John Genung in an influential textbook, *Practical Elements of Rhetoric*, developed his own version of invention, defining it as finding material by thought and observation, testing that material, and ordering it. He deemed finding material the least invaded by rules and dependent on the peculiar direction of the writer’s mind (217-19). He spoke of the inventive attitude that entailed grasping connections between ideas and seeing their power over others. He also asserted that the mark of the inventive mind was an aptitude to discern literary capacities in a subject and a native endowment of imagination to choose effective facts and group them in interesting combinations (221). He also differentiated between originative invention, reproductive invention, and methodizing invention (223-24). Genung’s inventional strategies were designed to work within the modes of discourse: description, narrative, exposition, and argumentation. Berlin in *Writing Instruction in Nineteenth-Century American Colleges* argued that textbooks in the nineteenth century presented invention as a managerial process that placed discovery outside the purview of the composing process. Invention was devoted to ways to impact the audience and the faculty being addressed, giving way to an emphasis on genre, form, and arrangement.

In 1888, Sara Lockwood in *Lessons in English* taught invention based on Pestalozzi’s work on the importance of children learning from direct observation of objects and personal experience and identified writing topics that came from these “collections of information” (Donawerth, *Rhetorical Theory* 223). Lockwood also maintained that for students between ages fourteen and sixteen composition should be limited to the reproduction of thought and should concentrate on practice, observation, and the paraphrasing of models (Larson 231-32). Older students could begin to invent thought for themselves by exercising the imagination, collecting material, jotting down notes about their thoughts, and consulting authorities without copying their words (Lockwood 236). In 1904, Mary Augusta Jordan published *Correct Speaking and Writing*, arguing that writing correctly (including all aspects of writing) depends on personal and social virtues. She maintained that to write correctly students must think, feel, and act
correctly (312). She also advocated literary models for letter writing (315).

Women’s Rhetorical Education

In “Women’s Reclamation of Rhetoric in Nineteenth-Century America,” Robert Connors recounted that with the introduction of women to colleges the male “agonistic rhetorical culture was swept away, and rhetoric itself was changed forever” (74). One result of this change was that oral rhetoric declined and writing ascended, with the women at first only being taught analytic rhetoric. He explained that argument courses slowly gave way to “multimodal” courses that included different types of discourse and that topics changed from abstract to concrete and to personal writing, which had been associated with women. Suzanne Bordelon, writing about Gertrude Buck’s rhetoric courses, described how Buck’s course in argumentative writing drew on her social Christianity, functional psychology, and progressive realism. It rejected faculty psychology and emphasized the dialectic process, inductive learning from experience and practice, and student interests. Rebecca Burke wrote that one of the three essentials in Gertrude Buck’s writing texts was the necessity of a real motive for writing, a desire to communicate. In Buck’s teaching of narration, according to Burke, she emphasized finding suitable matter and fixing a point of view by using exercises before the actual writing act. In teaching argumentation, she engaged students in finding “the reasoning in their own and others’ thoughts” (16), using exercises to help them analyze arguments.

Vicki Ricks described the writing program at Vassar which encouraged women to develop reflective, creative, and critical thinking. She also described Radcliffe’s program, which required women to write their “daily themes.” Sue Carter Simmons also explained that at Radcliffe during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, women were required to take a first-year writing course, to write several long papers, and to listen to lectures on style. They could also take an advanced writing course with its daily themes. Sandra Harmon described the curriculum at Illinois Normal College as requiring two final writing projects: a paper discussing the Geology, Botany or Natural History of the region in which the student lived and a paper as a graduation theme. None of these commentators referred to teaching or learning an art of invention.
**Current-Traditional Pedagogy**

The above pedagogies hardened into what Daniel Fogarty called the “current-traditional paradigm” that governed composition instruction in the first half of the twentieth century and still is prevalent today. Several composition theorists in the 1960s described this paradigm. Richard Young identified its overt features as an “emphasis on the composed product rather than the composing process; the analysis of discourse into words, sentences, and paragraphs; the classification of discourse into description, narration, exposition, and argument; the strong concern with usage (syntax, spelling, punctuation) and with style (economy, clarity, emphasis); the preoccupation with the informal essay and the research paper and so on” (“Paradigms” 31). Young claimed that vitalism, with its stress on the natural powers of the mind and the uniqueness of the creative act, led to a repudiation of the possibility of teaching the composing process, hence the tendency of current-traditional rhetoric to become a critical study of the products of composing and an art of editing. He maintained that vitalist assumptions become the most apparent when one considers what was excluded from the present discipline that had earlier been included, the most obvious and significant being the art of invention (“Paradigms” 31). Albert Kitzhaber noted that at this time studying literature was considered the best way to improve writing ability and that teachers considered the principles of rhetoric to be barren formulas. He also pointed out that in the early to mid-twentieth century the large numbers of students who were enrolled in college necessitated simple dogmatic texts, in which invention was often displaced by lists of topics (subject matters) or titles for papers.

Sharon Crowley referred to the current-traditional paradigm as “full frontal teaching; students don’t perform; teachers do” (*Methodical Memory* 147). She described the pedagogy in these terms:

> In the current traditional classroom, teachers required students to read the textbooks they assigned; they lectured about the prescriptions given in the textbooks; they analyzed finished essays to show how their authors had adhered to textbook prescriptions; and they asked students to complete textbook exercises about grammar, diction, and style. Almost never did they
model the writing process for students; almost never did students actually write in class. (147)

The model collapsed the composing process into a neat linear progression of select, narrow, and amplify. Crowley pointed out that the most common assignment was to choose a topic (a subject to write on) from a list, construct a thesis, develop support, organize your ideas, and draft the essay. This pedagogy, she contended, “substitutes discussion of current-traditional arcana for the writing process” (148). Berlin and Robert Inkster analyzed the epistemology of this paradigm, focusing on the ways it constrained the writer and ignored audience. They explained that it foreclosed heuristic processes by failing to discriminate among heuristic, algorithmic and aleatory processes (3). They pointed out that the paradigm was dominated by two polar positions about what should and could be taught in the composition course: those who would teach composition as stylistic correctness or facility and those who would teach composing as an act of genius (13). They went on to say that “Both ignore the problematic character of knowledge and meaning, and hence, of discourse. To view composition as a complex heuristic procedure is to acknowledge—even to embrace—the assumption that knowledge and meaning are tentative, problematic, elusive, and partial” (13).

Review: Pedagogy from the Renaissance through the Nineteenth Century

During these periods, aside from the resurgence and adaptation of classical invention in vernacular Renaissance rhetorics, many treatises gave only lip service to the art of rhetorical invention, placing the onus of creation and discovery on processes outside of rhetoric: intuition, imagination, logic, and scientific inquiry. Genung’s textbook did outline modal inventional questions for description, narration, argument, and exposition while Gertrude Buck applied psychology to the study of invention. After the Renaissance, authors placed natural gifts, imitation, practice and art in descending order of importance for teaching students to write.