

## 5 Glossary of Terms

Here in the glossary, we have tried to be as concise as possible in defining and describing terms. Our glossary of the terms is specific to our treatment of the teaching of argument in this text. This means that some terms specific to Kenneth Burke's *terministic screen* appear among traditional argument terms. By no means is this a definitive or exhaustive list, as most rhetorical terms are applicable to teaching argument. For more complete historical and theoretical definitions of key rhetorical terms, interested readers might consult one of the more comprehensive reference works, such as the *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric*, edited by Thomas Sloane, the *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric and Composition*, edited by Theresa Enos, or the *Sourcebook on Rhetoric* by James Jasinski.

**Action vs. Motion**—In *A Grammar of Motives*, Burke defines action as the “human body in conscious or purposive motion” (14). Action is something only human beings are capable of. A capacity to act, meanwhile, is a prerequisite for moral choices. A baseball, thus, is capable of motion but not action, as it “is neither moral nor immoral, it cannot act, it can only move, or be moved” (136). For Burke, action involves moving toward an ideal, creating novelty along the way. The transformations effected by action are all necessarily partial, by necessity, due to the paradox of substance. See also: **Magic**, the **Paradox of Substance**.

**Agonistic/Eristical Argument**—From the Greek *agon*, meaning contest or conflict, and *eris*, meaning strife; agonistic or eristical argument represents a model of argument stressing conflict and dispute, advancing one person's perspective at the expense of others. Agonistic/eristical argument has been challenged by feminist scholars, among others, as an adversarial, patriarchal model that promotes dissensus rather than consensus. Moreover, eristical argument has also been criticized for being unrealistic. Most contemporary models of argument are many-

sided and reject the goal of defeating one's adversaries in favor of a more realistic goal such as increasing or decreasing participants' adherence to or identification with the arguer's position and/or loosening adherence or identification with alternative positions.

**Analogy**—See **Invention**.

**Attitude**—Burke used five terms to explain human motives: act, agent, agency, scene and purpose. Later on, he added attitude, a term describing the manner in which the act is carried out. It is a precursor to the act, what he calls an “incipient act.” Rhetoric moves people to act or bends their attitude so as to incline them to act. It does not force people to act, it convinces them. Acts then become the representations of our attitudes.

**Burkeian Pentad**—Kenneth Burke believed that social communication was best analyzed and understood as drama, leading him to privilege a pentad of terms for rhetorical study: *act*, *scene*, *agent*, *agency*, and *purpose*. Outcomes for rhetorical actions are determined by the *ratios* (relationships) between these five elements. See also: **Rhetorical Situation**.

**Casuistry**— “The general and the particular directions of rhetoric overlap insofar as all unique cases will necessarily involve the application of the universal topics to the particular matter at hand, and insofar as even situations considered very broadly may possess uniqueness” (Burke, *Rhetoric* 72-73). For Burke, casuistries are philosophies, general principles extended to specific situations. While casuistry has negative connotations for many contemporary analysts, Burke sees it as unavoidable. However, “casuistic stretching” is often needed to persuade people that an original frame (like the United States Constitution, for example) is still viable, despite new variables in time and space. See also: **Identification**, the **Paradox of substance**.

**Consubstantiality**—See **Identification**.

**Courtship**—For Kenneth Burke, courtship is a form of persuasion that operates through identification in which one “entity” persuades the other. For courtship to exist, each entity must belong to a sepa-

rate class, which leads to what Burke refers to as “estrangement.” For individuals, this estrangement lies in the difference between sexes; in the social realm, the difference between the sexes finds its equivalent within the differences between social classes. Burke refers to communication between classes as “abstract” courtship. Within the realm of abstract courtship, members of higher social classes attempt to control less privileged classes through “doctrine” and “education.” Thus, “[b]y the ‘principle of courtship’ in rhetoric we mean the use of suasive devices for the transcending of social estrangement” (Rhetoric 208).

Within this relationship of social estrangement, parties are “mysterious” to one another and that mystery can be converted to power. A teacher, for example, might remain largely silent so as to add gravity to questions that s/he raises, thus appearing to “probe into the depths of things” in the eyes of the student (210).

Burke’s courtship differs from Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca’s notion of *adherence* in that it does not seek explicitly to use persuasion to increase the degree of agreement with the rhetor. An audience’s degree of adherence to the rhetor’s argument can vary greatly. By contrast, courtship focuses primarily on the unequal relationship between the persuader and those being persuaded, rather than employ means generally considered “persuasive.” Through courtship, the “courtier” already commands a certain “captivation” of the audience. This “courted” audience thus yearns to transcend the gap of social estrangement to unite with the persuader, while the persuader “coyly” maintains that distance and thus captivation and power.

**Deliberative Rhetoric**—See **Species of Rhetoric**.

**Dialectic**—With his opening sentence in the Rhetoric, Aristotle defines Rhetoric as the counterpart to Dialectic. Both rhetoric and dialectic are faculties of furnishing arguments. Historically, dialectic is sometimes seen as rhetoric’s counterpart; at times it has competed with rhetoric. Aristotle distinguishes demonstrative reasoning (causal) from dialectical reasoning (non-causal or contingent), defining the latter as “reasoning from opinions” that are generally accepted as probable truths. Dialectic reasoning can occur between interlocutors, or it can be an internal inquiry. The Socratic Method is the best known example of dialectic reasoning whereby one begins with a proposition then pushes it to its conclusion by questions and answers and by ap-

plying the law of contradiction. Dialectic reasoning is a test for truth, a meaning-making process. Propositions must be secured prior to argument; a proposition is dialectically secured when it passes the law of contradiction. The Hegelian model of dialectic involves thesis (a proposition), antithesis (the contradiction of the proposition), and synthesis (an incorporation of the first two elements).

**Doxa**—The Greek word for common or popular opinions, which is the root of English words like “orthodoxy” (straight opinion) and “paradox” (opinions alongside one another). Doxa are the opinions sometimes codified, that are generally accepted within a community. The notion of doxa places the locus of authority outside of the individual and in the community. The opinions of individual people are not solely theirs, but also that of many others, thus giving those opinions more importance. Placing opinions outside of the individual also opens the door for persuasion to take place.

**Enthymeme**—Sometimes called a “truncated syllogism,” the enthymeme leaves out a premise, and then hopes its audience will tacitly supply it. The enthymeme, thus, is not to be judged by the conventions of formal validity, but rather by the laws of probability. The more widely accepted the premise, the more likely it is that an audience will grant assent to the enthymeme’s argument. Aristotle labeled the enthymeme the “substance of rhetorical persuasion” (I.1). Since there is very little that can be known for certain, rhetors must rely on beliefs and assumptions of their audience.

**Ethos**—See **Pisteis**.

**Example, Illustration, Model**—Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca analyze how rhetors seek to establish a commonality with their audience through a resort to the particular, in the form of *example*, which makes generalization possible; *illustration*, which provides support for an established generalization; and *model*, which encourages imitation. These can be further defined as follows:

*Example*: A particular instance which provides a foundation for a rule and acts as the starting point of a generalization. An example must be, at least provisionally, a fact. Examples serve both to illustrate a gener-

alization and to establish the truth of the generalization. According to Perelman, much of argument is designed to get audiences to recognize invalidating facts (i.e., those examples which contradict the generalizations or rules they also admit). For Aristotle, proofs come in the form of either enthymeme or example. An example is neither the relation of “part to whole, nor whole to part, nor one whole to another whole; instead, example is the relation of part to part, and of like to like.” Examples might be historical (referencing past events) or invented (Aristotle identified the fable as one type of effective invented example).

*Illustration:* Illustration seeks to make an abstract rule or idea concrete through a particular case; it promotes understanding of the rule. Whereas examples must be beyond question, illustrations need not be. Illustrations can be detailed, but examples should be pruned to avoid distraction.

*Model:* Models are idealized illustrations of a general rule. Models are not simply to be understood; they are to be imitated.

**Epideictic Rhetoric**—See **Species of Rhetoric**.

**Fallacies, Informal**—Fallacies, in the most general sense, are defective arguments (Sloane prefers “deficient moves in argumentative discourse”). Arguments may be fallacious due to flaws in their structure and form. These are formal fallacies. Arguments that are invalid for any other reason besides the form of the argument are informal fallacies. Informal fallacies come in many forms. One example of an informal fallacy is a “spurious relationship”: claiming two different groups that have no logical relationship are nevertheless connected. Wikipedia provides the following example: “an example of a spurious relationship can be illuminated examining a city’s ice cream sales. These sales are highest when the city’s rate of drownings is highest. To allege that ice cream sales cause drowning would be to imply a spurious relationship between the two. In reality, a heat wave may have caused both.” For a more complete treatment of informal fallacies in arguments, see Fulkerson’s *Teaching the Argument in Writing*.

**Forensic Rhetoric**—See **Species of Rhetoric**.

**Heuristics**—See **Invention**.

**Identification**—For Burke, the concept of identification is central to rhetoric and to argument. Burkean identification relies on the concepts of merger and division. Person A experiences merger if s/he has common interests with Person B or if s/he is persuaded to believe that there are common interests: “in being identified with B, A is ‘substantially one’ with a person other than himself” (Rhetoric 21). In the process of acting together, individuals share common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, and attitudes. Burke’s term for this is consubstantiality, a way of “acting together.” To clarify, Burke speaks of consubstantiality in terms of parent/child relations. For example, a child is consubstantial with his/her parents in the sense that it is at once their offspring and an autonomous actor. Some modicum of separation (division) always exists, as each person is a “unique, individual locus of motives” (21). Through identification, rhetoric and argumentation are made possible as arguments use the principles of merger and division to bend attitudes and persuade. See also: **Paradox of Substance**.

**Illustration**—See **Example**.

**Impartiality**—The condition of being a member of a group that will be affected by the outcome of an argument without having one’s decisions influenced by that fact, as “an impartial judge,” whose rulings would apply to everyone, including the judge. Impartiality, therefore, involves balancing all points of view in an argument. This contrasts with *objectivity* as used by Perelman, where neutrality is maintained because the rhetor purports to be unaffected by the argument’s outcome.

**Inertia**—Perelman’s *The New Rhetoric* uses the term “inertia” to designate human resistance to change. Borrowing from physics, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca describe the idea that an audience’s attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors tend to stay on course through habit. Value is also placed on any attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors that conserve the status quo. Thus, inertia favors the norm; while it is not necessary to persuade toward that which is already accepted, any change will be questioned and will require justification—an audience’s natural inertia places the burden of proof on the party who wishes to promote change.

**Invention**—From the Latin *invenire*, “to find,” invention is the first of the five classical canons of rhetoric, followed by arrangement, style, memory, and delivery. Since Aristotle defines rhetoric as “the faculty of discovering the available means of persuasion,” much of his *Rhetoric* focuses on invention. Invention concerns finding something to say; consequently, invention relates to *logos*, (i.e., *what* the rhetor says rather than *how*). *Heuristics* (from the Greek *heuriskein*, meaning “to find out, to discover,”) are invention strategies by which the rhetor can investigate systematically, following a set of procedures. A rhetor might run through a series of questions or prompts as a means of exploring and investigating a problem or question. In the realm of argument, *stasis theory* functions primarily as a heuristic insofar as each type of claim raises different questions for those making and hearing the claim. In arguments, there are five main claim types: definition (is X a Y?), cause (does X cause Y?), evaluation (is X a good or bad Y?), proposal (should we do X?), and resemblance (is X like Y?). Resemblance arguments are the foremost contemporary versions of *analogies*, where the most general formulation is A is to B as C is to D. However, the formulation may have only three terms, as in B is to A as C is to B, or A is to B as A is to C. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca quote Aristotle’s analogy, “For as the eyes of bats are to the blaze of day, so is the reason in our soul to the things which are by nature most evident of all” to explain *theme* (reason in the soul, obviousness) and *phoros* (eyes of bats, blaze of day). In analogy, the theme and phoros must belong to different spheres; if they are in the same sphere, we have example or illustration. Analogy relies on transfers of value from phoros to theme and vice versa. Analogy is often viewed with distrust when used as a proof. Perelman views it as an unstable means of argument similar to informal fallacies. See also: **Stasis Theory**.

**Kairos**—Both *kairos* and *chronos*, roughly translated from the Greek, represent the concept of time. Aristotle used *kairos* in its classical sense as a critical moment in the unfolding of an argument when one has an opportunity to arouse one’s audience.

More recently *kairos* has also been translated as a sense of appropriateness and timeliness. James Kinneavy uses the term to refer to the “situational context.” In this second, fuller sense, *kairos* plays a role in the construction of the entire argument and every rhetorical choice.

**Logos**—See **Pisteis**.

**Mediation**—See **Negotiation**.

**Model**—See **Example**.

**Mystification**—A Burkeian term, mystification occurs when language is used to deceive rather than communicate between different classes. Mystification reduces the fertile potential of mystery by “bureaucratizing” hierarchy into a set scheme that privileges one group over another absolutely and by ginning up the mysterious differences between classes at the expense of their underlying identity. Such misdirected rhetoric is concerned primarily with coercion and control. Mystery and mystification are differentiated from *magic*. As a supernatural force, magic is based on a primitive conception of influence, but it has similarities to rhetoric in its persuasive ends. While magic mistakenly attempts to induce action in things (or to reduce human actors to objects to be moved), rhetoric (often through exhortatory speech) attempts to induce action in people. Burke notes that magic is also associated with novelty, in that it creates something out of nothing; every rhetorical act thus involves a hint of magic to the extent that it uses novelty in the inducement of action. See also: **Courtship**.

**Negotiation**—Negotiation is an agreement-oriented mode of reaching consensus through communicating, or “working out differences.” The concept of negotiation has been accepted by many feminist scholars as an alternative to the agonistic model of argument and as a model for classroom interaction. Others, including some feminists, criticize negotiation insofar as it avoids conflict in situations where conflict is called for. The idea of critical negotiation has been raised as well by scholars such as Thomas West, who connects the concept of negotiation with postcolonial theory, identity formation, and hybridization. Mediation is a particular type of negotiation. In mediation, a disinterested party helps guide the course of an argument, rather than becoming involved in it, or making a judgment for either participant. In mediation the mediator has no power over any participant in the argument, as opposed to arbitration, in which the third party has power to decide the outcome of an argument. Mediation is increasingly used in legal dispute resolution.

**Objectivity**—Objectivity is the condition of having no interest in and being unaffected by the outcome of an argument. Most contemporary theories of argument reject objectivity as a realistic or even desirable stance for a rhetor or audience. Perelman, for example, acknowledges that outside of science, controversies are settled among interested parties. The best one can hope for is not objectivity but impartiality whereby people act in the name of what's best for all rather than what is best for them or their allies.

**Offices (Teaching and Informing, Pleasing, Moving and Bending)**—These three rhetorical purposes originated in Cicero's ideas of the three offices of the orator. Each office is said to have an appropriate style. More specifically, the first office, (to teach, inform, instruct), is thought to be a plain style. The second office, (pleasing), called for a more tempered style. The moving and bending aspect of oratory, meanwhile, requires a more grandiloquent style that is stirring enough to persuade an audience to action.

**Paradox of Substance**—"Literally, a person's or a thing's substance would be something that stands beneath or supports the person or thing" (Burke, *Grammar* 22). Here, Burke traces the etymological roots of the word "substance" to help explain his concept of the paradox of substance, showing that the word itself implies the presence of externals. Burke's concept of substance contrasts markedly with Aristotle's. For Aristotle the substance of an entity would be entire unto itself. Burke inclines to Spinoza's view that no single entity could be understood as self identical but only by what it is not ("all determination is negation" [*Grammar* 25]). This concept is the heart of the Burkeian Paradox of Substance: in order to be able to understand what a given thing is, you must first place it "in terms of" something else. This is the fundamental logic underlying Burke's dramatism. For Burke, there is an "inevitable paradox of definition, an antinomy that must endow the concept of substance with unresolvable ambiguity" (*Grammar* 24): something's substance can only be known in terms of what it is substantially not. See also: **Identification** and the **Dialectic**.

**Pathos**—See **Pisteis**.

**Pisteis**—Aristotle identified two types of rhetorical proofs: (1) artistic (intrinsic) and (2) inartistic (extrinsic). Inartistic proofs come, not

from a rhetor's own efforts, but from preexisting data that the speaker must discover and use: confessions, written contracts, and so forth. Artistic proofs must be furnished by methods of rhetoric through the rhetor's own efforts. **Pisteis** (coming from the Greek word referring to the means of persuasion available in an argument) are the three types of artistic proofs available to the rhetor: logos, ethos, and pathos.

The *ethos* (Greek for "character") of the speaker refers to the rhetor's credibility. In Aristotle's time, trust was created from the speech itself rather than from the type of man speaking. More recently, however, ethos often as not derives more from office or position. For instance, we trust those who are experts in their fields more than those who are generalists. *Pathos* (Greek for "suffering" or "experience") refers to the emotions of the audience when they are brought into a state that is favorable to increasing adherence to the argument itself. The rhetor can appeal effectively to pathos by knowing the beliefs and values of the audience and employing various rhetorical strategies accordingly. *Logos* (Greek for "word") refers to the rationality of the argument proper. The argument itself should be consistent, coherent, rational, well grounded, and plausible in its logical appeal.

**Praxis**—Praxis is an alternative to the bifurcated theory/practice pair in which practice is subordinate to theory. Praxis exists as theorized, informed, and situated practice. In composition it is what separates classroom "lore" (criticized as unreflective and ad-hoc, as well as over-theorized abstraction) from reflective teaching that is grounded in critical, pedagogically situated ways of knowing and learning.

**Presence**—Presence refers to the elements of selection, arrangement and/or omission of facts, judgments, or lines of reasoning that act directly on our sensibility. Those elements of an argument endowed with presence allow an audience to perceive what otherwise would be merely conceived. Lending presence to one's argument through use of metaphors, vivid examples, striking graphics, etc. greatly increases audience identification with one's argument.

**Propaganda**—Propaganda is a type of rhetorical persuasion aimed at a mass rather than individual audience. It is explicit, and is produced by an institution or group (like a government). Propaganda is also distinguished by its self-serving nature: it makes no attempt to find

compromise between rhetor and audience. Relying heavily on the repetition of symbols and images in social media, propaganda often has negative connotations in Western society, as governments, organized religions, and corporate advertisers (among others) continue to produce propaganda at high levels. The arguments (often visual in nature) produced by propaganda provide vivid examples that foster productive discussion in argument classrooms.

**Ratio**—See **Burkeian Pentad**.

**Rhetoric of Bureaucracy**—Rhetoric of bureaucracy refers to a rhetoric of gesture, usually symbolic in nature. A modern US example of Rhetoric of bureaucracy is the toppling of the statue of Saddam Hussein after the invasion of US forces into Baghdad. This type of rhetorical gesture signified victory for the United States forces and the defeat of Iraq.

**Rhetorical Situation**—The rhetorical situation refers to the contextually situated call to persuade, whether it is oral or written. How best to determine how to persuasively impact a given target audience? What are the elements of a given rhetorical situation? There is no easy answer to this question, and scholars continue to offer competing theoretical and practical frameworks. One common framework used in writing instruction is the rhetorical triangle, with focuses on the interrelatedness of the message, the writer, and the audience. Other frameworks are even more specific, identifying five major components of the rhetorical situation: occasion, purpose, topic, audience, and writer. Kenneth Burke's Pentad also identified five essential elements: act, scene, agent, agency, and purpose. Notice that even as these different frameworks are comprised of different terminologies, the core elements are similar, providing variations on the rhetorical triangle. No matter which terminological framework is used, the key to understanding the rhetorical situation lies in recognizing the "ratio" of the terms: which elements are most important to the given situation

**Rogierian Argument**—This is a type of argument that attempts to explore and/or resolve issues by engaging in empathic listening. The fundamental principle is to regard communication from the standpoint of understanding another person. To participate in authentic

communication requires one to see the ideas and attitudes of the other person so profoundly that one can sense how it feels to be that person. The goal is to bring about a change in perspective or to modify the other person's conception of reality so that mutually advantageous cooperation is possible. There are three strategies: (1) reassure the person s/he is understood, (2) discover the validity of the person's position and (3) find areas of similarity. Some problems with Rogerian argument are its practice of identification at the start of argumentation when argumentation presupposes identification as a possible result. There is also potential for its manipulative use. Used as a technique, identification may not be sincerely felt, creating a false empathy with others.

**Rule of Justice**—This term is at the heart of Perelman's theories of argumentation. The key to this formal rule is in giving "identical treatment to beings or situations of the same kind" (*New* 218). Observing the rule of justice is necessary to the construction of arguments for justice. Through this rule, precedents also acquire greater importance: past cases can influence future cases (provided the categories are essentially the same).

**Sophistry**—In popular parlance, *sophistry* refers to any specious argument intended to trick rather than legitimately persuade a listener. The term dates from the fifth century B.C. and the Sophists, a loose collection of pre-Platonic philosophers and teachers employed as instructors of rhetoric. In general, Sophists taught from practical experience rather than theory, and stressed real-world persuasive skills rather than the quest for a particular form of truth. That is, their tactics taught one how to "argue to win" regardless of one's position.

In Plato's *Dialogues*, the Sophists are used as convenient debate fodder and straw men for Socrates's questioning, their use of rhetoric exposed as selfish and amoral (see Plato's *Gorgias*). Against Plato's condemnation of rhetoric, the Sophists emerge as artful tricksters, using language to deceive rather than to find truth. Contemporary perspectives on rhetoric have rehabilitated many Sophistic concepts, including attention to the ambiguity of language and the contextual nature of truth and knowledge. Susan Jarratt's "rhetorical feminism," for example, links the political focus of contemporary feminism with Sophistic approaches to the real-world power of language use.

**Species of Rhetoric**—For Aristotle, there are three kinds of discourse, each with its own temporal emphasis. Firstly, *epideictic* (ceremonial) discourse has to do with praise or blame. An example of this type of discourse is eulogy. The speaker uses ceremonial speech to bolster important attitudes and beliefs in the present. Secondly, *deliberative* discourse is a call for some sort of action, typically legislative, that either exhorts to or dissuades from a particular course of action. Thirdly, *forensic* (judicial) discourse determines guilt, innocence, or causation based on an examination of past events.

**Stasis Theory**—From the Greek word *staseis* which means “to take a stand.” In rhetorical theory, stasis theory can be used to find common ground on an issue or as an invention strategy that provides the rhetor with a series of questions that serve to discover the point of disagreement between two disputants. Since the 2nd C. CE, there has traditionally been a hierarchical order of the stasis questions; however, recently scholars have argued that the questions do not necessarily have to be asked in a specific order; depending on the rhetorical situation, some of the questions may not be applicable. The significance of finding the point of origin of a disagreement is invaluable if the goal of argument is to reach a resolution or at least a clearer understanding of the issue, as opposed to bickering, which is often the result of an argument where stasis has not been reached prior to engagement. The stases are divided into four questions:

1. Conjecture—is there an act to be considered?
2. Definition—how can the act be defined?
3. Quality—how serious is the act? What are the extenuating circumstances?
4. Procedure—what should we do? Is there anything about the act that calls for a non-standard ruling or lessened punishment?

**Topoi (Topics)**—Originally delineated by Aristotle, the *topics* are the available means of persuasion and are used during the invention phase of argumentation. Aristotle classified the topics under two headings: (1) those common to all subjects (commonplaces) and usable in all circumstances and (2) those from specialized fields, such as physics or politics. Perelman takes a different approach to topics. He applies his term *loci* only to premises of a general nature that can serve as the

bases for values and hierarchies and that relate to choices we make. He classifies *loci* into: (1) loci of quantity (e.g., a greater number of goods is more desirable than a lesser number of goods), (2) quality (e.g., one truth is to be desired above one hundred errors or the unique is valued above the usual, the ordinary, or the vulgar), (3) order (e.g., that which is earlier is superior to that which is later, for instance the original is superior to copy), (4) the existing (e.g., that which is actual or real is superior to the possible, the contingent, or the impossible), (5) essence (e.g., the superiority of the value of individuals as embodying the essence, for instance a best of breed would exhibit the qualities of that breed better than its competitors), and (6) the person (e.g., the value of dignity, worth, or autonomy of the person).

**Toulmin's Schema for Argumentation**—Toulmin's schema and terminology for analyzing and creating arguments are often used in the teaching of argument. Central to Toulmin's model of the structure of arguments are several key terms. All arguments make a *claim* based on *data*. A *warrant* is a general proposition that establishes a connection between the claim and the data. Warrants often need *backing* (evidence helping prove the warrant). The claim may also need a *qualifier* (to prevent absolutist language) and conditions for *rebuttal* (exceptions to the rule formed by the claim) to maximize its persuasive potential. Toulmin's schema has proven to be applicable across academic disciplines and to popular arguments as well.